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lovers 
say it to each other wordlessly 
with a gesture 
Dearest, your coat, don’t forget your gloves 
stepping aside to let her pass 
she smiling, eyelids lowered then raised 
 
proclaim it to the onlookers  
and those who do not look 
with the self-confidence you have  
when someone is waiting for you 
at a café 
a public garden 
the self-confidence you have  
when someone is waiting for you in this life 
 
say it to the animals in the zoo 
together  
this one is so ugly that one is so beautiful 
sincerely agreeing 
or not 
no matter 
Charlotte Delbo, Auschwitz and After 
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Introduction 
Aim and structure  
I do not at all think that a question – or, at least, the original question – is only a 
deficiency of answers. Functional and scientific questions – and many philosophical 
ones – await only answers. Questioning qua original attitude is a “relation” to that 
which no response can contain, to the “uncontainable”; it becomes responsibility. 
(GCM, 86) 
This is a work about trust and its counterpart, distrust. The overall thesis is 
that trust and distrust are part of how we orient ourselves morally in the 
world because they express a way of understanding and responding to 
others and to a social situation in an irreducibly ethical register. I will term 
this responsiveness to the moral quality of a situation in which trust and 
distrust are based basic reflectivity.
1
 The analysis takes place within a 
phenomenological-existential framework, and its guiding question is about 
what kind of experience trust and distrust constitute, or, in other words, in 
what way they can be said to express an understanding of the other. 
Answering this question requires an analysis of the conditions for those 
experiences, i.e. the nature of the self and, in particular, the role of 
intersubjectivity, and I will argue that the intersubjective relationship that 
we have in trusting and distrusting demonstrates the indispensable other-
relatedness of selfhood, wherefore an analysis of basic reflectivity’s 
dependence on this other-relatedness will tell us much about what it means 
to be a (trusting or distrusting) self. Against this backdrop I will attempt to 
explain what it means to be a morally oriented self or, more specifically, 
 
                                           
1
 Two comments on terminology are called for:  
(I) Trust and distrust. As will become clear, trust and distrust, although not entirely 
symmetrical, are always potentially manifest under the same circumstances: if one is 
possible, so is the other. That they do not seem to reside in the same breast at the same 
time towards the same person is another matter. Therefore, in my analyses, one term 
implies the other. What I have to say about the trusting relationship is – unless 
otherwise specified – applicable to the distrusting relationship and vice versa. My use of 
only one term in many sentences - usually trust – is for reasons of simplicity and clarity. 
An exception is when I discuss other philosophical views where it is often the case that 
only trust is treated and distrust is seen as something entirely different, and there it 
should be apparent.  
(II) Morality and ethics: I do not distinguish between what is moral and what is ethical 
but use the terms interchangeably. A Lévinasian perspective dominates the pages to 
come, and it is from there that the meaning of the terms will come. Lévinas himself 
does not distinguish morality from ethics.  
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that selfhood is essentially a work of moral orientation. The twofold focus 
is, as reflected in the title, to investigate the intersubjective relationship of 
trust, including its intrinsic pleasure and vulnerability, and thereby to 
contribute to the understanding of what it means to be a self ethically 
related to a world shared with others. We may say that the analysis of trust 
serves as a method for investigating the ethical nature of selfhood while the 
investigation of selfhood similarly provides a framework for the discussion 
of the phenomenon of trust.  
The thesis is divided into four chapters and a conclusion. In chapter one I 
present an overview of the current philosophical discussion of trust in order 
to demonstrate that although it is certainly strong and vibrant, there are 
aspects of the trusting relationship that remain insufficiently understood. I 
shall in particular argue that the discriminatory element of trusting and 
distrusting is either dismissed or, if it is admitted, is delegated to the realm 
of conceptual deliberation; and that its nature as a mode of understanding 
that is not primarily about forming beliefs is thereby overlooked. Two 
overall camps or approaches can be identified in the existing literature, here 
labelled pre-reflective and strategic trust. Both sides have valuable insights 
into what it is that we do when we trust and distrust, but it is my claim that 
neither ultimately explains the trusting and distrusting relationships in a 
phenomenologically satisfying manner owing to, I argue, a flawed 
conceptualization of selfhood which misunderstands or overlooks its basic 
world-relatedness. Very schematically it can be said that they each 
overemphasize one side of human nature, namely either the passivity of 
affection or the spontaneous autonomy of cognition. Chapter one explains 
why we must analyse trust and distrust as expressions of an essentially 
ethical mode of understanding that is irreducible to epistemic cognition. 
This mode of understanding is what I call basic reflectivity.  
The second chapter is an excursion from, and yet in a way the foundation 
for, the philosophical analysis of trust and distrust. Based in an analysis of 
autobiographical accounts of torture survivors, the chapter contains a 
detailed discussion of the significance of trust and distrust for survivors of 
torture, which plays a crucial role for the research presented in this thesis. It 
is my claim that an ethical mode of understanding (i.e. basic reflectivity) 
underlies trust and distrust, and that the intersubjectively dependent basic 
reflectivity is central to a sense of self, and the need to understand trust and 
distrust as part of an orientational capacity becomes evident when 
examining how torture survivors use these terms. With the particular 
insistence that comes from lived experience, the autobiographical stories 
illustrate both the intimate relationship between trust and selfhood and that 
fact that trust and distrust are not somehow external to experience, but 
rather condition it in certain important ways. That one’s ability to trust is 
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profoundly affected by the experience of being subjected to destructive 
violence at the hands of another human being is readily understood. As we 
shall see, among the severe consequences of the loss of trust is that the 
relation with the world, with others, and with oneself is fundamentally 
altered to the extent that it becomes difficult to assign meaning to even the 
most ordinary situations. Chapter two culminates in the suggestion that 
trust and distrust are manifestations of a capacity which we need in order to 
orient ourselves, to assign meaning, and to attain a sense of reality for 
ourselves and the world, that is, to experience it with meaning and 
coherency. It must be borne in mind that this loss is brought about in what 
is essentially an intersubjective situation, namely the incomprehensibly 
cruel and perverted intimacy of torture.  
Chapters one and two provide a specific focus for the subsequent analysis 
of the (trusting and distrusting) self, namely the capacity for discernment 
that is expressed in trust and distrust. It is significant that this discerning 
capacity (i.e. basic reflectivity) is damaged by a disturbance of 
intersubjectivity, and in the third chapter I explore the role of the other as 
regards the self’s basic reflectivity, in which trust and distrust are rooted. 
Turning to the thinking of Emmanuel Lévinas, the aim is to present an 
account of the self that is structured by an ethically imbued 
intersubjectively dependent basic reflectivity. As I will try to show, a 
Lévinasian perspective is particularly helpful for addressing those aspects 
of trust which in chapter one were identified as being in need of 
philosophical attention.  
Chapter four examines in more detail the precise nature of basic 
reflectivity. I argue that since trust and distrust are about something, 
namely about the other’s trustworthiness, they convey morally significant 
insights to the self. For that reason they should be understood as 
expressions of a form of judgment. Bearing in mind the need to provide an 
account that integrates the insights of the existing philosophical positions 
on trust while avoiding the pitfalls of an either overly cognitive or purely 
affective position, I suggest that when we trust and distrust, we are 
engaging with the world in a critically reflective manner which is set apart 
from pure affectivity, but which is also not primarily or essentially of a 
cognitive nature. Through basic reflectivity, which is a mode of experience, 
the morally responsible self exhibits a critical capacity for judging moral 
matters in a way fundamentally different from how we judge objective 
matters. This chapter contains an account of such a capacity that is rooted 
in the thought of Lévinas but which also draws on Immanuel Kant and 
Hannah Arendt. Starting from a phenomenological-existential account of 
selfhood, I make a case for using Kant’s faculty of aesthetic judgment (read 
through a Lévinasian lens) as a model for the way the self relates to the 
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world through trusting and distrusting. It is the aim to explore to what 
extent this model can accommodate, philosophically, the experience of 
trusting and distrusting. 
In chapter five I present the conclusions and point to some implications for 
further research. The conclusion, and the argument that supports it, is 
structured by the six theses that are presented below.  
Six theses 
(I) Trust and distrust are inherently personal. They describe a relation 
where one person trust or distrust another, which means that they are 
derived from the irreducible singularity of the concrete situation and the 
persons who comprise it.  
(II) Trust and distrust are intrinsically ethical. The unconditional ethicality 
of trust does not, however, entail that it is always better to trust than to 
distrust from an ethical perspective. Trust and distrust alike express the 
fundamentally ethical nature of intersubjectivity, because they are part of 
how we come to understand and respond to a social situation in an ethically 
appropriate way.  
(III) Trust and distrust express a reflectivity that is basic to selfhood. 
Selfhood is constituted as responsivity towards others and is therefore 
always already reflectively related to the other and to a shared world. Trust 
and distrust express a mode of understanding that retains the trace of is 
origin in the ethical encounter. 
(IV) Trust and distrust are inherently reflective and express a judgment 
because they signal that we have come to hold a certain view with regard to 
the other’s trustworthiness.  
(V) Trust and distrust are subjectively valid feelings that impart non-
objective and universal insights into the other’s character and point to the 
presumed shareability of the world. The phenomenology of trust reveals 
that the judgment of trustworthiness is grounded in the ethical response to 
exteriority and yields an understanding of what is essentially indeterminate, 
non-conceptual, and inaccessible to thought. In doing so, it reveals to us 
something about the way the mind works when confronted with what 
exceeds it.  
(VI) Lack of trust signifies a disturbed intersubjective relatedness. Torture 
is essentially a violation of the fundamental responsivity of the victim, 
wherefore it severely impairs the possibility of believing in a shared 
meaningful world. This is felt as a lack of trust in the world and as 
disorientation, alienation, and self-estrangement.  
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Basic reflectivity 
Basic reflectivity is the term that I will use to designate a way of being 
related to the other which underlies my trust or distrust. In that sense, basic 
reflectivity is the answer to the question of where the discriminatory 
element of trust comes from, because it is as expressions of this 
fundamentally ethical way of understanding or judging about the other that 
trust and distrust come to signify a moral evaluation. When I call basic 
reflectivity a form of understanding or judging it is not my intent to define 
our ethical relatedness to the other in epistemic terms or as primarily an 
exercise in cognitive deliberation. On the contrary, I hope to show that the 
form of understanding that gives rise to trust and distrust operates on 
different principles from those underlying objective judgments, and that 
this is our primary form of engagement with others. In other words, I try to 
demonstrate that the intersubjective relationship’s unfolding in trust or 
distrust has a discriminatory aspect that grows out of responsibility and 
obligation and is as such inherently ethical. When I trust or distrust 
someone, that feeling represents an evaluation of the other’s character and 
it is in this sense that I call it an orientational feeling: it is a way of 
understanding the ethical import of something. Coming to an understanding 
of the other’s trustworthiness differs from coming to hold a belief about for 
instance the other’s nationality; whereas the latter requires concepts whose 
accuracy one can determine with some certainty, the first does not rely on a 
preconceived concept of what (the other’s) trustworthiness is like. My 
relationship to an other is an experience of infinite alterity which exceeds 
the experience itself and remains, even in our relatedness, absolutely 
separate from me:  
The relation with infinity will have to be stated in terms other than those of objective 
experience; but if experience precisely means a relation with the absolutely other, 
that is, with what always overflows thought, the relation with infinity accomplishes 
experience in the fullest sense of the word. (TI, 25) 
That which sets an “experience in the fullest sense of the word” apart from 
objective experience is not only that the content is very different, but also 
that the subject’s encounter with alterity becomes part of what structures 
experience as such. The form of experience becomes ethical because of 
how the subject approaches the other, namely as a being elevated to a 
position of height before whom one is called upon to answer for oneself. 
Through the call to responsibility, experience as such becomes moral:  
First, the term “moral experience”: I try to avoid it. Moral experience supposes a 
subject who is there; who, first of all, is and who, at a certain moment, has a moral 
experience, whereas it is in the way in which he is there, in which he lives, that there 
is this ethics; or more precisely, the dis-inter-estedness un-does his esse. Ethics 
signifies this. (GCM, 90) 
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Lévinas’ reservations about the term moral experience comes from how it 
leads one to assume that morality is but one of the ways that I experience 
the world, whereas for him the very form of experience altogether depends 
on morality, which also implies that the subject emerges as always already 
responsible. The modality of experience is ethical: experience is structured 
by how the remnants of infinity that linger in the phenomena appears as 
meaningful to a comprehending mind that is never adequate to the task. 
The open-endedness of this form of understanding, which emerges from the 
original encounter with infinity, is what I call basic reflectivity, and a 
central enterprise of this dissertation is to account for its nature. For this 
purpose, Lévinas is the central figure. His descriptions of the situation of 
proximity as one where the other confronts me and calls me to 
responsibility, and where the meaningfulness of experience is grounded, is 
a promising starting point for the task of bringing out the discriminatory 
element in trust without transforming it into an matter of perception. When 
giving priority to the ethical, and grounding understanding therein, Lévinas 
provides an account of the intersubjective relationship as always already 
structured by my responsibility towards the other, from which all other 
meaning is derived. Here, the other appears to me as someone who 
addresses me, and my understanding is the response that I give. To 
encounter the other as an address is to experience myself as ready to 
answer, as responsivity, responding with a “”here I am,” [me voice] from 
the first present in the accusative [l'accusatif]” (OB, 149). Before I concern 
myself with asking for reasons I am responding to an other who demands 
accountability from me for my being, and because trust and distrust retain a 
connection to the original address they remain ethical.  
With Lévinas we can say that trusting and distrusting are rooted in the 
ethical relationship between self and other which is one of openness and 
indeterminacy. Precisely because the other is an other in the Lévinasian 
sense, we cannot presume to understand the other’s being in full, but must 
relate to it through an open-ended attentiveness that reveals the other to us 
not as an object to be comprehended, but as someone of deep relevance to 
us. The relationship between self and other that we find in Lévinas has the 
same character of openness and commitment that we need in order to 
account for what it means that one person trusts another (cf. Grøn 2010). It 
is a twofold character that testifies to my primordial openness and to 
alterity’s presence at the beginning of selfhood, as well as to the openness 
of my experience of the other, who cannot be comprehended as finite 
perceptual content.  
Lévinas describes his work as phenomenological in the sense that it attends 
to the ways in which the world appears as meaningful in subjective 
experience. It is a phenomenology about the way in which things appear 
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and about the form or modes in which the world makes itself of concern to 
me. In these forms of experience, phenomena are given as inexhaustible 
and indefinite motifs for reflective thinking in a confrontation with the 
productive limits of representation (sens pensé, as Lévinas call it (GCM, 
88)). Lévinas takes up phenomenological analysis to show that the 
representation involved therein is always already exceeded and superseded 
by the call to an original sense beyond the phenomenal world:  
The dominant trait, which even determines all those who no longer call themselves 
phenomenologists today, is that, in proceeding back from what is thought towards 
the fullness of the thought itself, one discovers – without there being any deductive, 
dialectical, or other implication therein – dimensions of meaning, each time new. 
(GCM, 87) 
I follow Lévinas in attempting to grasp the conditions for the appearance of 
trustworthiness in our encounters with others. What does it mean to 
experience the other as trustworthy? What are the defining elements of 
such an experience of the other that leads me to trust or distrust that 
person? These questions provide guidance for the phenomenological 
analysis of the trusting relationship in its aim “to make appear appearing 
itself behind the quiddity that appears, even if this appearing does not 
encrust its modalities in the meaning that it delivers to the gaze” (GCM, 
87). The argument of this dissertation concerns the situation when one 
particular person trusts or distrusts another particular person, and therefore 
it is inevitably an intersubjective investigation. In Lévinas’ 
phenomenologically rooted ethics we find a description of an 
intersubjective relationship that can help us understand those elements of 
the trusting relationship that are at issue here. By situating trusting and 
distrusting within the intersubjective space I argue that they form part of 
ethical orientation, that is, of a kind of ethical sense-making through which 
one person may come to understand the other. A pivotal point for 
Lévinasian thought is the relationship between reason and ethical 
significance, and yet it is not univocally clear in his work how the two 
terms are related. My reading brings forth the pivotal role of reflectivity in 
his ethics and demonstrates the way in which is structures intersubjectivity. 
Since this thesis aims at accounting for the discriminatory element of 
trusting and distrusting as a form of ethical orientation that precedes 
objective knowledge about the other, Lévinas’ work provides an 
advantageous starting-point. I also draw on Hannah Arendt and Immanuel 
Kant, and in the next paragraphs I will briefly introduce each of them, 
deferring more substantial presentations to the coming discussions.  
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Hannah Arendt and the human condition 
Like Lévinas, Arendt is influenced by Heidegger, but she is also in many 
important respects deeply influenced by Kant. Her work ranges across a 
variety of topics, as demonstrated by books titles such as Personal 
Responsibility under Dictatorship (1964), The Life of the Mind (1971), and 
Love and Saint Augustine (1929). What seems to underlie her manifold 
philosophical interests is her engagement with human existence and her 
concern with how phenomenal reality is grounded in plurality. Although 
Arendt seldom characterized herself as a phenomenologist, her conception 
of how things are manifested in experience is essentially a phenomenology 
of the common world as a space of appearances, and Arendt argues that 
plurality, as the presence of irreducibly different singular human beings 
engaged with a shared world, is the precondition for the existence of such a 
phenomenal world: 
The reality of the public realm relies on the simultaneous presence of innumerable 
perspectives and aspects in which the common world presents itself and for which no 
common measurement or denominator can ever be devised. (Arendt 1999, 57) 
Plurality and singularity, or distinctness, are two sides of the same coin. 
Here the affinity between Lévinas and Arendt is plainly visible sight as 
they both begin with the singularity of every human person, always beyond 
any general description that would consider them instances of a common 
genus, and build their analysis on that ground. In Arendt’s words:  
Plurality is the condition of human action because we are all the same, that is, 
human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, 
lives, or will live. (Arendt 1999, 8) 
That which makes us distinct in this radical manner is what Arendt calls 
natality, which is the essence of what it means to be human, namely to be 
always more than what can be understood as the effect of our nature, 
culture and history. Natality is the inexhaustible potential for initiation, that 
is, for beginning something new that cannot be foreseen or explained in 
hindsight by reference to causal factors. It is the realization of something 
that was not fully available as potential:  
It is in the very nature of every new beginning that it breaks into the world as an 
‘inﬁnite improbability,’ and yet it is precisely this inﬁnitely improbable which 
actually constitutes the very texture of everything we call real. (Arendt 1993, 169) 
Arendt’s argument for natality draws on the Kantian argument for the 
noumenal essence of humans, but for her it is in action that natality is truly 
realized:  
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Speech and action reveal this unique distinctness. Through them, men distinguish 
themselves instead of being merely distinct; they are the modes in which human 
beings appear to each other, not indeed as physical objects, but qua men. This 
appearance, as distinguished from mere bodily existence, rests on initiative, but it is 
an initiative from which no human being can refrain and still be human. (Arendt 
1999, 176) 
We truly become selves by becoming unique though committing to and 
engaging in a shared world. In plurality, constitutive of the phenomenal 
world, we realize our essential being, namely natality. Through appearing 
as distinct selves before a plurality of others we attain another and more 
solid sense of self or of our own reality: 
[F]or without a space of appearance and without trusting in action and speech as a 
mode of being together, neither the reality of one's self, of one's own identity, nor the 
reality of the surrounding world can be established beyond doubt. (Arendt 1999, 208) 
In a comparable way to Lévinas, Arendt contends that we become singular 
persons in the true sense when we take responsibility for ourselves before 
others – when we answer for ourselves before others – and this is in part 
because it is in engaging with the irreducible plurality of human society 
that we become capable of acting in a way that brings the new into the 
world. The very constitution of selfhood does also in Arendt rely on self-
transcendence that can only come about through living with others (Arendt 
1981, T 70f, W 83; Arendt 1999, 180).  
Two Arendtian themes are of particular relevance for our concern with trust 
and distrust. First, Arendt’s account of how we appear to others in action 
and speech displays how trust or distrust are engendered by our 
demonstration of who we are in public. In acting with and among others we 
experience them, and they us, in a privileged way that differs from 
contemplating them as carriers of particular properties, and because action 
has an insuppressibly person-revealing character, we can come to 
understand the other as an other and as trustworthy or untrustworthy. 
Arendt introduces judgment as a central force in how we appear to each 
other in the public sphere as exceeding our phenomenal reality, and she 
turns to Kant’s notion of aesthetic judgment in her discussion. 
Unfortunately she never finished her intended book on judgment, but in her 
Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy (1992) it is possible to glean what 
she had in mind. In it she presents her reading of Kant’s Critique of the 
Power of Judgment (1790 / 2000). Since her reading is relevant to the 
inquiry at hand, I will discuss it as part of my reading of Kant in the fourth 
chapter. Arendt herself says: 
The Critique of Judgment is the only [one of Kant's] great writings where his point of 
departure is the World and the senses and capabilities which made men (in the 
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plural) fit to be inhabitants of it. This is perhaps not yet political philosophy, but it 
certainly is its condition sine qua non. If it could be found that in the capacities and 
regulative traffic and intercourse between men who are bound to each other by the 
common possession of a world (the earth) there exists an a priori principle, then it 
would be proved that man is essentially a political being. (Arendt Library of 
Congress Papers, Container 41, p. 032259) 
A second Arendtian theme relevant in this context is her analyses of the 
nature of isolation and its consequences for a sense of self. In chapter two 
we see how the loss of trust leads to what we may call a loss of world or of 
reality, and that Arendt’s acute sense of the significance of worldliness for 
selfhood is advantageous for understanding the complexities and depths of 
the experiences often reported by torture survivors. In this respect, Arendt 
complements Lévinas because she attends specifically to the social element 
of selfhood and develops an account of the constitutive role of action in the 
shared world which is largely compatible with Lévinas’ ethics. Her analysis 
of the worldliness of the self thus supplements his focus on the emergence 
of meaning in the original ethical encounter.  
Immanuel Kant and the judgment of experience2 
Arendt and Lévinas are deeply influenced by Kant and in somewhat the 
same manner. For Lévinas, Kant’s notion of the supersensible shows his 
eminent awareness of something beyond being and beyond experience. 
Kant discovered the necessity of an exit from being, says Lévinas, and 
though he did not develop the theme at any length, it is a precondition for 
the system as such (GDT, 59ff; e.g. PH, 43f). Arendt points out that in 
Kant’s aesthetic judgment we find something like an experience of the 
inexperientiable and hence a way for this exteriority to manifest itself to a 
human being and affect thinking. Through the felt receding presence of the 
supersensible, experience as such is altered because it brings with it a sense 
of what it cannot contain. When experience manifests such a lack or a 
surplus, it alters the experiencing self – it alters the unicity of the I – so that 
the intervention of exteriority becomes part of it.  
 
                                           
2
 English quotations from Kant’s works are all from the Cambridge Edition of the 
Works of Immanuel Kant, which provides the volume and page number of the Akademie 
Ausgabe (AA) of Kants gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1910ff) in the 
margins. My references to Kant accordingly begins with volume and page number for 
the Akademie edition followed by section number (§) where such apply. For the sake of 
uniformity and clarity I have largely omitted Kant’s profuse used of emphasis.  
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It is in part through a discussion of the aesthetic judgment that I arrive at 
the notion of basic reflectivity, i.e. of the ethically structured relationship 
between self and other that grounds our trust and distrust. Aesthetic 
judgment is a way of understanding something without basing this 
understanding in concepts;
3
 it allows the subject to judge about aesthetic 
quality in an indeterminate manner, and its open-endedness and sensitivity 
to the singular is what distinguishes it from other types of judgment. Kant’s 
critique of aesthetic judgment is motivated by the apparent contradiction 
that resides in aesthetic taste, summarized in what he calls the antinomy of 
taste:  
1. Thesis. The judgment of taste is not based on concepts, for otherwise it would be 
possible to dispute about it (decide by means of proofs). 
2. Antithesis. The judgment of taste is based on concepts, for otherwise, despite its 
variety, it would not even be possible to argue about it (to lay claim to the 
necessary assent of others to this judgment).  
(CPJ, 5:338–339, 56)  
The antinomy of taste expresses what Kant needs to prove, namely that it is 
possible to claim the existence of necessary and valid judgments that are 
neither based on concepts nor justification in a propositional sense. 
Basically, he needs to show that there exists another form of validity than 
that pertaining to objective matters. This is an equal challenge to my 
account of trust, since I claim that the discrimination inherent in trust and 
distrust is not based on arbitrary subjective preferences but does in fact 
relate to that which it is about, namely the other’s character, in a non-
arbitrary fashion. In chapter four I present Kant’s resolution of the 
antinomy as a model for what we may think of as a resolution of a 
comparable antinomy of trust, and therefore for how we may judge about 
trustworthiness. The beginning of chapter four will in effect be an 
explication of the following:  
But now all contradiction vanishes if I say that the judgment of taste is based on a 
concept (of a general ground for the subjective purposiveness of nature for the power 
of judgment), from which, however, nothing can be cognized and proved with regard 
to the object, because it is in itself indeterminable and unfit for cognition; yet at the 
 
                                           
3
 My use of conceptual versus non-conceptual follows Kant and Lévinas; claiming that 
basic reflectivity is non-conceptual does not mean that concepts cannot be involved or 
arise from its judging activity, but that the kind of judging that is in question is not 
grounded in or justified by concepts. I do not engage with contemporary views on 
conceptuality but use the term only with reference to the thinkers I introduce. It would 
lead too far to bring in this weighty discussion, and I shall not pretend to do so.  
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same time by means of this very concept it acquires validity for everyone (in each 
case, to be sure, as a singular judgment immediately accompanying the intuition), 
because its determining ground may lie in the concept of that which can be regarded 
as the supersensible substratum of humanity. (CPJ, 5:340, 57) 
The aesthetic judgment expresses the non-adequate relationship between 
what is judged and the faculty of judgment. Aesthetic objects cannot be 
explained comprehensively in conceptual terms, yet we are for all that not 
confined to subjective fancies when making judgments about them. The 
most problematic aspect of Kant’s account is how the aesthetic judgment is 
both about the object and not about the object, and Kant’s concern with 
how aesthetic phenomena impress their quality on us in a non-arbitrary way 
without the relationship being adequately describable in conceptual terms is 
paralleled by Lévinas’ concern with how we receive the saying of the other. 
From our present perspective, two major issues separate the two thinkers. 
First, for Lévinas the experience of the other, which does not lend itself 
entirely to conceptuality, is logically prior to and conditions objective 
knowledge, whereas for Kant the priority is the opposite; here I subscribe 
unconditionally to Lévinas’ view. I am less unequivocal about the second 
issue: For Kant, meaning and morality only becomes sensible under the 
assumption of a teleological structure underlying reality and history, 
something that Lévinas vehemently opposes. This latter point will give rise 
to some discussion, because there is something about the ethical character 
of trusting and distrusting which implies the subjunctive modality of a 
shared world, and it is at least open for discussion whether such a shared 
world is thinkable without an implicit idea of purposefulness. 
 
1 The problem of trust  
Recently I was travelling by train between the Danish cities of Copenhagen 
and Aarhus. In the new non-stop trains the trip takes approximately two 
hours and forty minutes; unlike many other types of train these have closed 
compartments seating a maximum of sixteen in groups of four. Seat 
reservations are required, and consequently you share your time with the 
same people for the duration. Midway through my voyage a woman in one 
of the other groups got up, and as she made to leave the compartment she 
turned to the person next to her and asked if he would keep an eye on her 
laptop for a few minutes. We were perhaps seven or eight persons in the 
compartment all in all, and I felt offended. What – or who – in our 
company had given her the idea that she had to take such precautionary 
measures to ensure the safety of her things? Quite apart from how 
excessive her caution must seem given the circumstances, there was 
something wrong in the very gesture. She owed me – us – her trust, I felt. 
But why? Were I to witness similar behaviour in an airport or public library 
I would have felt no offence whatsoever. The difference is perhaps because 
in more complex situations the lack of trust is directed at some vague 
generalized stranger, whereas in this rather more personal case it was I and 
a small number of concrete human beings who were unmistakeably the 
target.  
I start off with this example not because it illuminates the full spectrum of 
the phenomenon of trusting, but because it highlights some of the 
complexities that are inherent in everyday social relationships. One of these 
is that, instead of being mutually exclusive, trust and distrust appear to be 
companions as we orient ourselves in the structure of familiarity and 
alienation that is our everyday existence. As the woman placed her trust in 
the person next to her, she demonstrated at the same time a broader, less 
specific lack of trust, and an imbalance was evident that would not have 
appeared in the airport scenario. Another is that it seems that we expect 
trust from each other, and perhaps even owe it to each other (or at least to 
refrain from outright distrust), as part of normal coexistence. There is an 
asymmetry to trust and distrust with respect to sociality because we can 
demand reasons for another’s distrust in a way that seems irrelevant for 
trust. It is part of my ambition here to show that although trust need not be 
grounded in reasons in order to be justified – and indeed cannot be justified 
entirely by way of reasons – it is not therefore irrational, nor is the 
placement or refusal of it beyond accountability. There are sense and 
significance in trust, and the relationship between trust and the 
meaningfulness that it expresses and makes possible is more complex than, 
and prior to, the kind of grounds that are needed to justify an epistemic 
belief.  
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Trust is a complicated figure that is hard to pin down with a clear-cut and 
unequivocal definition. Philosophers grapple with the relationship between 
trust and related concepts such as certainty and faith while discussing its 
cognitive and affective dimensions, and in recent years it has surfaced as a 
central theme of research in other disciplines as well. Natural scientists 
have discovered the neuropeptide oxytocin and its many effects on our 
behaviour, and social scientists have set up experiments showing that we 
are more willing to invest money and to go along with a situation 
unquestioningly when influenced by oxytocin (Kosfeld et al. 2005). The 
general agreement in such experiments seems to be that a definition of trust 
can be found somewhere between a willingness to take risks and a 
suspension of critical attention. For the purpose of this thesis, however, the 
focus is different: instead of concentrating on the opposition between trust 
and critical thought it investigates the interrelation between them. Let me 
hasten to clarify that I shall not engage with either natural science or social 
science discussions of trust and distrust in any systematic way; my focus is 
on developing a philosophical account of what trust and distrust mean for 
the self, and my primary discussion partners are those who share a 
phenomenological-existential outlook on the nature of our relationships 
with the world, with others and with ourselves and try to situate our 
trusting and distrusting therein. In recent years the topic has received more 
systematic attention in those quarters, and it is to this emerging 
conversation that the current project will contribute by developing what 
Liebsch calls for: a “‘positive’ phenomenology of trust as it is experienced” 
and what Steinbock also pursues as “the essential structures of trust in 
terms of trust’s givenness, which is […] a feature of interpersonal 
existence” (Liebsch 2010, 186; Steinbock 2010, 83). In doing so I follow 
Welz, who has convincingly argued that trust and distrust serve as means of 
orientation in a social world, and that they contain an implicit form of 
judgment (Welz 2010a; Welz 2010b). 
In the course of this first chapter I describe the current positions within the 
philosophy of trust as falling into two overall camps, pre-reflective and 
strategic trust, and show that although both versions bring important 
insights to the fore, neither can in the end give a satisfying explanation of 
the trusting relationship. This inability is not solved by integrating them 
into a single account, because, I contend, both are starting from a mistaken 
view of how we as selves relate to others and to the world. I shall identify 
concrete problems for both views and point out how, when followed to 
their logical conclusion, they seem paradoxically to eliminate what they 
attempt to explain.  
The chapter is structured around thematic discussions and not around 
particular thinkers, which means that I do not provide detailed 
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presentations of any one thinker in particular. I do however bring a number 
of thinkers into the discussion, both when I integrate their insights into my 
own approach and when I distance myself from them, and sometimes a 
thinker will appear on both sides of a discussion if I find that they give 
grounds which support the relevant positions. To some I am more indebted 
than others, but all contribute valuable insights into the phenomenon of 
trust.  
1.1 Overview of the field: basic trust and strategic trust 
Often, the different positions within the philosophy of trust are grouped in 
two after whether trust is viewed as primarily a cognitive or an affective 
endeavour. In other words, do we trust with the mind or with our feelings?
4
 
I shall make a slightly different division here, heeding the truth of Baier’s 
contention that “[t]rust is one of those mental phenomena attention to 
which shows us the inadequacy of attempting to classify mental 
phenomena into the “cognitive”, the “affective,” and the “conative”. Trust, 
if it is any of these, is all three” (Baier 1992, 111). In practice, my division 
may fall along almost similar lines, but there are also differences. I will 
discuss the existing positions under the labels pre-reflective and strategic 
trust.  
The first term describes a notion of trust that is pervasive, unreflected, and 
immediate. Often its proponents will speak about basic trust, a term 
originally introduced by Erikson (1950), but here pre-reflective is 
preferred, because whereas strategic trust may never be basic in the way 
that pre-reflective trust is meant to be, it is certainly often considered 
indispensable.
5
 Pre-reflective trust is a background feeling or attunement 
 
                                           
4
 Or, as Becker has clarified, “let us call our trust "cognitive" if it is fundamentally a 
matter of our beliefs or expectations about others' trustworthiness; it is noncognitive if it 
is fundamentally a matter of our having trustful attitudes, affects, emotions, or 
motivational structures that are not focused on specific people, institutions, or groups” 
(Becker 1996, 44, italics added).  
5
 When strategic trust is considered basic, it is as a contingent fact, as when Luhmann 
declares that we could not exist as social creatures without it, but at the same time it 
does not hold that trust is constitutive for the self. It is an open question, however, to 
what extent the same cannot be said to hold for many pre-reflective accounts, because 
although it is a practical truth that infants cannot survive without help, this does not 
make them trustful (it makes them reliant, certainly; more about that later) and neither 
does the fact that a life without trust is an isolated and poor life necessarily make it a 
constituent feature of selfhood, because in such account we can still imagine a self 
without trustful relations. It is often the case that neither pre-reflective nor strategic trust 
(continued) 
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that grounds our lives, and we are not conscious of it until it is broken. Pre-
reflective trust does not, then, offer itself to cognition and is ultimately not 
experienced as long as it remains undisturbed. There is a clear asymmetry 
between trust and distrust here, in that distrust pertains to a concrete 
experience and is secondary to and derived from the more primary and 
general trust that forms a medium for experience as such. The second – 
strategic trust – entails a symmetrical relationship with distrust. In this 
account trust and distrust are equal in that they are opposed epistemic 
attitudes that we may adopt towards someone on the basis of reflection and 
consideration. Under this heading we find for instance what e.g. Jones 
refers to as the risk assessment view (Jones 1999, 68), where trust is 
something we utilize to optimize the odds of a positive outcome of 
individual actions though minimizing risks. Whereas pre-reflective trust is 
usually defined as unconscious, strategic trust is a consciously adopted 
stance towards a person or a situation expressing a strategic choice 
regarding the management of uncertainty in a world too complex for 
certain knowledge to suffice. And where pre-reflective trust underlies 
human existence, strategic trust can be added too and subtracted from an 
experience without altering its objective characteristic, because it is 
essentially exterior to it.  
In strategic and cognitively inclined accounts, where trust is seen in its 
functionality and analysed as something we do in order to, there is a clear 
tendency to focus on what we can call task-specific trust. An example of 
this can be found in Baier:  
To trust is to give discretionary powers to the trusted, to let the trusted decide how, 
on a given matter, one’s welfare is best advanced, to delay the accounting for a 
while, to be willing to wait to see how the trusted has advanced one’s welfare. (Baier 
1992, 117) 
 
                                                                                                                           
is truly basic in the sense of being a necessary precondition for having a self. In order 
for trust to be basic in this more radical sense we would be forced to argue that some of 
the abilities that we consider inherent in selfhood depend on trust, such as thinking, 
remembering or experiencing, or we must suggest something to the effect that a life 
without trust blocks the fulfilment of our potentials as humans (similar to what Welz 
points to as trust being at the beginning of and furthering personal development and 
flourishing in what I take to be a non-contingent process (Welz 2010a, 47,61)). These 
two avenues for claiming that trust is basic – in the sense of being necessary for 
selfhood – will be explored in the course of this dissertation as I examine the feasibility 
and desirability of the claim that trust is basic in a more radical sense than what even 
those who subscribe to basic trust usually acknowledge. 
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Compare Jones:  
Trust is an attitude of optimism that the goodwill and competence of another will 
extend to cover the domain of our interaction with her, together with the expectation 
that the one trusted will be directly and favorably moved by the thought that we are 
counting on her. (Jones 1996, 4) 
Both thinkers analyse trusting as a three-place predicate: A trusts B with 
valued thing C, whether C is then whatever our interaction may involve, as 
in Jones, or any given matter in which our general welfare is implicated, as 
in Baier. Understanding trust in this competence-specific suggests a 
plumber or a day care professional by way of example, and in its limited 
scope, and correspondingly manageable vulnerability, it seems to leave out 
a kind of trust that is not regulated by clear specifications. Trust between 
friends is often of the kind where I cannot spell out what I trust them for or 
my reasons for trusting them, other than that I have some vague expectation 
of their being able to employ “a kind of moral competence”: 
The competence we expect in trusting need not be technical: when we trust a friend, 
the competence we expect them to display is a kind of moral competence. We expect 
a friend to understand loyalty, kindness, and generosity, and what they call for in 
various situations. (Jones 1996, 7) 
Jones does not delve into what this “kind of moral competence” might be. 
Certainly it appears to be of a different kind than what is needed for 
judging epistemological matters or truth claims, and it might be helpful to 
follow Steinbock’s suggestion that it is grounded in the felt experience of 
the other’s “integrity, sincerity or sanctity” (Steinbock 2010, 95). In other 
words, I suggest that trust and distrust are expressions of the basic 
reflectivity of a responsible self engaging with a shared world, and that this 
reflectivity has the form of a non-determinate judgment. We trust because 
we find the other to be someone who will judge appropriately in various 
situations; and although we may err in our judgments about 
trustworthiness, the other’s character is indeed that which we judge in the 
indeterminate manner of basic reflectivity. The inability to account fully for 
why we trust or distrust, then, is not just a result of our inability to 
comprehend the complexity of the situation and hence to make explicit all 
our reasons for, say, trusting this particular friend, but is part of the very 
nature of the relationship.  
A functional view of trust like the one presented above ends up with a 
description of a relationship that does not seem to be trust at all, but rather 
some form of expectation or reliance. It treats trust as a primarily epistemic 
notion that we may come to adopt if we can find sufficient reasons to 
justify it, yet overlooks that in order to take something to be a good reason 
we need already to have trust, as Wittgenstein has argued (e.g. Hertzberg 
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1988). To see trust as essentially a tool for managing vulnerability in a 
complex world makes it simply a fall back and a second-best alternative to 
knowledge: if uncertainty and vulnerability could be eliminated, so would 
the impractical need for trust. Reducing trust to vulnerability management 
ultimately makes of it a stand-in for certainty and nothing more than 
deficient knowledge which translates into a moral weakness. 
As mentioned above, the development within the strategic camp has 
departed from a purely volitional notion towards one where affectivity 
plays a larger role, but it is still the case, as Becker points out, that the work 
of such influential thinkers as Baier and Jones is ultimately committed to 
the cognitivist element of trust and to a version of it that compares it to 
belief (Becker 1996, 44). Increasingly sophisticated, trust is nevertheless 
still described as essentially a functional term, which means that it is 
understood with reference to its telos; we are seen as trusting in order to 
secure our well-being.  
Advocates of a pre-reflective notion of trust wants to avoid reducing it to a 
deliberative assessment of someone’s ability and credibility in a given 
manner, but their way of doing so creates its own set of problems. The 
most incriminating problem, as I see it, is that pre-reflective trust loses the 
ability to be about something particular in the world. Its character as a 
climate or medium for experience means that it is a general disposition, and 
therefore it is ultimately difficult to explain how my trust or distrust is in 
any way occasioned by or even related to the other’s trustworthiness or 
lack thereof. It remains fundamentally impersonal since it is simply there, 
or not, irrespective of how I relate to the world through experience. 
Pedersen argues, along similar lines, that Løgstrup analysis of trust as a 
sovereign expression of life is peculiarly indifferent to the actual persons 
involved in the contingent relationship, because it is presented as an 
unavoidable and indeed given fact of life that is not grounded in empirical 
circumstances (Pedersen 2009, 76). Løgstrup wants to demonstrate that 
trust exerts itself between people despite the constraints that may be in 
place. He relates the example of a woman who, alone in her house early in 
the morning, is visited by the secret police and interrogated about her 
husband’s whereabouts. Despite her knowledge of the perilous situation 
she and her husband would be in if she let the least bit of information slip, 
she finds that she must struggle to inhibit the inclination to relax and let her 
guard down with the polite and friendly officer (Løgstrup 1972, 17f). It is, 
Løgstrup submits, in the nature of speech that it is an opening, a 
spontaneous openness between those talking, and it is so regardless of what 
we intend with the communication: 
What is it that comes to the fore in this inclination? It is the elementary and definitive 
peculiarity that belongs to all speech as a spontaneous expression of life, and that is 
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its openness. To speak means to express and reveal. The individual does not bring 
this to speech, which is so beforehand, as an anonymous expression of life, as it 
were. It is its sovereignty, to which we submit at the very moment we begin to speak. 
[..] The sovereign expression of life precedes us, we are gripped by it. Therein lies its 
spontaneity. (Løgstrup 1972, 17, my translation)
6
 
The sovereign expressions of life are not dependent on what we experience 
and do not depend on the way actual persons relate to each other, but 
function spontaneously and anonymously in all human interaction. 
Løgstrup describes trust as a sovereign expression of life, and indeed his 
account is the epitome of pre-reflective trust and displays the core 
weakness of that position. In establishing the fundamental nature of trust 
with regard to experience, language and beliefs he avoids the reductive 
conceptualization of it as an assessment of competence or risk (which fails 
to capture the breadth of the phenomenology of trusting); but in ridding 
himself of the authority of conceptual cognition he throws the significance 
of the person out with the bathwater, as it were. It is certainly not the 
person – the police officer himself – that inspires trust in the woman, and it 
is not the situation itself, such as when we might trust a random teenager 
with our car keys because he sits in a booth at a car parking.
7
 Neither is it a 
manifestation as such of how the woman’s past has made trustfulness 
habitual to her, although in Løgstrup’s view the sovereign expressions of 
life may be hindered in their coming forward in a person by that person’s 
past experiences. Trust as a sovereign expression of life is indeed 
anonymous and impersonal. Its sovereignty has a force of its own, 
irreducible to and not based on a person’s likes and dislikes, values, or 
deliberations about right and wrong. Still, forceful and independent as it is, 
it is at the same time rather fragile, because “the least interruption, the least 
calculation, the least reduction of it to a means for some other end, destroys 
it totally, and even turns it into its opposite” (Løgstrup 1972, 19).  
We find the same structural tension in the opposition between conscious 
thought and pre-reflective trust, as when Liebsch points out that, when we 
live in trustful relations, we in fact do not experience trust at all (Liebsch 
2010, 184), or when Bernstein maintains that “the more unnoticed it is, the 
more substantial its actuality” (Bernstein 2011, 414). If trust is essentially 
prereflecive, then of course it cannot manifest itself to the human mind 
 
                                           
6
 The book that I quote here and in the next section (Norm og spontaneitet / Norm and 
Spontaneity) has not been translated into English, and so I have provided the 
translations of these quotes myself.  
7
 The example is taken from the discussion following Seligman’s presentation at Stony 
Brook University on 5 May 2008, available as a podcast (Seligman 2008). 
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while it exists, but can only be assessed as something that has passed, 
posthumously as it were. If trust is contemplated at all, then, it is in a 
certain way already lost since it is no longer given as unquestionable, 
which means that it is somewhere on a scale of “weakened, doubtful, 
destroyed or altogether meaningless” (Liebsch 2010, 179). Consequently, 
we can only be aware of an experience of “I trust you” in situations where 
trust is in question and problematic. Baier, for instance, holds that we only 
become aware of our trust when we doubt it, and that such scrutiny is a 
sign of distrust rather than trust. Thus we can sum up: 
Where trust reigns in ’trustful’ relations, it is neither necessary nor even possible to 
thematize it. To thematize trust inevitably has the consequence of putting it into 
question, that is, destroying it. (Liebsch 2010, 180) 
Although I do agree that a trusting relationship that needs reasons to 
scaffold it is a failed one,
8
 and that one cannot ever expect to have anything 
like a proof of trustworthiness, I find it equally unhelpful to insist that trust 
can only consist in this fragile unconscious climate of innocence that 
vanishes like dew before the intelligibility of the morning sun. For one 
thing, as we have seen, such a trust must be and remain irresponsible since 
it cannot coexist with the critical self-relation that responsibility is; just as 
it is in danger of becoming impersonal. The strength of the pre-reflective 
account, and that which Løgstrup wants to make explicit, is that 
interpersonal trust is unconditional in the sense that it defies justification by 
reasons, the possibility of which would imply that its value was relative to 
a purpose, or that its potential goodness consisted in being good for. The 
sovereignty and spontaneity that Løgstrup describes as essential to trust 
consist “not in masterliness but simply in the fact that any ulterior motive is 
excluded”, meaning that neither self-interest nor other forms of 
instrumentalization can be a part of it. The value – the ethical value – of 
trust does not come from its rational character as based in a justified belief 
about the other’s competences and intentions, but is independent, and with 
this I do concur; but in wanting to liberate trust from the reign of 
justification, the proponents of pre-reflective trust make the additional and 
unnecessary move of dismissing thought and experience entirely.  
 
                                           
8
 I am reminded of Arendt’s insistence that reasons cannot explain morality: ”It is with 
this reason as with all reasons in this matter (quoting Nietzsche again): ”If someone told 
us he needed reasons to remain decent we could hardly trust him any longer; certainly, 
we would avoid his company” – after all, can’t he change his mind? And with this, 
we’ve come back to that faculty of pure spontaneity that prompts us into doing and 
arbitrates between reasons without being subject to them” ((Arendt 2003, 131). 
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It will be my aim to present an account that keeps the unconditionality of 
trust – that it is not relative to purposes external to it – while not losing 
sight of its inherently personal nature, namely that it is a matter of one 
particular person trusting another particular person.  
As we have seen, both a purely pre-reflective and a purely strategic account 
contain important insights as well as problems. They are not mutually 
exclusive, though, and there are those who propose an integrated account, 
arguing that we live with a pre-reflective trust in the world of which we are 
normally not aware until it is broken, and that, after experiencing the 
possibility of broken trust, we may then continue to develop a more 
reflected attitude of trust and distrust towards the world. In this account, the 
strategic attitude will rest on a regained pre-reflective trust which must still 
be in place – as a sort of second immediacy – if we are to be able to engage 
with the world. Even after trust has been regained, strategic trust is separate 
from pre-reflective trust because they are essentially different things, one 
derived from the other. Confusion could arise from the fact that strategic 
trusting may also very well at times be unconscious, but this should not be 
confused with the necessarily unconscious nature of pre-reflective trust. 
Strategic trust becomes possible with the arrival of deliberation and is 
available for thought, should we want it, in a way that pre-reflective trust is 
not, so although strategic trust may remain below the threshold of 
awareness, it does not necessarily do so.  
In integrated accounts the term trust applies to two quite different things 
whereas distrust remains a conscious and deliberate affair, as it was in both 
the pre-reflective and strategic descriptions. Psychologist Erik Erikson, 
who first spoke of basic trust as the foundation of and the critical factor in 
the small child’s development, can be said to give an integrated account by 
focusing on the intertwinement of trust and distrust, where the first crisis of 
the small child’s life comes when, in its absolute dependence, it 
experiences either that its needs are consistently met or that they are not. 
For Erikson, the basis of the child’s relationship with the world is grounded 
here, as is the ability to cope with insecurity or even betrayal later, and as it 
is in the situations of crisis, where trust is in question, that basic trust must 
prove its worth (Erikson 1950).
9
 A recent formulation of an integrated 
account can be found in Liebsch:  
 
                                           
9
 As Welz also points out, Erikson’s account, although certainly deeming trust an 
essential factor in human development, does not necessarily work with innate trust 
(Welz 2010a, 46). Although Erikson does describe neonate feeding and sleeping as 
expressions of some form of primordial trust, this first stage is directly superseded by a 
kind of trust that is created by the consistent care of the parents, i.e. by their 
(continued) 
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In order to ’relate’ to others one must – at least – trust in their response to one’s 
appeal demand. That means: the minimum of trust without which we cannot imagine 
any meaningful communication, is trust in them as ‘promising’ an answer to our 
appeal or demand at all. This minimalistic approach does not yet refer to trust in the 
self or the other. Even when we place mistrust in someone but, nevertheless, stay in a 
social relation with the other, we must place a minimal trust in him. At least we must 
place trust in him as a social being that will respond to us. This minimal trust is to be 
distinguished from trust as a stance we can deliberately adopt or refuse to adopt. To 
minimal trust we are in fact ‘doomed’ insofar as we cannot help but trust in other’s 
responsivity when we wish to relate to them (as personal beings) at all. (Liebsch 
2010, 181, n. 12) 
Baier formulates the need for an integrated view when she asks, in response 
to Lagerspetz, if it is not possible to allow for both unreflective and 
reflective trust to count equally as real forms of trust so that it becomes 
possible to understand both the unthinking certainty of an infant and the 
deliberate act of entrusting as forms of a single phenomenon with a shared 
developmental and conceptual root (Baier 1997, 120). Similarly, Pedersen 
defines the relationship between what she defines as prima facie trust and 
reflective trust (and distrust)
10
 from the vantage point of the breach; 
reflective trust is understood from the perspective of someone who may 
respond to a breach with different attitudes, thereby transforming the 
breach itself into different types of experiences that call for different 
reactions in terms of a possible wish to re-establish the social relations of 
trusting (Pedersen 2009; 2010).
11
 In accentuating the importance of the 
 
                                                                                                                           
trustworthiness: “The amount of trust derived from earliest infantile 
experience….[depends] on the quality of the maternal relationship. Mothers create a 
sense of trust in their children by……sensitive care of the baby’s individual needs and a 
firm sense of personal trustworthiness” (Erikson 1950, 249). That being so, distrust is at 
least potentially present as well. One must always tread carefully with terminological 
issues: Erikson states that he prefers to describe the very first primordial acceptance of 
care as ‘trust’ instead of for instance confidence because he finds that it brings out the 
naiveté of such mutuality (Erikson 1985, 247f). For exactly the same reason I would 
hesitate to call it trust.  
10
 She also uses the coupled terms passive/active trust and elemental/intentional trust to 
demonstrate her view that on the one hand we have an immediate and unreflected 
reaction to a situation, based on our personal history, and on the other we can come to 
question our immediate reaction and thereby take responsibility for it through reflection 
and reason giving. Her view does not include a notion of basic trust in the sense of 
human beings having an innate spontaneous trust towards others (as in e.g. Løgstrup 
and arguably Erikson), but includes distrust as a possibility on all levels. That being so, 
our prima facie reaction may as well be distrust owing to our personal history (Pedersen 
2009; 2011; 2012; forthcoming).  
11
 Pedersen refers to Garfinkel’s outline of such reactions (Garfinkel 1963). 
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personal interpretation of events for experience, Pedersen’s account has the 
advantage of securing a dynamic and relational view that overcomes some 
of the challenges that a strictly individualistic and strategic account meets 
without abandoning the possibility of a moral qualification of the trusting 
relationship. It is a challenge for her account, however, as well as for other 
integrated accounts, to explain the relationship between those two very 
different kinds of trust that are given the same name, and although an 
integrated framework observes how trust is a more complicated 
phenomenon than either of the two versions can in themselves account for, 
it is not clear how their combination solves the problems that they have on 
their own.  
Broadly speaking, we can say that trust cannot be accounted for as either 
purely pre-reflective or purely strategic. Both versions express 
phenomenologically salient features that are lost to the other, and the fact 
that many thinkers can be seen to move towards an integrated account goes 
to show that each is insufficient on its own. Whereas both offer valuable 
insights I would like to suggest that that they are, even in an integrated 
framework, ultimately not sufficient to explain the nature of the 
relationship we have with the world, with others and with ourselves in 
terms of trust and distrust. The problem is in a sense the same for both of 
them, and it comes down to their views on the tension between trust and 
critical thought.  
What the two approaches have in common is that they presuppose a 
distinction between basic non-rational affectivity and higher-order 
conceptual rationality, and they agree that reflection enters as a (distrustful) 
break with pre-reflective immediacy and as a determinate, conscious 
undertaking. It follows that pre-reflective trust is necessarily non-rational, 
i.e. it is a personal, idiosyncratic response that has no necessary relation to 
the phenomenon that gives rise to it, just like the comfort I feel in front of a 
warm fire is not an experience of the fire as much as it is an experience of 
my own idiosyncratic response to it. The fire is not comforting in any but 
the most private and contingent of senses, and in a parallel way pre-
reflective trust is in danger of losing contact with the trusted person and 
becoming exclusively an expression of the truster’s preferences or, in 
Løgstrup’s case, of an anonymous force of life. If we accept this division 
between rationality and the non-rational it follows that for trust to be about 
someone in a meaningful and non-arbitrary way it must be deliberate. The 
discerning or discriminating element that is, I argue, inherent in the 
trust/distrust distinction – namely that we understand the other in a certain, 
ethical way in trusting and distrusting – is relegated to the realm of 
conscious deliberation. There seems to be an implicit agreement that if we 
want, like O’Neill, to claim that “[t]rusting is not a matter of blind 
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deference, but of placing – and refusing – trust with good judgments” 
(O’Neill 2002, vii), then we must ultimately account for it in epistemic and 
cognitive terms.  
Both positions fall victim to the misunderstanding that in order for trust to 
be reasonable as a form of understanding it must be grounded in reasons in 
the same way that beliefs are, and if one wishes to reject a conflation of 
trust and such things as belief, expectation and reliance, one must abandon 
any claim to rationality. For a pre-reflective position, this creates a 
significant challenge, namely to account consistently for how trust can be 
both basic and pre-reflective. The seemingly fragile nature of a pre-
reflective trust conflicts with how it can be basic, since if trust is basic for 
the self, how can it then be lost without devastating consequences? One 
solution is to relax the basic constraint by defining the term ‘self’ as 
something less fundamental, say my self-image or some such thing. This 
would allow trust to be both basic for the self and fragile, and it would 
minimize the vulnerability by minimizing what is at stake in trusting; 
namely a less fundamental concept of selfhood. Although one will at times 
see such a more or less intended terminological glide upwards when the 
rupture of the self is discussed in basic trust positions, this solution is 
probably not acceptable to most of those who advocate basic pre-reflective 
trust. The only other way to preserve both the basic and the pre-reflective 
character of trust is to show how trust has defence mechanisms that enables 
it to persist in spite of occurrences that prompts critical awareness. That 
this is a necessary requirement, as well as a natural corollary of such 
discussions, is elegantly described by Bernstein, who makes a virtue of 
necessity. Bernstein finds that trust is at the borderline of being sensible 
because it is, as he puts it, prospectively too risky and retrospectively often 
too naïve; hence for him the problem of trust becomes why we, as sensible 
beings, would ever want to trust at all (Bernstein 2011, 403). Although he 
insists that a life without trust is hardly worth living, he nevertheless cannot 
see how we get from the realization of the rational untowardness of trust to 
actually trusting unless by an aptitude for eschewing our experience of the 
world so as to deceive ourselves about our own vulnerability.  
Bernstein brings to the fore how pre-reflective trust must be seen as being 
against our better judgments and only possible owing to a failure of 
rationality that is “dependent on partial insensitivity to deliberative scrutiny 
and present-tense evidential evaluation. […] Trust cannot be trust , 
accepting, and open and blinkered in its interpretive outlook, without some 
degree of what retrospectively looks like gullibility or naiveté [and lack of] 
vigilance” (Bernstein 2011, 403). Bernstein calls this the deliberative 
paradox of trust, namely that we would rarely, if ever, be in a position to 
adopt trust on reasonable grounds, and it leads him to claim that since trust 
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cannot be explained in terms of reasons, it must be a primitive form of 
reaction. He thereby turns on its head a motive dear to Baier, namely to 
“look at various reasons we might have for wanting or accepting such 
closeness of those in power to harm us, and for confidence that they will 
not use this power”(Baier 1986, 235). Bernstein holds that we would not 
find such reasons as to make the risk worth taking, wherefore our trust 
must have the power to disable the demand that the instinct for self-
preservation makes for reasons.
12
 It follows that trust can never be 
reasonable, but to turn trust into an attitude that can only exist in the 
absence of critical awareness has the consequence of turning it into an 
irresponsible and arbitrary reaction and a moral weakness. The 
contradistinction between trust and critical discernment, which rests on the 
commitment to deliberative cognition as the only basis for sense, leaves us 
with no other option. I propose that we need not accept such a dichotomy, 
and that trust is indeed not a nonsensical primitive reaction, but has sense 
in its own way. Steinbock is on to something when he points out that: 
Just because the judicative, epistemic sphere is cognitive, this does not mean that 
non-judicative, non-epistemic kinds of experience are non-cognitive. The emotional 
sphere has its own style of cognition and its own style of evidence which is pre-
judicative, yet not irrational. (Steinbock 2010, 84) 
I propose that trusting and distrusting are manifestations of a form of 
discrimination that gives the world to subjectivity in a meaningful manner 
and with its own style of validity that is not grounded in conceptual 
cognition. Unlike Steinbock I do find that we need the power of judgment 
to accomplish this, which does not testify to disagreements rooted in our 
views on trust, but on how I aim to understand judgment in a broader 
manner than he does. There is such a thing as sound, sensible trust and 
distrust that is an evaluative affair – both in terms of evaluating what it is 
about, namely the other’s trustworthiness, and itself being open to 
evaluation and therefore possibly valid – which rests on a different kind of 
judgment from the one which gives us justification for holding a particular 
belief. It is this form of judgment or ethical understanding that I call basic 
reflectivity. 
 
                                           
12
 As he proceeds to explain how trust works as a self-perpetuating mode of 
interpretation that blocks or distorts experience to make it better fit to preserve the 
trusting attitude, Bernstein ends up with a notion of trust as a quite complex and 
powerful capacity which is still basic and unconscious (Bernstein 2011, 402f), and it is 
not obvious to me why trust should remain unreflected with regard to the world that it 
pertains to and with regard to itself when it is granted these other powers.  
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1.2 Critical thought and ethical understanding  
In the following I shall give a preliminary demarcation of the phenomenon 
of trust that is under consideration, contrasting it with the related 
phenomena of reliance and familiarity.
13
 Attention will be paid primarily to 
the difference between trust and reliance because these are often confused, 
and because that distinction highlights very precisely the particular nature 
of the trusting relationship. The tendency to confuse trust with either of the 
two will often correspond to whether pre-reflective or strategic trust is 
preferred.  
As we noticed above, the distinction between trust and critical awareness is 
upheld by both the pre-reflective and the strategic accounts, concordant 
with what Hertzberg identifies as a “prevalent attitude among 
philosophers”, namely that if “trust is not based on grounds, it is never a 
rational option” (Hertzberg 1988, 128). But is this phenomenologically 
recognizable? It appears to me that we do indeed find fault with someone 
who trusts inappropriately. The question of appropriateness is relevant to 
trusting and distrusting in a way that it is not for instance to grieving or 
loving, or to matters of personal taste. Trust cannot be lifted entirely out of 
the social sphere of accountability, I contend. In the pre-reflective accounts 
trust cannot coexist with the awareness of its frailty, because only where 
my trust has not been put into question, as will happen when I know that it 
might fail me, can it remain in the background and whole. Against this I 
would argue that trust is always accompanied at the very least by an 
implicit awareness of its fallibility. Otherwise we would not be able to 
make sense of a difference between trust and belief from a 
phenomenological perspective, that is, we would be unable to experience 
having trust. I find it unconvincing that we should not be able to make 
sense of an experience of trust, and I will on the contrary contend that we 
do indeed have an experience of trusting – that there is something that it is 
like to trust – and not only in retrospect. Lagerspetz, for whom trust is 
doubly unreflected in that it is not just unreflected as we have it, but simply 
not a topic for reflection at all for the agent,
14
 compares trust and distrust to 
how Wittgenstein describes familiarity:  
 
                                           
13
 Terminologies differ: what I denote familiarity is sometimes termed confidence, but 
so is what I call reliance, and either may at times be called certainty. I prefer using 
familiarity and reliance for those phenomena that demarcate trusting. The precise 
meaning of these terms will, I hope, be apparent. 
14
 In describing the situation of putting a friend up for the night in a room with access to 
the kitchen knives and not giving the possibility of her stabbing him in his sleep any 
thought, he says: “Here I am acting without reflection. Doubly so: I do not reflect; and if 
(continued) 
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I come into my room and something is changed. I have a feeling of unfamiliarity. But 
did I have a feeling of familiarity previously, each time I entered the room? 
(Lagerspetz 1997, 97) 
In opposition to Lagerspetz and Wittgenstein I would, with regard to trust, 
answer positively. Yes, we do have such an experience, and it only goes 
unnoticed because it is – hopefully – with us most of the time. It is an 
experience of contentment or of everything being all right; or, as I will 
elaborate in chapter four, of pleasure in how things are. Even if we are not 
necessarily aware of our experience of trusting, we would be able to bring 
it to the fore of our minds should we want to. If someone were to ask me if 
I trust my husband, I could happily answer yes, while bringing forth a 
joyous and flourishing sense of the truth of that statement. Bringing 
trusting to mind does not, as Lagerspetz insists, destroy a necessary purity 
by introducing the serpent of knowledge into marital bliss (Lagerspetz 
1997, 104). Thought is not corrosive of trust; it is not the case that we can 
only be trusting if we are not aware of it, or that our behaviour is trustful 
only to an observer and then only because we are not ourselves of the 
opinion that it is. Lagerspetz compares being trustful to being generous, but 
there I would disagree with his characterization of both terms and claim 
that it is perfectly possible to perform a generous act while knowing that it 
is generous. Such knowledge does not automatically transform the act into 
one of calculation or insincerity (Lagerspetz 1997, 110).  
The question is, then, if a pre-reflective account truly describes trust at all. 
Does not trust require at least the possibility of its opposite in order to be 
something more than mere familiarity? This is what Hertzberg proposes as 
he questions whether it is correct to say that an infant trusts its caregivers 
(Hertzberg 1988, 124f; Welz 2010a, 48).
15
 The infant is clearly dependent 
 
                                                                                                                           
I did I would find nothing to reflect upon” (Lagerspetz 1997, 98). Trust, he holds, is not 
addressed in such situations, and that is where it really exists. Even asking the question 
means that the situation has changed into one where unreflecting self-evidence has gone 
and been replaced by struggling trust. It is unhelpful, I find, to stress such a strong 
allergy between trust and its consideration that even the awareness of it can only signal 
its weakness. As Lagerspetz points out, the sentence “I trust you” will then belie itself, 
or at least testify to the doubtful character of the trust relation. I find that an account of 
trust that exclude the phenomenology of trusting, i.e. the experience of trusting another 
person and of having an awareness of it, is inadequate.  
15
 The difficulty besetting pre-reflective accounts through their insistence that trust and 
thought are altogether foreign to each other is evident when both Hertzberg and 
Bernstein (who quotes Hertzberg favourably here (Bernstein 2011, 407)) still find that 
what infants and very young children have is not really trust. But if that is so, why is 
adult pre-reflective trust any different? I cannot see how they can make sense of a 
(continued) 
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on others for survival, and although the acceptance of food and sleep in that 
very first period of life is perhaps the epitome of pre-reflective trust, it 
seems at least doubtful that this is necessarily a matter of trust. Similarly, 
although I may be forced to rely on directions from a stranger, the fact that 
I have no choice in the matter does not automatically create trust, and in the 
same manner my unconscious confidence that the ground will stay in place 
when I walk forward also seems misplaced under the name of trust. To say 
that I trust people on the tube because I dare stand next to them trivializes 
the concept. In other words:  
In most of these cases, “trust” just appears to be equated with the absence of outright 
distrust. But if this is done categorically and regardless of the circumstances, trust is 
turned into a trivial element of almost all interaction, indeed of many cases where 
people do nothing more than keep out of each other’s way. I have not formed any 
specific judgment (good or bad) about most of the individual men and women who 
constitute humankind. Should we now say I trust them all since I go unarmed among 
them? (Lagerspetz and Hertzberg forthcoming) 
A purely pre-reflective position, which cannot account for how my trust or 
distrust relates to the other’s trustworthiness and not just my mental 
disposition, is perhaps better understood as familiarity or confidence. 
Luhmann, whose account of trust certainly belongs among the more 
strategic versions, describes the difference like this:  
To begin with, we have to avoid confusion between familiarity and trust. 
Familiarity is an unavoidable fact of life; trust is a solution for specific 
problems of risk. (Luhmann 1990, 95)
16
  
To see trust as a solution to “specific problems of risk” errs on the other 
side, though, confusing not trust and familiarity, but trust and predictability 
or reliability. In doing so, Luhmann underestimates the affective 
component of trust, and, significantly, how important our relationships of 
trust are to us: trust cannot be wielded like a tool, but appears to us as 
 
                                                                                                                           
distinction between infant reliance and adult pre-reflective trust without including some 
notion of reflection and vulnerability awareness in their definition of adult trust. 
16
 Again, terminologies differ. The terms familiarity and trust translate Luhmann’s 
terms Vertrautheit and Vertrauen. Pedersen points to how Kant in comparison uses 
Vertrauen and Zutrauen to denote what she terms active and passive trust (Pedersen 
forthcoming). Danish would use tiltro or at forlade sig på for passive trust, and 
although the etymological translation of Zutrauen in English would be confidence, 
perhaps a better alternative could be assurance with its connotations of resting in 
peaceful conviction. I use familiarity here simply because it is prevalent in the literature, 
which is probably due to how that was the term chosen for the translation of Luhmann’s 
work into English to which contemporary philosophy of trust is deeply indebted.  
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already in place, with a certain involuntariness and a significance for the 
self that go deep. Indeed, Luhmann himself seems partly to accept as much 
when, after pointing to how a complete absence of trust would leave us 
impotent, victims of paralyzing fears, he says that without trust we would 
“not even be capable of formulating distrust and making that a basis of 
precautionary measures, since this would presuppose trust in other 
directions” (Luhmann 1979, 4). He touches on a point that I find crucial: if 
trust is impossible for us, we are also barred from distrust as they 
presuppose the possibility of each other; and without the ability to discern 
the trustworthy and the untrustworthy we would be unable to orient 
ourselves in a sensible manner in social life. As part of our mode of 
orienting ourselves trust becomes necessary for the self beyond the mere 
practical necessity of trusting that the groceries we buy are not poisoned or 
that other tube passengers will refrain from hurting us, because it points to 
something deeper. Losing trust will not just make my life incredibly 
impractical, but also, and more problematically, leave me disoriented. One 
could ask Luhmann, then, what it is that needs to be in place in order for us 
to be able to trust and distrust? What is the nature of that discernment such 
that its loss would all but incapacitate us? The answer, I claim, is given 
with basic reflectivity and the intersubjective responsiveness that it 
contains.  
The distinction between trust and reliance is blurred in many accounts, but 
I claim here that they are in significant ways opposing modes of relating to 
other people. One way to differentiate between them is to look at their 
different conditions of validity, i.e. how a person can be challenged for 
entertaining them. Reliance is justified if we have enough experience with 
someone or something to be able to predict their behaviour with regard to 
some particular instance and with some particular purpose in mind. 
Reliance, then, is like a factual belief in that it needs reasons of the same 
order for it to be sensible and it needs a definite purpose to measure up 
against. Importantly, however, what I rely on seems not to be the other 
person as much as some particular competence of theirs, and I can rely on 
someone’s competence in this or that regard quite independently of other 
kinds of competence and traits the other may or may not possess. I rely on 
someone in much the same manner as I rely on my car or on the laws of 
physics, and my reliance is sensible if I have evidence for it. Trust, on the 
other hand, is not justified by evidence; indeed we may well say that “a 
relation is less trust-like the more external reasons enter into it” (Hertzberg 
2010, 198). It is not the trusting relationship that craves evidence, but the 
mistrusting mentality that imagines how only certainty can alleviate the 
distress and calm the mind. The trusting relationship rests in itself – 
indefinite and insubstantial – unoccupied with knowledge and certainty and 
a source of pleasure for the persons involved. Despite the constitutive 
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vulnerability of the trusting relationship we would as a general rule not 
prefer to have it replaced by one of perfect predictability; we take pleasure 
in it in its own right and find it superior to absolute certainty, which is only 
keenly desired where trust has failed. Such a pleasure, which exists for its 
own sake without reference to a purpose or an efficient cause, is 
overlooked in much of the existing philosophy of trust which tends to treat 
it either as something entirely unexperienced or as a facilitator of social 
interaction, that is, in functional terms. 
The confusion between trust and reliability becomes almost unavoidable, 
Hertzberg rightly points out, when “philosophers approach the subject from 
what is sometimes called the belief-desire model of human agency” 
(Hertzberg 2010, 197): 
On this view, the basic relation of a human being to his or her world is that of the 
solitary observer who gathers factual information about her environment and then 
applies it in action. When this is the starting point from which human life is regarded, 
what might be called a cognitive or instrumental view of trust comes to seem 
inevitable. (Hertzberg 2010, 196) 
Hertzberg places Baier and Jones under this heading, because their primary 
concern seems to be how the rational actor can reasonably adopt a trusting 
attitude, which leads them to treat trusting as a form of belief and in 
consequence to confuse it with reliability. Let us have a look at the 
differences between trust and reliability, partly inspired by Hertzberg 
(Hertzberg 2010, 189ff; Hertzberg 1988, 118ff). 
Reliance has a more or less specific content that implies a definite range of 
things. It concerns a specific expectation which can be made entirely 
explicit and is limited in scope and duration. It is one-sided in that my 
reliance on the other has no implications for the other’s reliance on me for 
something similar, and it is self-contained in that I can rely on someone 
regardless of that someone’s recognition of it. It is impersonal in two ways, 
first because I can rely on others for something specific regardless of what I 
may otherwise think of them, and second because what I rely on is 
ultimately a function of the other, i.e. their ability for this or that, and in 
that sense, “reliance seems not to be, essentially, an attitude towards a 
person. The way one may rely on people seems to be analogous in some 
respects with the way one may rely on a tool, a measuring instrument, etc.” 
(Hertzberg 2010, 199), that is, on a function or a role.  
If the difference between reliance and trust is not upheld, it leads to 
confusion. Dalferth is given pause by the paradoxes he finds in how we can 
trust someone in a specific respect but not in everything, and how we can 
trust someone absolutely while distrusting particular things about them, e.g. 
if we “trust his mathematical competence but he has no idea of good wine”, 
 The problem of trust 43 
 
or “absolutely trust her but she has no ear for music” (Dalferth 2010, 137). 
It seems to me that Dalferth misdiagnoses what it is that we trust when he 
suggests that we trust someone’s competence with regard to some specific 
thing: what we in fact do trust in such a situation is not their specific 
competence, but their competence in judging their own abilities. I will still 
trust her absolutely even if she has no ear for music as long as she does not 
try to lecture me on it, and in the same way I will still trust him regardless 
of his proficiency level in math and wine tasting as long as he is a sensible 
judge of his own spheres of expertise.
17
 Again we return to the notion of 
judgment, in the guise of critical self-awareness, which is certainly crucial 
to someone’s being a trustworthy person.  
Continuing in this vein, let us consider a remark by Steinbock which is 
very much to the point, namely that reliability is a “practical mode of 
straightforward belief” (Steinbock 2010, 86). Beliefs are decided with 
reference to the past and the evidence it provides, and similarly reliance 
needs such a base to be reasonable. My reliance on you can be assessed by 
independent standards and can be judged from a third person perspective in 
terms of its appropriateness, similarly to how we assess the justification of 
another’s beliefs. That trust and reliance are qualitatively different can be 
seen from the fact that reliance, no matter how strong, does not amount to 
trust, and vice versa, because it is not substantiated in the same way. 
Steinbock continues: 
While reliability is a relation of familiarity, trust is not necessarily so. It belongs to 
the essence of trust to be able to live through a trust act with a perfect stranger. […] 
Trust does not depend on the past, but on the givenness of the person in the present, 
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 Steinbock has another and quite compelling way of describing a situation where I, for 
instance, trust my child’s teacher. The benefit of his view is that it preserves the 
description of that situation as one of trust in a person, as I do in moving the target of 
the trust from the specific function to the person’s judgment, and therefore the two are 
compatible and supplementary. When I trust my child’s teacher, Steinbock explains, I 
do not trust her as a token of a particular type, namely teacher, because then we should 
more correctly speak of reliance. But it is still in her capacity as teacher that I trust her, 
and not necessarily in any other respect. Steinbock explains that it is misleading to say 
that trust is context dependent, because it is not the context that determines my trust. 
Instead, I do actually trust the teacher as teacher in all contexts: “It is also true that 
while I may trust the person as a teacher, I might not trust the same person as a 
mechanic or as someone to watch our pets. But this does not mean that the trust is 
‘conditional’. In fact, if we trust the teacher, we trust him or her ‘unconditionally’ – 
within this modality” (Steinbock 2010, 100). Although Steinbock does shift back 
towards a concept of trust that is about someone in their function and not about a 
person, and therefore meets with the same problems as Dalferth in this respect, I find it 
convincing that trust exhibits such an unconditional modality. 
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an insighting (that may be accurate or not) of the person from an originary encounter. 
(Steinbock 2010, 89) 
It is my hope to provide an explanation of what such an “insighting” 
amounts to. I find that a proper understanding of trust requires that we 
integrate the insights of both of the traditions sketched above. From the 
pre-reflective side we need the realization that trust is indeed basic and 
necessary for human existence; and from the strategic side we need the 
realization that trust is not irrational, but provides an insight into the 
character of people and situations. The essence of trust is not a purposive 
striving for perfect knowledge. Part of the argument here is that trust is not 
a suspension of critical thought as much as it is a suspension of a purposive 
attitude towards the other. What neither the pre-reflective nor the strategic 
account manages to elicit is how the trusting relationship is inherently 
indeterminable because that which I trust is an other and not an object or a 
function. In trusting we go beyond what the facts support not simply 
because we do not have all the facts, but because trust is not a matter of fact 
at all. In trusting and distrusting I express a relationship between me and 
another person who transcends what I can know and estimate. Vulnerability 
is essential to trust, as is the possibility of betrayal, because trust does not 
seek to eliminate the unpredictability that follows from the other’s freedom. 
In this I am again in agreement with Steinbock when he claims that “trust is 
implicitly an orientation toward the other as transcendent and free, and who 
can do otherwise than be faithful to my trust” (Steinbock 2010, 88). Or, as 
Lévinas would have it:  
This danger will appear to knowing as uncertainty, but it is transcendence itself, 
before certainty and uncertainty, which arise only in knowledge. (OB, 167) 
Compare Liebsch: 
We trust others not despite but, rather, and paradoxically, in view of their radical 
alterity that inevitably ‘blinds’ our trust, belief, and faith in them. I can trust only 
others whose ultimate trustworthiness I cannot grasp cognitively and calculate as 
risk. This means that in trust we are related to others whose genuine otherness 
‘blinds’ our anticipation of their future conduct. (Liebsch 2010, 188) 
The reference to Lévinas is clear, and turning again to Arendt and her 
Kantian ideas of human freedom we could say that anticipation and 
calculation are devices for measuring and predicting human behaviour in so 
far as it is a part of the natural world of causation, whereas in trust we 
relate to the other as a free existence capable of the new and unpredictable. 
We rely on something definite, whereas we trust (or distrust) something 
indefinite, namely the other.  
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1.3 Openness and secrecy 
Trust is essentially a relationship between persons, and its mutual character 
makes it a more convoluted experience than that of reliance. That trust in 
persons differs from trust in non-persons, e.g. companies, can be seen in 
how the relationships we have in the two cases are markedly different. If I 
rely on the phone company not to cheat with the bill and it turns out that I 
was nevertheless intentionally overcharged then I am simply mistaken in 
my belief about the company, but if a trusted friend knowingly cheats me 
out of some money I am not just mistaken, I will also feel betrayed. An 
object does not betray me but a person might. The common use of language 
can guide us here in that the word betrayal is one we usually reserve for 
interpersonal relationships.
18
 To put it another way: when it comes to non-
persons, trust is something we have for lack of better, that is, for lack of 
certainty or knowledge. We really would rather know that the bill is exact 
than simply rely on trust, but such is this complex reality that we have to 
settle for trust sometimes. When it comes to persons, however, the very 
idea of perfect certainty seems entirely beside the point because it 
overlooks how we appreciate the trusting relationship in its own right and 
not merely as a means.  
It is indeed true, as O’Neill writes, that in cases where “we have guarantees 
or proof, placing trust is redundant” (O’Neill 2002, 6). The redundancy 
comes from the fact that trust is always already in play, before we can view 
something as a guarantee and in the continuing process of questioning 
whether or not to accept something as proof (Steinbock 2010, 90; 
Hertzberg 2010). Likewise, O’Neill points out that “trust is needed 
precisely because guarantees are incomplete” (O’Neill 2002, 6), but 
thereby comes very close to reversing the priority between the mental states 
and making trust the handmaiden of conviction and knowledge. My point 
would be the opposite, namely that verbal contracts are needed where trust 
is not sufficiently present, or where it is simply not in the proper form for 
the relationship. O’Neill tends towards a cognitivist account of trust that 
overvalues the role of conscious deliberation, but she also has an eye for 
the intricate survival conditions of trust, namely that its reliance on secrecy 
– unlike certainty, which needs transparency. When discussing the 
‘revolution of accountability’ in Britain’s public sector she points out that 
despite its professed ambition, the call for complete accountability and 
transparency seems not to create trust but to attempt to make it superfluous 
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 Like vulnerability, which we will come to later, the possibility of betrayal is almost 
unequivocally accepted as a feature of trust. Whether or not we can be aware of our 
vulnerability and the fallibility of our trust is another and more contested matter. 
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and, as a consequence, makes it well-nigh impossible. Instead of a culture 
of trust it becomes one of mistrust, she argues, because having all of one’s 
decisions and actions laid bare before a third (and fourth and fifth) party 
observer will not motivate honesty about our shortcomings and mistakes, as 
might be the case in a smaller group of colleagues, but will encourage 
double bookkeeping. And, as she points out, the enemy of trust is not 
secrecy or even incompetence or mistake; it is deception (O’Neill 2002, 
63ff). O’Neill makes an important point regarding the ethics of trust: 
deception is not a minor moral wrong, but is at the very heart of disrespect, 
of applying a more lenient standard to oneself than one would generally 
approve of, and of hiding oneself and avoiding responsibility before others. 
The difference between deception and secrecy is exactly right, in that when 
asking others to account for themselves we should not expect a complete 
exposure of their very soul to the public, but an ethically sensitive self-
critical relation of conduct. As regards accountability we should expect 
people to give an account, not insist on providing the account ourselves on 
the basis of what we can make of the facts that they give us. O’Neill makes 
her point with regard to the accountability of nurses and teachers, but it is 
also helpful when we think about trusting a friend. It is an important part of 
O’Neill’s analysis that one cannot eliminate deceit without also eliminating 
the possibility of secrecy. Since having a private side to one’s life is part of 
what it means to be a person, the zero tolerance attitude towards deception 
is harmful to the self.  
In Seligman we find a comparable concern. He suggests that when faced 
with the uncertainty of life and the unknowability of the other we may 
respond with either a controlling or a trustful attitude, where only the latter 
is respectful of the distance between me and the trusted one, and the former 
seeks to abolish vulnerability altogether by attempting to understand and 
grasp all. As an illustration of where the controlling attitude will lead to if 
unchecked he quotes a saying attributed to Lenin: “Trust is good, control is 
better” (Seligman 2000, 17).19 Lévinas, I am sure, would very much agree 
that there must be such a distance and respect for the secrecy of the other in 
trust, and that it cannot be a matter of absolute transparency and 
togetherness. When discussing the need for separation and what he calls the 
secrecy of subjectivity, Lévinas uses the myth of Gyges as described by 
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 “The version attributed to V. I. Lenin (and still used by East Berlin border guards in 
the 1970s) ran: “Vertrauen ist gut, Kontrol noch besser”” (Seligman 2000, 178 n15). 
See also Seligman (2008). 
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Plato in book two of The Republic.
20
 The myth describes how a shepherd, 
with the help of a ring that can make him invisible, seduces a queen, 
murders a king and claims the throne. Gyges is part of a discussion 
between Glaucon and Socrates concerning the motives for just actions, and 
Lévinas sees in Gyges the ever-present choice of not owning up to 
responsibility for one’s actions:  
Gyges plays a double game, a presence to others and an absence, speaking to ‘others’ 
and evading speech; Gyges is the very condition of man, the possibility of injustice 
and radical egoism, the possibility of accepting the rules of the game, but cheating. 
(TI, 173)  
Egoism and violence can always be chosen over responsibility and care, 
although Lévinas is careful to insist that this ever-present option does not 
mean that egoism and violence are the original human relationship; 
”egoism is neither first nor last” (OB, 128). In addition to this, Gyges also 
serves as a premise of the ethical relationship by constituting the definition 
of separation: 
The Myth of Gyges is the very myth of the I and interiority, which exist non-
recognized. They are, to be sure,  the eventuality of all unpunished crimes, but 
such is the price of interiority, which is the price of separation. The inner life, the I, 
separation are uprootedness ifself, non-participation, and consequently the 
ambivalent possibility of error and of truth. (TI, 61, italics added) 
For Arendt also, the possibility of the unsolved crime is the difference 
between a totalitarian and a non-totalitarian (but possibly quite unjust) 
regime. Gyges is the price of freedom, but he is also freedom’s premise, 
and it is precisely freedom and unpredictability that are decisive for the 
human ability to act freely and exercise the human capacity for natality. 
Part of Lévinas’ insistence on the absolute incomprehensibility of the other, 
and of the necessity of separation, comes from the realization of what a 
fundamentalist culture of sincerity can bring with it, namely a totalitarian 
state with the right not only to the ritualistic adherence of its citizens but 
also to the loyalty of their hearts and minds. We may be reminded of the 
eminent demonstration of this in Orwell’s novel 1984 (1949), when the 
protagonist Winston Smith is pursued by the Thought Police and finally 
brought to prove his loyalty beyond doubt. To prove one’s loyalty without 
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 Glacon actually refers to a ring that gave powers to “the ancestors of Gyges the 
Lydian”, but in book ten Plato talks about “the ring of Gyges” (Plato 1901, Book X, p. 
302). Since it is of no consequence for the present discussion whether the ring was put 
to efficient use by Gyges or his ancestors I will simply use the accepted phrase, i.e. the 
one used by Plato and Lévinas.  
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doubt is only possible through a complete erasure of privacy, that is, 
through a destruction of the person.
21
 Trust requires respectful distance that 
does not seek to lay bare the other’s soul. Trusting someone does not mean 
a suspension of final judgment until sufficient knowledge has been 
obtained, and the dialectics of interpersonal trust is not a teleological search 
for certainty. Instead, the logic of trust and the logic of certainty (or 
control) are opposites with regard to the other person because there is 
something about trust which has to do with not trying to control the 
outcome of a situation. There is an openness in the intersubjective 
relationship in which trust takes place that is entirely different from a 
striving for epistemological certainty. When we judge the other’s 
trustworthiness, it is with the awareness of the inaccessibility of the other’s 
being, and concomitantly with the awareness of how we are exposed before 
the perspective of another free being. To understand the other in trust is 
therefore a problematic endeavour that leaves us with more questions than 
answers, and indeed calls us into question (Grøn 2010). Our own 
trustworthiness becomes of relevance in the encounter, and by questioning 
the other we come to demand accountability from ourselves. 
1.4 Ethical trust 
By attempting to develop an account of trust and distrust that embeds them 
in the basic reflectivity of selfhood I wish to hold on to the strengths of the 
pre-reflective position, namely that trust is essential for the self and 
precedes the mind’s concern with matters of knowledge and belief. From 
what I have termed the strategic accounts I want to bring along what I find 
entirely convincing, and indeed necessary, namely a concern with the 
ethical character of trusting and distrusting in terms of how we come to a 
responsible and valid judgment of trustworthiness. I will in turn attempt to 
avoid the pitfalls of both, most notably how the pre-reflective kind of trust 
becomes invisible, inexperientiable, impersonal and unengaged in worldly 
matters since it must remain free from the taint of thought and 
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 In 1984 this is accomplished through psychological torture that breaks Winston’s will 
and person and makes him betray what he thought was more important to him than life 
itself and more ineradicable than the conviction that two and two make four. Torture is 
often described as aiming at the destruction of the person. It is significant that it is the 
violation of one’s deepest privacy – often named dignity – that is also the negation of 
trust in the more everyday experience of manipulation. See e.g. Grøn's analysis of 
Hamlet's experience of being monitored by his friends (Grøn 2010, 19f). In chapter two 
this link between torture and the elimination of separation and secrecy – a prerequisite 
for trust – is pursued. 
 The problem of trust 49 
 
understanding, and how the strategic version is to a great extent chosen and 
something we can reason ourselves into or out of. This is the tension 
inherent in trust and distrust: they are both private and social, both subject 
to accountability and fundamentally beyond control. 
The problem for both sides of the divide is, as we saw, that they confine 
meaning and sense to the realm of conceptual cognition, from which it 
follows that if trust is not irrational, then its rationality is conceptually 
determinable, as is the case with beliefs. The meaningful nature of trust and 
its response to the encounter with another are lost to both accounts, 
because, as I explain here, they overlook the particular kind of meaning 
that trusting and distrusting express. In the next section I will address a few 
questions concerning my claim that the meaningfulness inherent in trust 
and distrust is ethically grounded.  
1.4.1 Judging trustworthiness 
It is noteworthy that a notion of judging is often more or less explicitly 
present when trust is discussed. Although there are clear differences 
between what judging means for the different positions, the prevalence of 
implicit references to how we judge trustworthiness is significant, and I 
find that it supports the claim that there is a form of judgment inherent in 
the trusting relationship and that without a proper understanding of it we 
will not advance our understanding of trust. That a form of critical 
judgment is inherent in trust and the trusting relationship is indicated by 
how I cannot be a trustworthy person myself if my judgments are not 
sound, just as I cannot trust appropriately if I cannot judge situations 
properly. We need sound judgment in order to be trustworthy persons, and 
our evaluation of others’ trustworthiness seems to rest on an evaluation of 
their capacity for judging the moral significance of a situation.  
The claim that trust and distrust are not irrational, but contain valid insight, 
leads me to consider distrust as a significant part of what it means to be a 
responsible self, thereby distancing myself from those that view trust as a 
default condition that is or should unfailingly be adopted when there are no 
positive grounds for distrust. Indeed, by letting both be expressions of a 
judgment (and not just distrust, as is usually the case) I suggest that we 
always have positive grounds for trust as well as distrust even if these 
grounds cannot be made explicit in language. My view of distrust 
consequently differs from what usually results from adopting the pre-
reflective version and is also often implicitly assumed in more strategic 
versions:  
The distrustful person is someone who has been damaged by other people. No matter 
that this, to an extent, is what happens normally in the process of growing up: the 
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destruction of our trust in others is a tragedy of life, a fall from grace. (Hertzberg 
1988, 129)  
In chapter two I shall show that to view distrust as the sign of a damaged 
self is a mistake. Although distrust is certainly a sign that something is not 
as it should be, the ability to show distrust is the sign of a self that is still 
capable of exercising appropriate moral judgment of a situation. Distrust is 
not corrosive of self and sociality, but is how a responsible self judges its 
surroundings.
22
 It is part of the critical awareness that allows us to 
transcend our own history and social situation and view them from a moral 
vantage point. There can, of course, be such a thing as pathological distrust, 
but that is another matter. If the possibility for distrust were not there, trust 
would have no bearing on the situation at hand, because it would not be 
qualified; it would simply be a default position only arbitrarily related to 
the trusted person.  
When Liebsch investigates how the violations of trust show that we are 
ordinarily dependent on our trust in others (and on theirs in us), he 
sometimes uses the expression trust-less, though without thematizing its 
relationship to trust and distrust or discussing what it means (Liebsch 2010, 
182,185). Notwithstanding this, the choice of word is probably no 
coincidence from someone who has engaged with first person accounts of 
survivors of violent trauma, because remarkably the words distrust and 
mistrust are little used in the autobiographical accounts of torture survivors 
that we shall look at; instead they speak of a loss or a lack of trust. For 
people who have lost trust as a result of torture it is perhaps less the 
outright distrust that is the problem than the confusion, disorientation and 
estrangement that follow from having one’s basic intersubjective 
responsiveness violated.
23
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 Martha Nussbaum has said of anger that it “as a whole is neither reliable nor 
unreliable, reasonable or unreasonable; it is only the specific anger of a specific person 
at a specific object that can coherently be deemed unreasonable” (Nussbaum 2006, 74) 
In the same way, distrust is not inherently corrosive or pathological and the presence of 
distrusting feelings in a person is not a sign of damage to that person. The inability to 
feel distrust would be as problematic for the self as the inability to react with anger to 
being wronged. See Brudholm (2008) for an argument similar to Nussbaum’s with 
regard to feeling resentment towards perpetrators of wrong.  
23
 As I will argue, traumatic violation of this sort leads to disorientation because it 
makes it difficult to connect to and find meaning in a shared world. Significantly, we 
“do not simply decide not to trust any longer – we lose our trust” (Grøn 2010, 25). But 
Grøn’s point, with which I am inclined to agree, is that in all instances of personal trust 
we are committed to the extent that it is more appropriate to talk of loss than of 
decision, and that “it takes something to give it up” (Grøn 2010, 24): it is, in a sense, 
(continued) 
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Both trust and distrust express an understanding of the other based on what 
we have called the givenness of the person in an original encounter 
(Steinbock 2010, 88). That being so, they are not arbitrary matters, but 
relate to that which is trusted or distrusted in a significant way. There is a 
claim inherent in the trusting relationship that I have with another, and 
although this claim is by no means one of which I am necessarily aware, or 
one for which I can make all my reasons explicit, it is never the less a claim 
about the other. The nature of this claim, and how it pertains to the other, is 
one way of understanding how trust differs from other human relationships 
of a comparable kind. Take love, for instance. When I say, ‘I love him’, I 
am really saying something about me. I am not stating something about the 
other except for the relative and contingent fact that I find the other 
lovable.
24
 In no way does my love claim that others should feel the same 
way. Not so when I trust: when I say, ‘I trust her’, it seems to me that I 
make a claim that exceeds the fact that ‘she is trustworthy for me’ and 
extends to claiming that the trustworthiness of this person is something that 
others should recognize. It is the suggestion here that the claim inherent to 
trust has intrinsic validity, hence it is more than a purely subjective feeling 
because it is an insight into the other’s character. If this were not the case, 
trust would not be helpful for our social orientation, because it would not 
ultimately pertain to anything in the world with any kind of validity. In that 
case, the sentence ‘I trust you’ would be misplaced and to some extent 
meaningless. It should more correctly simply be ‘I trust’. But a reduction of 
someone’s trust in me to a mere subjective stance like that is not an 
adequate explanation of the phenomenon. It does not satisfactorily convey 
the intersubjective relationship that trust is.  
Importantly, the fact that the claim inherent in trust is of more than 
subjective validity does not mean that I can demand the agreement of 
others in the same way that I can demand agreement about objective facts 
like what year it is or what the capital of Iceland is called. My implicit 
assertion of the other’s trustworthiness is not of the same kind as my 
assertion about what colour their hair is or about whether or not they are 
 
                                                                                                                           
forced from us. Trust and distrust are not additions to be added and subtracted at will in 
a situation, but structure the form of our relatedness to each other.  
24
 Love is of course by no means as easily put aside as it is here. The complexities of the 
intersubjectivity of love and how it reveals and hides the lovers is not overlooked or 
diminished here, but is simply passed over and not treated at all. Resources for a 
philosophical analysis of love are innumerable, but a good place to start could be e.g. 
Welz (2008), Nussbaum (1992), Jeanrond (2010), Vetlsesen (1994), and Arendt (1998). 
The point here is simply that love and trust differ essentially in that trust is about 
something (the other) and gives this something to me in a way that love does not.  
52 The problem of trust 
 
present in the room with me. On the subject of the relationship between 
trust and judging we can again consider both our agreement with and 
departure from Hertzberg’s view:  
Regarding a statement as true is itself an exercise in judgment, which becomes 
possible only on a comparatively advanced level of understanding: the decision to 
accept a judgment cannot be meaningfully attributed to someone who is not yet in a 
position to reject it. The attempt to account for the role of trust in human relations as 
a matter of the accepting of statements, I would argue, suffers from a cognitive or 
intellectual bias. Believing what others say is a refinement of other, more basic forms 
of trust. (Hertzberg 1994, 115) 
Hertzberg argues that trust precedes the judgment of true and false for the 
experiencing self. In Hertzberg’s view, judging is the way in which we 
evaluate the truth value of a given statement, and as such it is a capacity 
which precedes truth; however, just as it seems that judging is made 
fundamental to the self, preceding even the capacity for judging matters of 
truth, Hertzberg apparently places it at a ‘comparatively advanced level of 
understanding’. Objective perception – which is not on a ‘comparatively 
advanced level’ – is not a judging endeavour, then, and the ability to 
‘regard a statement as true’ is a judging activity in a way that, say, 
perceiving a tree as existing is not. For Hertzberg, the experience that ‘this 
tree is’ has no reference to judgment until we start questioning its truth 
value on the level of discourse. As can be imagined, I disagree with this 
last point. It is my claim that discrimination, or judging, happens at a far 
deeper level as well, and that even what Hertzberg calls a more basic form 
of trust comes about through judging. I find that there is a judgment 
inherent in placing one’s trust and distrust which expresses the fact that a 
judgment cannot be meaningfully accepted if it cannot be meaningfully 
rejected; or, in other words, distrust must be possible for trust to be actual, 
and therefore something akin to judging is at the basis of trust and distrust, 
even if this judgment is different from one that pertains to the justification 
of truth claims. Hertzberg implicitly gives credit to this more fundamental 
kind of judging. When he uses the expression ‘the decision to accept a 
judgment’, do we not have two references to judgment – a first- and a 
second-order judgment – the latter evaluative of the merits of the first? The 
task is to account for the nature of this first form of judgment which exists 
before truth or untruth enters the equation.  
In spite of his ambition to free trust from its subjugation to matters of truth 
and certainty, or at least to overturn the hierarchy between them,
25
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 As one would expect, there appears to be a development from Hertzberg’s book The 
Limits of Experience (1994) to his more recent texts on trust. In 1994 his concern was 
(continued) 
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Hertzberg concedes too much to conceptual consciousness, leaving 
rationality behind in search of “the nature of trust as a primitive reaction” 
(Hertzberg 1994, 115). As a consequence it becomes difficult to account 
for the relationship between such a basic reaction and the more deliberative 
versions of trust that enter into and support rationality. If the basic (and, in 
his view, truest) form of trust is irrational (or rational only to the extent that 
it has been shaped appropriately by our upbringing, that is, at best 
contingently), it seems to have its only justification in how it may inform 
rationality (though what exactly it may be informative about is unclear). It 
becomes a matter of how, as Lévinas finds it in Husserl, “the responsibility 
of the-one-for-the-other could express only the naivety of lived experience 
that is unreflected but promised to thematization” (OB, 167). This is not, I 
am sure, what Hertzberg intends. We shall attempt here to counter this 
constant threat of losing trust to the realm of the irrational or the pre-
rational by emphasizing its inherent meaningfulness as the expression of a 
judgment that makes it sensible to trust as well as to distrust. 
1.4.2 Asymmetry 
Am I then claiming that trust and distrust are symmetrical dispositions, 
both based on positive grounds? Not entirely. Hertzberg is right in 
proclaiming that to view subjectivity as symmetrically disposed towards 
care for and indifference towards others is mistaken, and that we need a 
concept of subjectivity where this is not so in order to understand properly 
what the trusting relationship is. He further states that this asymmetrical 
disposition of the self – i.e. that our primary reaction to others springs from 
care and empathy – is not a factual but a logical necessity, though without 
developing further what that might mean. This dissertation can be viewed 
as a step towards such a goal in that it attempts to account for how selfhood 
is intrinsically asymmetrically disposed towards normative matters, 
favouring care and responsibility over their opposites.  
Nonetheless, I do not find to the same extent as Hertzberg that trust is the 
‘natural default’, so to speak. What is basic and intrinsic is not that we trust 
 
                                                                                                                           
with the primacy of trust with regard to certainty, particularly with reference to 
Wittgenstein, whereas in later texts he looks beyond this theme to investigate what kind 
of a relationship between self and world we have in trust, i.e. to see what trust is in its 
own right. The views are not incompatible, but in the later texts trust is given more 
meticulous and refined attention and is explored more fully. Since there is in the earlier 
text a tendency to revert to a language of objective justification and of what can 
rightfully be demanded of each other in the tripartite relation of A trusting B to do C - 
which the later texts would be more hesitant to endorse – I shall refer mainly to the later 
texts.  
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(although this is empirically the case, I think, if we have had reasonably 
good childhoods), but that the other is with me from the first, and that it is 
because of the obligation that this bestows upon me that my self-relation as 
well as my experience of the world becomes meaningful. Asymmetry 
means that the meaningful character of my world and even of myself starts 
not from me but from the demand through which I become aware of 
another. That asymmetry is the source of meaning makes it also the source 
of our ability to discern trustworthy from untrustworthy and therefore trust 
and distrust, which is in a way exactly the opposite of Hertzberg’s idea 
when he claims that it is from an asymmetry of the trusting and distrusting 
attitude that intelligibility arises. As I see it, asymmetry is the precondition 
for trusting and distrusting (as well as for knowledge), whereas for 
Hertzberg trust is the institutor of asymmetry (which is a source of 
knowledge). In both cases, however, trusting and distrusting are more than 
passive affections since they express a form of insight that is not without 
validity. Therefore, meaning must on both accounts be available before or 
with trust and distrust, so although trust and distrust are prior to factual 
knowledge there is still meaning of another sort available to the subject 
prior even to them. This meaning, as I shall show, is derived from how we 
as selves come to experience ourselves through the relationship with 
exteriority. With Lévinas as the main figure I will investigate the character 
of this meaning that makes trust and distrust possible as more than a pre-
reflective affective disposition. The relationship between trust and 
intelligibility that we pursue is then another one than that which Hertzberg 
admirably presents as he shows how intelligibility is grounded in trust. We 
take yet another step back and look for the form of meaning that precedes 
our capacity for trust and distrust. We will approach it through the 
Lévinasian terms proximity, responsibility and signification, and by so 
doing will discover that it has meaning in its own right as a precursor of, 
and not simply as a caterer to, deliberative consciousness; that it is not a 
matter of being always “promised to thematization”.  
1.4.3 Is trust always a good? 
Is trust inherently ethical? And if so, is it ethical because of its social 
consequences – of what it makes possible – or is it simply a good in and of 
itself? The connection between trust and morality is addressed by most 
accounts in one of these ways. For Løgstrup, for instance, trust is ethical 
because it is numbered among the sovereign expressions of life and as such 
demonstrates the existential condition of human interdependence whereby 
we inescapably lay our lives in the hands of the people we meet and have 
their lives thrust into our hands (Løgstrup 1956; Løgstrup 1972). The 
goodness of trust is a conceptual and a logical matter, not an empirical one. 
For Baier, the moral merits of trust are decided by investigating if and how 
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trusting supports the exercise of a moral life; it is a utilitarian question at 
heart, and so the answer to whether trust is always a good is a clear and 
unequivocal no: “If the enterprise is evil, a producer of poisons, then the 
trust that improves its workings will also be evil” (Baier 1992, 110). Here, 
we decide upon the possible goodness of trust relations by empirical, not 
conceptual, means.  
Pedersen makes a pertinent distinction that shows this difference: when we 
say that trust is or can be moral, do we then decide by standards internal to 
the relationship or external to it? As she demonstrates, Baier’s attempt to 
distinguish between morally sound and morally flawed trust only delivers 
an internalist criterion for differentiation, i.e. it depends on the attitudes 
taken by the participants towards the grounds. Baier holds that a morally 
sound relationship of trust is one that is not harmed if its grounds are 
brought to light, which means for instance that it cannot be dependent on 
one part being naïve, deceived or misinformed (Baier 1986, 255ff).
26
 But 
this does not truly make trust a moral enterprise unless one assumes that 
there is something within the contingent intersubjective process of 
validating grounds that can serve as an independent measure of morality. If 
this challenge is not met, the morality of trust is turned into a good that is 
relative to the acceptance of the involved parties. An inherently moral 
notion of trust needs an absolute standard to vet it by, and if we want such a 
one to be found in the grounds that the trusting parties have for trusting 
each other, we need an account of how ethical considerations of a non-
arbitrary description are integral to the person’s ability to trust. It is my 
ambition to provide just that, primarily with the help of Lévinas. In my 
account, trusting and distrusting are grounded in ethics because they are 
expressions of our capacity for moral orientation. Their existence, then, 
shows that we are morally responsible persons capable of ethical 
discrimination with regard to ourselves and sociality. Trust is ethical 
because it expresses an understanding that is grounded in my encounter 
with the other’s singularity, and so is distrust. Trust is not, however, a 
condition for the encounter itself. It is not because it is constitutive of the 
ethical encounter that trust is ethical, but because it expresses it. To use 
Lévinasian terms, trust is not what facilitates my encounter with the face of 
the other, but is on the contrary made possible by that encounter which he 
calls proximity. Trust as well as distrust express the fact that I am already 
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 Notice that Baier does not require that the grounds for trusting should be made 
explicit, nor, importantly, that they could actually be made entirely explicit. This is 
significant because it has implications for what kinds of grounds she has in mind. 
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an ethical being able, but by no means guaranteed, to act with respect and 
consideration.  
Trust and distrust are preceded by and grounded in ethical responsibility, 
and as we will see in chapter three, Lévinas provides an explanation of how 
selfhood as such emerges from the encounter with alterity in which I 
experience myself as responsible. To conceive of selfhood as always 
already called to responsibility and hence ethically oriented is a very 
different starting-point from one in which the self is seen as self-
sufficiently preceding an ethical relatedness to others, and it is one that is 
better suited to make sense of how we relate to each other in terms of trust 
and distrust. Bernstein criticizes moral philosophy that treats its subject as 
an addendum to rational human existence, arguing that they 
counterproductively “begin their moral reflections with conditions in which 
it is absent” (Bernstein 2011, 395). He continues:  
Modern moral philosophy is not simply remote from the actuality of moral 
experience, it typically begins at the very juncture where actual moral life has 
collapsed. Moral philosophy as now practiced is the morality of a world without 
morality. (Bernstein 2011, 395) 
From his analysis of trust Bernstein comes to a conclusion similar to 
Lévinas’, namely that if we start from the assumption of a non-ethical life 
we can never properly come to understand ethics because we will miss the 
inherently ethical nature of existence itself. Our conceptualizations of non-
ethical existence are abstractions. Hertzberg points to this predicament as 
the reason why Baier’s account eventually falls short. Recalling Baier’s 
definition of trust as allowing someone to influence the advancement of 
one’s welfare out of confidence in their goodwill, or at least absence of ill-
will or indifference, we see how she addresses the parent-child relationship 
as one where the parents take care of such goods as “nutrition, shelter, 
clothing, health, education, privacy, and loving attachment to others”: 
Why, once the child becomes at all self-conscious about trusting parents to look after 
such goods for her, should she have confidence that parents are dependable 
custodians of such goods? Presumably because many of them are also goods to the 
parents, through their being goods to the child, especially if the parent loves the 
child. (Baier 1986, 242–243) 
To describe the parents’ care for their child as a function of shared 
interests, and a child’s trust in her parents as justified because of such a 
functional grounding, seems to miss what is essential to such a relationship. 
It is precisely because Baier starts from a view of human relationality as 
one where trust, commitment and responsibility are absent that she ends up 
with this contra-intuitive description of a family’s bonds of love and trust. 
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Instead, we shall heed the criticism that Hertzberg levels at her among 
others:  
What Baier seems to be describing is a child who for some reason has lost her trust in 
her parents, but is still trying to decide whether it is wise for her to reckon with them 
in the future. […] The interest of her account, however, lies in the fact that it very 
clearly and honestly brings out the consequences of adopting a certain view of 
human action, the belief-desire model, for our understanding of trust. What she has 
done, it appears, is the best one can do given those presuppositions. (Hertzberg 2010, 
202–203) 
In fact, most attempts to translate trust into some other good in order to 
explain its value for us are unsuccessful because for the most part the harm 
that we suffer from a breach of trust is loss of trust. Trust seems irreducible 
to other forms of harm, including risk, which is what we find in Luhmann, 
Baier and Jones, because, as Lagerspetz argues, trust is constitutive of what 
we mean by risk, not the other way round (Alanen, Heinämaa, and 
Wallgren 1997, 104f). As we saw, Jones explains trust in terms of an 
attitude of optimism regarding the other’s goodwill, and Baier similarly 
speaks of how the belief that another’s will towards one is good is always 
involved in trust, and that such a belief is itself a good that is entrusted in 
trusting; yet these notions of goodwill or optimism seem less to explain 
than to paraphrase what trust is, and hence what Baier’s claim amounts to 
is that we entrust each other with the trusting relationship itself in trusting, 
because this belief in the other’s good will that is trust “is itself a good, nor 
merely instrumentally but in itself” (Baier 1992, 111; Baier 1997, 119). It 
appears that we cannot translate trust into other attitudes or mental states in 
order to get a better grip of it, because such other states either turn out to be 
relying on trust to make sense or are simply another word for trust. We 
must seek the meaning of trust, and of the harm cause by its destruction, at 
a more basic level than risk, yet without turning it into the irresponsible and 
impersonal affectivity of a necessarily pre-reflective atmosphere.  
1.4.4 Can I meaningfully trust what is morally unsound?  
If trust differs from reliability in that it is not about what we can expect and 
anticipate with some certainty, but about trusting the other’s ‘moral 
competence’ or moral judgment, then what about people I am not in 
agreement with or am not particularly fond off? The trusting relationship is 
intersubjective in a more substantial sense than a relationship of reliance; I 
can certainly find a person reliable even if I have no sense of shared values, 
and I may even very reliably predict the behaviour of a sadistic murderer, 
but it would seem utterly absurd to say that I trusted such a person. Trust 
requires something more, namely a sense of the other as someone 
responsible, i.e. one who can judge what is right and wrong and is inclined 
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to act accordingly. On the other hand, it is not the case that we can only 
trust those with whom we substantially share beliefs and values. I may, for 
instance, find a politician trustworthy even though she represents a party 
that I disagree with on most matters, and we often make just such a 
distinction between politicians who act in accordance with their beliefs and 
those who we in Denmark name weather vanes because they change 
arbitrarily to follow popular demand. This distinction highlights that in 
trust we sense something like the consistency of the other’s character. It is 
what Arendt finds is revealed of us when we step into the light of the public 
sphere and announce ourselves through words and actions directed at our 
fellow citizens. According to her, a person or a self is realized by being 
expressed to others in actions that are aimed at our common world in the 
shape of sensus communis.
27
 When we trust, then, we assume a person’s 
consistency of character and ability to judge ethical matters appropriately. 
Since ethics is not a relative matter, but impresses itself on us as 
unconditional, my positive judgment about another’s trustworthiness is an 
implicit nod to their moral character.
28
 I can find a politician trustworthy 
despite our profound disagreements, and here at least trust is comparable to 
reliance and belief. I do not need to share my entire world view with 
someone to find them trustworthy, but what happens if we press the point 
by moving to the question of disliking or of outright disapproval? I can 
certainly believe in someone whom I do not like, and I can rely on them to 
behave in a certain manner, and perhaps I can even trust them, granted that 
they are decent people. A clear difference emerges, however, if we turn to 
the question of the morally unsound. A simple example will underline the 
difference. As Jean Améry arrives at the SS controlled prison in which he 
was tortured, he is led to the “business room” where serious and efficient 
people conduct the daily administration of the prison in a well-lit and quiet 
atmosphere that contrasts forcefully with the nightmarish cellars beneath:  
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 Arendt’s analysis of the interdependence of human plurality and personal singularity 
in the judging activity and in political action will be helpful later when we look in more 
detail at how we judge trustworthiness and when we seek an explanation for the 
profound sense of isolation that befalls people who have lost trust.  
28
 This is also true if we imagine the kind of trust that can exist between members of 
criminal gangs or even death squads. Although actions that such trust enables are 
horrible, they do not make a vice of trust itself. I would suggest, however, that trust 
thrives less in such situations than we are perhaps inclined to imagine, and that in the 
daily work of the mafia or the death squad it is reliance and control that predominate. 
See for instance Gambetta’s analysis of the mafia as relying on distrust (Gambetta 
1988). 
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Very efficiently they merely recorded the information contained on my false identity 
card and speedily relieved me of my rather inconsiderable possessions. […] 
Everything was recorded in writing, with the precision befitting the occurrences in a 
business room. Father Himmler gazed down contentedly onto the flag that covered 
the wooden table, and onto his people. They were dependable. (Amery 1998, 30) 
Reliance and trust are, as we saw, qualitatively different, and no matter 
how truly dependable someone is, our relation does not become one of 
trust. Just as trust cannot, by being sufficiently well grounded, be 
exchanged for reliability, so reliability, no matter how solid it is, does not 
amount to trust. I can believe in my torturer, and I can rely on my torturer, 
but I cannot trust my torturer.
29
 Trust is about the other’s moral character, 
about the other person, in a way that reliance and belief are not.  
In moving from disagreement over dislike to the morally objectionable we 
can see that whereas we need not share our entire world view with those we 
trust there must at least be a very minimum presumption of sharedness in 
order for trust to make sense. If I am to trust someone I must presume that 
we have at least enough of a world in common to respond to each other in a 
humanly recognizable way. As we proceed, I will argue that trust presumes 
the other’s responsivity to me and to third parties, and consequently that it 
presumes that our shared world is, at a minimal level, structured ethically.  
But is it inherent in the trusting relationship that it is necessarily a good 
relationship? Baier defines healthy trust as that which can survive the 
bringing to light of the grounds each person has for trusting the other, 
thereby excluding trust based on pretence from “morally decent” trust 
(Baier 1986, 259). As we noted above, for Baier and Jones alike, trust is a 
matter of what is good for me, that is, what will further my welfare. 
Trusting can then be reduced to a functional concern for the self, which 
gives it an oddly one-sided character, given that trust is particularly about 
the other. Conversely, Hertzberg makes the point that trust should be 
characterized “as a good relation, or perhaps we might say ‘a relation in 
goodness’” (Hertzberg 2010, 201). A relation in goodness, it emerges, 
means that trust is the primary openness with which we always meet the 
other provided that our upbringing and later life have not prominently 
featured neglect and abuse. It is natural to trust others, he holds, and 
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 In practice it will of course be impossible to form a belief about the truth value of 
what someone says in a complete absence of trust, but the point here is that it is not in 
principle nonsensical to speak about the truth or falsity of what someone utters in such a 
situation. Whether or not someone is right or wrong in stating something is independent 
of their moral character. Not so with whether or not they are trustworthy, as I shall 
endeavour to demonstrate.  
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“suspicion in the absence of positive grounds would strike us as 
pathological” (Hertzberg 2010, 202). The burden of proof has been 
changed from trust to distrust: we need no grounds to be justified in 
trusting, but we do need grounds for distrust to be reasonable. But does this 
asymmetry account for what it means that trust is a relation in goodness? 
Hertzberg does not further specify what he means, but I take it that he must 
mean that only in and with trusting relationships can human existence truly 
flourish, and that the kind of human existence made possible thereby has 
intrinsic value because we are free to realize our potential with each other 
instead of against each other. That trust should in this way have intrinsic 
value quite independent of whatever pleasures it (also) gives us in practical 
existence links it to a particular kind of philosophical anthropology.  
Unlike Hertzberg I do not subscribe to a view of trust as a basic or 
primitive reaction or a default condition for human life. Even so, there is 
still an asymmetry between trust and distrust with regard to what they make 
possible for the self. Distrust, if prevailing, is not in itself corrosive of the 
self, but it closes off avenues of possibility that I can only follow with 
others. In the long run, a person living in the isolation imposed by 
widespread distrust of others will live in a diminished world because she is 
foreclosed from the intersubjective affordances that otherwise comprise a 
person’s experiential world. Perhaps a reference to Arendt can make this 
point clearer. Her phenomenological analysis of the relationship between 
participation in a shared world and the development and reliability of our 
mental capacities identifies a crucial feature, namely that we can only truly 
realize what it means to be human in interaction with others because living 
with others in a sphere of plurality enables thinking and acting in a way that 
the solitary being cannot attain. In Arendt’s terminology this makes us 
worldly beings to a quite radical extent, whereby we truly only come to be 
selves through the work that a worldly existence is. The disclosure of the 
who that is born as the agent manifests as a person before the gaze of others 
confers a level of reality by bringing about a new form of self-relatedness 
without which the experience of oneself as responsible and rational could 
not take place.
30
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 As I will argue in chapter three, I follow Lévinas and Arendt in holding the view that 
without the experience of being accountable – which depends on the presence of other 
radically singular beings – I would not come to question my existing beliefs in a way 
that allowed me to transcend my own perspective.  
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In a similar way to Lévinas, then, we find in Arendt the double implication 
that “subjectivity is only subjectivity in transcendence, not only in 
transcending, but also in being itself transcended” (Grøn 2007, 24):  
It is a matter of becoming subjectivity in a full sense. This also complicates the 
movement of transcendence. It turns into a double movement in which we do not just 
transcend ourselves in relating to others, but come to see ourselves in being 
transcended in ways we cannot regain or reclaim in transcending ourselves. (Grøn 
2007, 24) 
This self-alteration is not a simple addition to a pre-existing self, but 
fundamentally changes (and incomparably enriches) what it means to be a 
self, experiencing a world shared with other free and singular persons, and 
consequently Arendt more or less implicitly subscribes to a notion of 
human flourishing in her phenomenological anthropology. Lévinas, whose 
view is indeed very similar to Arendt’s on a structural level, is quite averse 
to any such notion. In the course of the argument I shall address the 
question of whether a concept of human flourishing is necessary for an 
ethical account of trust and distrust. As chapter four will show, the question 
of the possible purposiveness of trust for human existence is related to the 
need to assume a minimally shared world in the form of mutual, albeit 
asymmetrical, responsiveness.  
1.5 Initiatory conclusion 
I have argued that the trusting relationship is irreducibly personal. By this I 
mean that it is a relationship in which one particular person trusts another 
particular person, and, as it appears, holding on to this structure can be 
problematic. What seems self-evident at first becomes complicated as soon 
as we try to work out the specifics of trusting and distrusting, because what 
does it actually mean that they are about the other? As we saw, when trust 
is conceived as something equivalent to a belief and to a sense of certainty 
it becomes about the function that the other has, i.e. about how purposive 
they are as a teacher or a carpenter, but not about their person as such. And 
when trust is conceived as a pre-reflective feeling of familiarity, the 
relation to the other is arbitrary at best, and mostly the feeling only 
expresses one’s own disposition and emotional state. Although both views 
manage to ensure that trust is anchored in the trusting person, expressing 
either the conceptual achievements of cognition or the emotional habitus of 
the truster, they lose the ability to be about another person in a substantial 
sense. The problem is not solved by an integrated account that includes 
both kinds of trust; instead, as solution must be found in an investigation of 
what it means to understand another person as trustworthy. My solution 
does not integrate two fundamentally different forms of trust, but instead 
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seeks to integrate the important insights that come from the different 
positions that we have visited. Similarly to the supporters of the pre-
reflective position I will argue that trust is unconditional, basic, and not 
reducible to some kind of deficient belief, and similarly to the supporters of 
the strategic position I shall insist that trust and distrust carry an 
understanding of that to which they pertain, in our case the other’s 
character, which makes them more than arbitrary expressions of 
idiosyncratic preference.  
Trust and distrust express one person’s understanding of another. There is a 
claim built into my trust and distrust, and this implicit claim is about the 
other’s character as trustworthy. Our claims may be mistaken, but even 
when they are, we are still unavoidably making claims: trust and distrust 
take a stand on reality. The challenge to my proposed view is to explain 
how this claim is essentially different from an epistemic claim about 
phenomenal properties, and my suggestion is to conceive of it as grounded 
in ethical responsivity towards the ultimately incomprehensible otherness 
of the other, that is, the other’s non-phenomenality. In seeing trust and 
distrust as expressions of how our ethical responsiveness to others may turn 
into the beginnings of understanding, their significance for the self comes 
into view. As ethical responsiveness is the most basic form of the self’s 
world-relatedness (a point I will argue later), trust and distrust are 
expressions of this basic orientational nature of the self. Trust is basic 
because it is an expression of basic reflectivity as a way of understanding 
the absolute other, and its ethical nature is unconditional because it does 
not depend on whether it serves a purpose nor does it measure the trusted 
person against a functional yardstick. One’s lack of trust, then, manifests in 
an inability to orient oneself in a world that, because it does not appear as 
meaningful to the person whose responsiveness to the other has been 
disturbed by a severe breach of trust, is confusing and strange. This is the 
topic of the following chapter.  
 
2 Trust and torture 
What makes loneliness so unbearable is the loss of one’s own self which can be 
realized in solitude, but confirmed in its identity only by the trusting and trustworthy 
company of my equals. In this situation, man loses trust in himself as the partner of 
his thoughts and that elementary confidence in the world which is necessary to make 
experiences at all. Self and world, capacity for thought and experience are lost at the 
same time. (Arendt 1973, 477) 
The motivating observation behind this chapter is that the loss of trust that 
results from torture is presented by survivors as an experience of extreme 
isolation and disorientation and as a loss of the sense of self or of being 
real. By engaging primarily with autobiographical accounts of two torture 
survivors I seek to explain this peculiar convolution which is a common 
theme for many survivors of torture and is expressed in the harsh 
consequences attributes to the loss of trust. That trust is of central 
importance is beyond doubt: without it even our most basic daily tasks 
would be rendered very difficult if not impossible. My suggestion, 
however, is that the significance of trust, and consequently of its loss, goes 
deeper. Trust seems to be intimately connected not only with our ability to 
behave in a trusting manner in everyday situations – say, take public 
transport after dark or investing in meaningful relationships – but to the 
ability to hold on to epistemic consistency. The loss of trust affects not just 
our ability to partake in relationships with others, but goes beyond this 
specific kind of isolation and effects alterations in basic forms of self-
experience and self-relation. The guiding question of the chapter is this: 
what is trust, that its loss has such severe consequences for the sense of 
self? The main purpose in relation to the overall argument is to explore the 
significance of trust and the loss of trust for someone who has experienced 
traumatic violence at the hands of another human being. My investigation 
is led by the idea that we can understand the connection between a loss of 
trust and a loss of self by analysing their connectedness with what we may 
call a loss of intersubjective relatedness, understood as a way of being 
related to others that enables us to give meaning and direction to our 
experiences. Trauma can severely obstruct this relatedness and thereby the 
experience of inhabiting a shareable world, and because of the deep 
isolation that comes about as a result thereof torture survivors can come to 
feel disoriented, dislocated and unreal.  
Torture survivors evidently struggle to give their experiences an 
expressible form, and the challenge of conveying their predicament to those 
of us who have no experiential access to it is evidenced in how they often 
resort to placing an ‘as if’ in front of their descriptions. This tiny 
conditional signals the difficulty they feel in thinking of references that can 
serve to integrate their experiences into a shareable world by turning it into 
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something that they can point to and say: it is like that. As they struggle to 
do this, the terms trust and loss of trust seem to be a better match than 
many others for what they aim to describe. The two torture survivors that 
we will accompany in the present chapter each in their own way seek to 
convey to others what it is like to exist after torture, and in this attempt they 
return again and again to how they feel less than real, as if their selves died, 
as if the world is utterly foreign, and as if underneath or next to the 
ordinary world of others they sense another horribly real world. As 
language fails in the face of this doubling of consciousness, their 
overwhelming feeling is one of isolation and loneliness.  
The cases of the two survivors are markedly different. Dianna Ortiz is an 
American Roman Catholic nun who, while serving as a missionary in 
Guatemala in 1989, was abducted and tortured. She authored the book The 
Blindfold's Eyes: My Journey from Torture to Truth (2004) in which she 
describes the struggle to recover. Jean Améry, whose birth name was Hans 
Mayer, was a Jewish holocaust survivor who, in his essay collection At the 
Mind’s Limits (1966), wrote about how he experienced living in the world 
after having been tortured. He committed suicide in 1978 at the age of 65. 
The differences between the two cases notwithstanding, they each in their 
way illuminate the conditions of living in the aftermath of torture, and their 
stories are significantly similar when it comes to understanding what is at 
stake when life-threatening events come to be experienced as self-
annihilating, and why it is that the connection with others becomes the 
pivotal factor for recovery.  
The chapter proceeds in three stages. First, I shall clarify the relationship 
between trust and the lost sense of self as well as introduce a few terms 
from the existing rehabilitation research; the second part engages directly 
with the autobiographical accounts and seeks to learn from them; and, 
finally, I briefly discuss the role and nature of trust and distrust for the self 
in view of the preceding analysis. Thus, the philosophical thrust of the 
following pages is to explore the fundamental world-relatedness of 
selfhood by way of an analysis of what survivors of torture mean when 
they speak of a loss of trust in the world. The examination proceeds from a 
primarily Lévinasian framework, which means that some of the 
terminology has not yet been fully introduced. This will be addressed in 
chapter three.  
2.1 Torture, lack of trust, and self-estrangement 
I told him that I didn’t trust people and he said that was just what the torturers had 
wanted – torture was designed to break down trust. (Ortiz 2004, 111) 
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Traumatized people feel utterly abandoned, utterly alone, cast out of the human and 
divine system of care and protection that sustain life. Thereafter, a sense of 
alienation, of disconnection, pervades every relationship, from the most intimate 
familial bonds to the most abstract community and religion. When trust is lost, 
traumatized people feel that they belong more to the dead than to the living. (Herman 
1997, 53) 
The United Nations Torture Convention of 1984 defines torture as the 
intentional infliction of pain by a public official to obtain information. The 
full text of the convention’s definition is: 
Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third 
person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has 
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a 
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain 
or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence 
of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. (A/RES/39/46 1984)  
This definition provides the ‘what’ of torture as well as the ‘why’, yet in a 
very important sense it misses the point. The purpose of torture is given as 
obtaining information, but this is only true on the rhetorical or theatrical 
level. The interrogation process is not so much the setting in which torture 
may take place as its pretext. Torture is not a means for obtaining 
information; interrogation is a means for torture, as Westin puts it (Westin 
1989, 19ff; cf. Gerrity, Keane, and Tuma 2001, 14), and although the aim 
of torture will often be to terrorize a population and prevent social 
movements or political opposition from gaining a foothold, the concrete 
target is the singular individual: the personality and self of the victim. It is 
not surprising that trust is lost after torture, and neither is it surprising that 
trust is the paramount issue in rehabilitative therapy,
31
 but for survivors of 
torture, the loss of trust is more than a by-product of the crime; it is its 
purpose and reason. Again and again, in research and in first-person 
statements, albeit couched in different terms, one meets the statement that 
torture is “designed to break down trust”. What is implied in the claim that 
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 “A natural consequence of exposure to torture is difficulty in forming trusting 
relationships. It has even been said that “nothing is more important for the professional 
than addressing the issue of trust” (Pope and Garcia-Peltoniemi 1991, 270, cf. 
Kanninen, K., Salo, J., and Punamaki, R. 2000, 438; Ebert and Dyck 2004, 629; Fabri 
2011; Silove 1999). 
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destruction of trust is the essence of torture? Let us examine a longer quote 
from Fabri:
32
 
Every aspect of Sister Dianna Ortiz’ functioning has been impacted by her 
experience of torture. She describes, accurately, torture as the destruction of 
personality. Certain aspects of daily living are extremely difficult for Sister Dianna. 
These include making direct eye contact; shaking hands and receiving other 
expressions of warmth; [... which ] impair her daily functioning, as well as her 
relationships with other people. [...] She has a diminished responsiveness to the 
external world [that she] describes as “being in a bubble,” seeing the world around 
her but not experiencing it. She feels detached from others and unable to express 
emotions. This lack of emotional investment in daily activities includes [...] Sister 
Dianna’s relationship with herself. Her self-image and self-esteem has been damaged 
by the torture experience. [...] At times Sister Dianna admits to preferring her 
“bubble” where she feels nothing, yet this promotes the feeling of isolation and of 
being a “nonperson.” This predicament is directly a result of the strategic torture 
process which dismantles an individual’s personality and leaves one with the task of 
rebuilding a sense of trust, not only in others, but in oneself (Ortiz 2002, 138-140) 
Fabri’s assessment of Ortiz’s mental health describes an unravelling of the 
person, as relationships with others as well as with oneself are distorted. As 
a natural conclusion to the assessment she includes in the last sentence the 
loss of trust, as if it were obvious that trust is intertwined with the 
formation and exercise of selfhood, and that such radical loss is 
devastating. The more or less synonymous way in which loss of trust and 
loss of personality are used in Fabri’s description reflects how they are 
described in first-person accounts, and raises the question of the nature of 
this intertwinement, or, in Bernstein’s words, “What is trust such that its 
loss could be said to be equivalent to one’s loss of one’s sense of oneself as 
a person?” (Bernstein 2011, 400).  
Many years after her torture, Ortiz sums up in her journal continuing 
struggle to recover in her journal: “IS IT POSSIBLE TO TRUST 
PEOPLE??” (Ortiz 2002, 441). This question constitutes the essence of her 
predicament, and its answer will determine whether she can re-establish 
connections with the social world, because whether or not we can trust is 
not just about what expectations we may have of our fellow people when 
we move among them, but goes further and deeper than that: the 
breakdown of trust, which is the essence of torture, is also the breakdown 
of “the individual’s personality” and consequently of something that is 
repeatedly and insistently called “the world”. E.g. Ortiz:  
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 Mary R. Fabri is a Clinical Psychologist and Director of Torture Treatment Services 
and International Training at the Marjorie Kovler Center of the Heartland Alliance. She 
participated in the therapeutic treatment of Sister Dianna Ortiz.  
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Every time he tortures, the torturer reinforces the idea that we cannot trust one 
another, and that we cannot trust the world we live in. (Ortiz 2004, 476)  
Similarly, Améry:  
Yet I am certain that with the very first blow that descends on him he loses 
something we will perhaps temporarily call “trust in the world.” (Amery 1998, 28) 
What does it mean to “trust in the world”? For Améry it means that you can 
expect the other’s respect and, should you need it, help. Torture is the 
“inversion of the social world” (Amery 1998, 35) and the negation of what 
you thought you knew about the world in which your identity and sense of 
self originated and made sense. From the testimonies of torture survivors it 
emerges that the loss of trust has global consequences; it signifies the loss 
of something very basic for the person, namely a web of connectedness 
with others that the sense of being a self depends on. When trust is lost, so 
is an intersubjective connectedness that is necessary for selfhood because it 
is the stuff that shared worlds are made of; losing trust in the world, then, 
means losing the ability to partake of the intersubjective relationships of 
trust that we normally more or less tacitly live with and in, and its result is 
isolation and confusion.  
2.1.1 The essence of torture is the destruction of the person  
In actuality these life stories are really death stories describing how the self died – in 
a way we still cannot properly explain. (Berliner et al. 2004, my translation) 
I am not alive. I died in Auschwitz, but no one knows it. (Delbo 1997, 267)
33
 
It is well established that torture aims at, and is a very successful strategy 
for, destroying a person’s identity, core values and sense of self (Ebert and 
Dyck 2004; Winter 2011; Herman 1997; Janoff-Bulman 2002; Basoglu 
1992; Bustos 1992; Somnier and Genefke 1986; Ardal 2010; Silove 1999; 
Steel et al. 2002), and recent attempts have been made to present this 
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 Charlotte Delbo wrote Auschwitz and After and Days and Memory as memoirs of her 
time in the concentrations camps from 1943 to 1945 and her return to France 
afterwards. In them she relates her experiences in a precise and very descriptive manner, 
almost documentary in style at times whereas at other times the same simplicity attains 
a poetic quality. Compare for instance: “Auschwitz is so deeply etched in my memory 
that I cannot forget one moment of it. – So you are living with Auschwitz? – No. I live 
next to it… No doubt I am very fortunate in not recognizing myself in the self that was 
in Auschwitz. ... I live within a twofold being. The Auschwitz double doesn’t bother 
me, doesn’t interfere with my life. As though it weren’t I at all. Without this split I 
would not have been able to revive” (Delbo 2001, 2,3).  
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particular symptom as an underlying and unifying factor for the complex 
symptomatic situation of the torture survivor. Different terms are chosen; 
some speak of “mental death” (Ebert and Dyck 2004), others of “mental 
defeat” (Ehlers et al. 1998; Ehlers et al. 2000). Herman mentions 
derealisation and depersonalization as part of how “alterations of 
consciousness are at the heart of constriction or numbing” (Herman 1997, 
42), and similar formulations can be found in Basoglu’s authoritative 
anthology on current treatment approaches (Basoglu 1992 (ed.)):  
In some individuals, defences such as derealization, depersonalization and other 
states of altered consciousness may arise, leading to a severe constriction, 
desymbolization and fragmentation of mental functioning (Krystal 1988). (Bustos 
1992, 339) 
Torture is comparable to other humanly inflicted traumatic experiences 
such as rape, domestic violence, and sexual abuse of children since they all 
share the fundamental characteristics of a relationship of powerlessness in 
the face of control and abuse, but in torture many of the dynamics that 
make such experiences traumatic are carried to their extreme. A defining 
feature of traumatic violence is that the victim is subjected to the 
perpetrator’s control, and that helplessness and powerlessness are central to 
the experience; in torture, the control is absolute, the period of control 
prolonged, and the helpless suffering of the victim the only purpose. It is 
certainly inaccurate to say that in the other forms of violence mentioned the 
victim’s suffering is only an unintended consequence, because each in its 
way relies on the elimination of the other’s boundaries, autonomy and 
dignity, and therefore each in its way “destroys the belief that one can be 
oneself in relation to others” (Herman 1997, 53). Yet in torture this is 
brought fully to the fore because it is the essence of torture: not just 
extreme helplessness and suffering, but the forced intimacy with someone 
who seem omnipotent, omniscient and malevolent.  
In their overview of the literature on torture survivors’ symptomatic 
accounts, Ebert and Dyck suggest that “the essence of mental death is the 
loss of identity, defined as the perception of sameness and continuity of the 
self – and the self in relation to others – based on the relative constancy of 
one’s assumptions, beliefs, values, attitudes, and behavior” (Ebert and 
Dyck 2004, 621). Although I find their emphasis of what they call mental 
death very much to the point, I would suggest that their focus remains too 
intellectual and too individualistic, thereby undervaluing or overlooking the 
significance of the intersubjective element in torture and the consequences 
it has for the self. It is not, I hold, just a matter of having one’s assumptions 
and beliefs about the goodness of others destroyed or of having one’s 
values overturned, but of losing something much more fundamental to the 
very fabric of selfhood, namely a relatedness that comes before beliefs and 
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values. This cognitive bias is not uncommon in rehabilitation research, and 
the altered self-experience that results from torture is consequently often 
conceptualized as a result of conflicts between the victim’s construal of the 
world prior to torture and the torture experience itself, which cannot be 
integrated into the framework of existing constructs. Horowitz, for 
instance, speaks of changes in core beliefs (1999), and Janoff-Bulman of 
shattered assumptions (2002). Building on the existing work in the field I 
aim to show that the ‘loss of trust in the world’ related by torture survivors 
points to the signification of a deeper level of intersubjectivity that has 
been affected and transformed by torture and is at the bottom of how we 
experience, think and act. Consequently, the destruction that torture wreaks 
can only be understood through understanding the nature of the destructive 
relatedness of one person to the other that gives torture its nature.  
Survivors of torture are often diagnosed with chronic post-traumatic stress 
disorder, but the discussion leading up to the publication of the fourth 
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-IV) in 1994 included arguments for introducing the diagnosis of 
complex PTSD in order to capture the consequences of “prolonged, 
repeated trauma […] where the victim is in a state of captivity, unable to 
flee, and under the control of the perpetrator” (Herman 1992, 377). Herman 
has been asked to give the rationale for the inclusion of such a diagnosis to 
the task force behind the forthcoming fifth revision (Ford 2009, 359). The 
new diagnosis would have as its core feature a much more pronounced 
emphasis on what was described above as an experience of mental death, 
and which in the diagnostic language falls under the categories of 
derealization and dissociation.
34
 
Derealization is a symptom of various mental disorders, and it denotes an 
experience in which the person feels unreal and detached from her- or 
himself (APA 1994, 766)
35
. When asked about it, people will often talk 
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 See Herman (1992) for references to the discussion. By all accounts no diagnosis by 
the name of complex PTSD will be included in the DSM-V, but a number of disorders 
are being considered for inclusion under the heading Trauma- and Stressor-Related 
Disorder. See the website for the DSMV for more information (www.dsm5.org) as well 
as a recent article commissioned by the DSM-5 Anxiety, Obsessive-Compulsive 
Spectrum, Post-Traumatic, and Dissociative Disorders Work Group (Friedman et al. 
2011). 
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 Ebert and Dyck suggest investigating how therapies that have demonstrated their 
effectiveness with personality disorders with a substantially overlapping clinical 
presentation may be of help in constructing a treatment targeted post-traumatic mental 
death. In such situations, they point out, lacking trust is “the most refractory of 
symptoms, and an approach that makes the capacity for trust the initial focus of 
(continued) 
70 Trust and torture 
 
about living in a dreamlike state and feeling disconnected from their own 
bodily parts to the extent that it is as if they are observing the world from 
behind a glass barrier. The external environment appears unfamiliar, and 
other people seem like actors or even robots, and the world itself takes on 
the character of a stage set. Comparatively, dissociation is defined as a 
“disruption in the usually integrated functions of consciousness, memory, 
identity, or perception of the environment” that may be sudden or gradual, 
transient or chronic (APA 1994, 766). As this chapter serves to illustrate, 
the basic disturbance of self-relatedness that is at the core of a proposed 
diagnosis like complex PTSD is, at least for torture survivors, related to the 
loss of trust that occurs when an other is experienced as a torturer. It comes 
about as a result of an experience that Améry describes thus: 
Astonishment at the existence of the other, as he boundlessly asserts himself through 
torture, and astonishment at what one can become oneself: flesh and death. […] That 
one’s fellow man was experienced as the antiman remains in the tortured person as 
accumulated horror. It blocks the view into a world where hope rules. (Amery 1998, 
40) 
Parnas describes psychopathological self-disturbance as characterized by “a 
very dramatic problem of identity at a very basic level: the normally 
unreflected, automatic and non-observational or non-critical sense of being 
oneself is shattered, resulting in an ineffable painful feeling of 
incompleteness”, where the person loses the “identity of the experience and 
the self, as being me in an un-mediated way, without gap or fissure between 
the experience and the sense of the self” (Parnas 2007, 64). While prima 
facie similar in many ways to the phenomenon I seek to explain, I find the 
description prone to a problematic simplification of the way we ordinarily 
experience ourselves as selves. One could perhaps even speak of a fiction 
or a fantasy of normal selfhood, casting it as unproblematically immediate. 
However, such a conception of selfhood can only be a purely analytical 
concept abstracted from experienced reality. An essential characteristic of 
the view of the self that I set forth is its fundamental non-self-coincidence. 
It seems implausible and unrecognizable that there should be such a thing 
as a non-critical and unreflected immediate unity of self and experience 
that is without observation and ongoing simultaneous introspection – 
without distance – even as this is not accomplished as conscious cognition. 
Given that we, as selves, have always already encountered the other, 
radically separate from us, we are precluded from experiencing ourselves, 
 
                                                                                                                           
treatment may be expected to enhance the effectiveness of other treatment components” 
(Ebert and Dyck 2004, 629).  
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others, or worldly phenomena in this non-mediated way of complete unity 
and synchronicity of self and experience. It is proposed, instead, that we as 
selves are always slightly distanced from ourselves, always self-reflecting 
and reflecting-in-experiencing.
36
  
It is worth noting that the fantasy of how the normal sense of self is given 
to itself in an unproblematic and immediate way is mirrored in how the 
ideal of an unmediated relationship to the other is found in discussion of 
trust. On both these issues – the unreflected immediacy of selfhood and the 
unreflected immediacy of trust – I challenge the ideal as being impossible 
as well as undesirable for a philosophical account of ethics. In the trusting 
relationship the ideal of immediacy draws sustenance from the implicit 
assumption that a subject is either entirely absorbed in the presence of 
interpersonal interaction or drawn back into theoretical reflection, and that 
the two cannot coexist: reflection requires distance which is unavailable to 
the one who is utterly engulfed in life. This strict division into the 
perspectives of either the participant or the spectator is a construction that 
does not do justice to the complexity of either situation, but which in 
particular renders an impoverished account of the actively world-engaged 
self. The trusting relationship is a good example of how we need something 
like our notion of basic reflectivity as the primary form of the worldly 
engagement of the self. In other words, the trusting person does not need to 
recede to a third person stance in order to reflect upon the relationship we 
have to others in trust. The spectator’s view is unsituated, and this makes it 
not more, but less capable of the full insight into the nature and quality of 
the trusting relationship. But more of this later. 
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 Regardless of whether some sort of underlying, unexperientiable, immediate self-
coincidence can be argued for, it is my claim that immediacy is often given a role for 
the self’s relationship to its world that it cannot support. We saw the same tendency in 
the pre-reflective version of trust in chapter 1. There, immediacy tends to be seen as the 
ideal for human relationships, and reflection correspondingly as a fall from grace. 
Incidentally, much the same tendency can be found in particularly the early Lévinas-
reception where a strong dichotomy is often set up between ethics and cognitive 
thought, making them in effect allergic as well as irrelevant to each other (a tendency 
partly understandable due to Lévinas’ own language which certainly invites such 
descriptions at times). I aim to demonstrate that there is a role for reflection in trust as 
well as in the ethical relationship, albeit a concept of reflection that is stripped of its 
overly conceptual connotations and remain more sensitive to experiencing otherwise. 
Ethics does for Lévinas influence ontology even though it is of a wholly different place 
– “Goodness will indeed show itself in ontology metamorphosed into essence, and to be 
reduced; but essence cannot contain it” (OB, 137) – wherefore it is also in the 
restlessness accompanying objective experience that we should look for the trace of 
alterity and hence for the ability to experience that which resists our grasp.  
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As we shall see in the following, the analysis of mental death or self-
estrangement will not only facilitate a deeper understanding of the 
experiences themselves, but will also shed light on how they relate to our 
‘ordinary’ experience of being real and feeling in touch with the world. 
What I have looked for in my reading of the autobiographical accounts are 
expressions that say something about alterations of the fundamental 
relatedness of self and world and their consequences. Such alterations can 
be experienced in many different ways, and will often have to do with 
language and the ability to communicate, with feeling isolated and with 
memory loss, with feeling that one has disappeared or is unreal, and with 
disorientation and a profound mistrust of one’s own senses and sanity. 
These are some of the factors that I have found in the narratives and present 
below.  
2.2 Loss of trust and loss of world  
Survivors of random attacks frequently describe themselves as living in different 
worlds before and after the attack and describe the change in trust terms. (Jones 
2004, 7) 
I must accept being foreign as an essential element of my personality […] must get 
along without trust in the world. (Amery 1998, 95) 
Trust plays a role for torture survivors in many ways. They do not trust 
themselves; often they express the feeling that evil has got inside them, and 
that they may contaminate their loved ones. They know that they cannot 
rely on their own thoughts and feelings because they so often turn out to be 
mistaken, most significantly so the belief they once held that human beings 
will respect and care for – and not unduly harm – each other. The world 
around them seems insubstantial, as if walls may at any moment turn to 
dust, as in a nightmare. In addition to this there may be relationships with 
the therapists and doctors who oversee their rehabilitation, should they be 
in a position to receive this, and sometimes with the courts – all of which 
have their own structure of trust and distrust. On the whole, trust is a 
significant issue for the rehabilitation of torture victims, but our focus at 
present will be limited to the kind of trust that has to do with the basic 
world-relatedness of the self and with how its loss is felt.  
As Jones takes notes, survivors of traumatic events are often found to 
describe their experiences as if they lived in different worlds before and 
after the occurrence, and the notion of trust appears central to the accounts, 
as does some kind of notion of the loss of self. Spatial metaphors are often 
used to communicate how the loss of trust feels, such as when survivors 
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speak of feeling exiled, lost, alienated, homeless and foreign, and of how 
the world is incomprehensible:  
Faces, gestures, clothes, houses, words (even if I halfway understood them) were 
sensory reality, but not interpretable signs. There was no order for me in this world. 
[…] Home is security, I say. At home we are all in full command of the dialectics of 
knowledge and recognition, of trust and confidence. Since we know them, we 
recognize them and we trust ourselves to speak and to act - for we may have justified 
confidence in our knowledge and recognition. [...] To live in one’s homeland means 
that what is already known to us occurs before our eyes again and again, in slight 
variants. That can lead to desolation and to intellectual wilting in provincialism - if 
one knows only one’s homeland and nothing else. If one has no home, however, one 
becomes subject to disorder, confusion, desultoriness. (Amery 1998, 47) 
The loss of trust leads to what we can call a loss of world; without trust in 
the world it seems that its familiarity and meaningfulness slip away and 
leaves a sense of disorientation. The confusion of an unfamiliar world is 
reflected in the estrangement that the self experiences as a result of an 
impassive world, unresponsive to its orientational efforts. The fundamental 
relationship between self and world is one of orientation, I argue, which 
means that selfhood is always already a worldly engagement, always 
already extended out into its world. The relationship is not simply one of 
interdependence but is constitutive: self and world are equiprimordial. The 
world is constituted as a sensible to me and as a place in which I am 
oriented.  
Ortiz begins her story, which starts as she is abducted from the 
missionary’s courtyard in San Miguel, Guatemala, by saying: “So I entered 
a world from which few return” (Ortiz 2004, ix). This world has a double 
meaning: it is both the concrete world of the secret prison where she is kept 
and tortured – its physical properties, its social hierarchies and dynamics, 
its hiddenness – and the world of the one who has been tortured. That 
world is one of isolation, destitution, and fear, and it will remain more real 
to her than the world she finds on her return which she is expected to 
recognize and inhabit with others as before. Some months after escaping 
from her Guatemalan torturers she agrees to stay at a psychiatric hospital. 
Her first meeting with her psychiatrist, Dr Snodgrass, is characterized by 
doubts about appearance and reality:  
No notes, I want to say. They could fall into the wrong hands. But I say nothing. He 
would ask me which hands and how the notes could fall into them. And he would 
know what a tenuous line I walk between a world that seems vaguely familiar, a 
world that everyone else thinks is real, and the world I know, in which nothing that 
seems is, in which nothing can be trusted. (Ortiz 2004, 51)  
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Also: 
I look up quickly at Dr Snodgrass to see if he is telling the truth. His eyes express 
nothing. Maybe he is only a surface, perfectly groomed – skin with nothing beneath 
it. I half expect him to evaporate when I blink. But he is still there, waiting for me to 
speak. But I myself am not present, not really. […] Was he a real human being, I 
wonder when he was gone. […] Although Dr Snodgrass had seemed two-
dimensional, like a paper cut-out, everyone else seems that way too at the hospital, 
myself included. (Ortiz 2004, 52,53) 
In the last quote it becomes clear that the feeling of unreality pertains to 
both self and world. “Self and world, capacity for thought and experience 
are lost at the same time”, Arendt claims in the quote that I have chosen to 
open this chapter. Throughout Arendt’s work we find her deeply concerned 
with a careful examination of the intricate relationship between our mental 
powers and our relatedness to a social world. By way of phenomenological 
and existential analysis of the feeling of isolation she comes to the 
conclusion that even perception cannot be understood as an individual 
affair since our ability to trust our own senses and hold on to the 
knowledge of what we have seen is intricately bound up with our 
connection to a common world. The individual human being does not exist 
in isolation, she argues, as it is only through appearing in public as a 
singular human being among singular human beings that we attain our 
uniqueness as irreplaceable individuals. And it is only by appearing before 
a plurality of singular perspectives that phenomena can properly attain the 
status of reality: 
For us, appearance – something that is being seen and heard by others as well as by 
ourselves – constitutes reality. Compared with the reality that comes from being seen 
and heard, even the greatest forces of intimate life – the passions of the heart, the 
thoughts of the mind, the delights of the senses – lead an uncertain, shadowy kind of 
existence unless and until they are transformed, deprivatized and deindividualized, as 
it were, into a shape to fit them for public appearance. (Arendt 1999, 50) 
Améry describes it thus: 
Suddenly, the past was buried and one no longer knew who one was. […] I was a 
person who could no longer say “we” and who therefore said “I” merely out of habit, 
but not with the feeling of full possession of my self. (Amery 1998, 43,44) 
We can think of how a memory from one’s childhood becomes elusive and 
unreal if there is no one to share it with. If I am the only one to remember 
it, it will take on a dreamlike quality, whereas if I can share it with a friend 
it solidifies into reality. If I hear a sound and the people I am with hear 
nothing I will be inclined to dismiss it as my senses playing tricks on me. 
Thinking about everyday experience in this way forces us to attend to the 
social dependence of perception and memory, and in social psychology the 
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same dependence has been shown repeatedly in experiments. One example 
is the classical, and often repeated, study first conducted by Solomon E. 
Asch, where groups of seven to nine student subjects are asked to compare 
the length of lines that are visible to all of them. All but one of the subjects 
are coached beforehand to unanimously provide wrong answers on some of 
the tests whereas the last only knows that it is an experiment in perception. 
The aim is to see how the last person will fare when affected by the 
opinions of the others, and Asch’s findings were striking:  
Whereas in ordinary circumstances individuals matching the lines will make 
mistakes less than 1 per cent of the time, under group pressure the minority subjects 
swung to acceptance of the misleading majority’s wrong judgments in 36.8 per cent 
of the selections. (Asch 1955, 32–33)  
Asch observes that the most remarkable finding is perhaps not so much the 
conformity but the extent to which the ones who conformed would 
afterwards via different mental strategies seem to forget the discomfort of 
the disagreement in order to “recover from doubt and to reestablish their 
equilibrium” (Asch 1955, 33). In other words, they did not remember ever 
having been in doubt about the rightness of their wrong answers. Similarly, 
Arendt points out that it is almost impossible to truly register things as real 
if they exist only in private: 
Even the experience of the materially and sensually given world depends upon my 
being in contact with other men, upon our common sense which regulates and 
controls all other senses and without which each of us would be enclosed in our own 
particularity of sense data which in themselves are unreliable and treacherous. Only 
because we have common sense, that is, only because not one man, but men in the 
plural inhabit the earth can we trust our immediate sensual experience. (Arendt 1973, 
475–476)  
According to Arendt, the realness of things depends on sharing a world, 
and this seems to be reflected in the devastating effects that torture can 
have on the sense of self and the ability to feel at home in a meaningful 
world. Being isolated from a common world is similar to a kind of death, 
she claims, since the sensuous quality of the phenomenal world becomes 
unclear and ambiguous, and when the world feels less real, so does the self 
(Arendt 1999, 51). To be among men – inter homines esse – was, according 
to Arendt, the Roman way of expressing the fact of being alive, while 
“inter homines esse desinere, to cease to be among men, [was] a synonym 
for dying” (Arendt 1981, 74). To find oneself living as if in a different 
world is to be isolated from the meaningfulness of a shared world, 
separated from the world of others as if “by interstellar distances” (Amery 
1998, 95), and the self is rendered homeless, estranged, and exiled. What 
survivors of extreme violence try to suggest when they talk about the loss 
of trust seems to be this profound loss of orientation, meaning, and 
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connection with a shared social world. The loss of trust is a symptom of the 
shattered embeddedness of the self, and perhaps inextricable from it. 
Without being connected to a shared world we cannot give coherency and 
order to our experiences, and disorientation results. Trust is not only an 
instrument for manoeuvrings in a complex world or a weak kind of belief 
which one can hold when proper proof is lacking, but appears to be 
fundamental to how we perceive our world as meaningful and real. Trust is 
part of our embeddedness in a common world and suffers when this 
embeddedness is torn, as happens when we suffer deliberate violence at the 
hands of another person. When torture survivors return to ordinary life, the 
loss of trust becomes palpable to a new extent because of the glaring 
difference between them and others, and between them and the person they 
used to be:  
People around me were celebrating my miraculous return while I was mourning my 
death, the emergence of a new person into a world I no longer felt a part of, a world I 
no longer trusted. (Anonymous in Ortiz 2001, 16)  
Having died is for many survivors the best way of expressing the sense 
they have of unreality and alienation. A therapist describes it thus:  
The torturer dictates every aspect of the victim’s life, stripping the individual of his 
or her personal identity and agency. The victim is totally vulnerable to the strategic 
acts of torture that break down the individual – physically, psychologically, or both. 
Survivors indicate the experience of torture as dismantling their personalities and that 
even though they may physically survive, the person they were before being tortured 
died at the hand of the torturers. (Fabri 2001, 453) 
For Améry, who also stresses the link between torture and the actual 
experience of death (Amery 1998, 34), the feeling of unreality is especially 
attenuated on his return to the ‘normality’ of post-Second World War 
Europe. For him it was not, ultimately, the torture itself which dealt the 
final blow; “[society] and only it robbed me of my trust in the world” 
(Amery 1998, 100), he explains. He emphasizes that his resentment arose 
not as much in captivity as when, after the first joyous time of liberation, he 
began to notice how the world was out of patience with the 
uncompromising outrage of the victims and wanted to move on:  
Still, for quite some time there lasted what was for me a totally unprecedented social 
and moral status, and it elated me to the extreme: being what I was – a surviving 
Resistance fighter, Jew, victim of persecution by a universally hated regime – there 
was mutual understanding between me and the rest of the world. [...] There was no 
reason, hardly a real possibility, for resentments to form. [...] For the first time in my 
life I was in tune with the public opinion that resounded around me. [...] At the very 
moment when I was imagining that through the fate I had suffered I had finally 
caught up with world opinion, the latter was about to transcend itself. I thought I was 
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right in the middle of contemporary reality and was already thrown back into an 
illusion. (Amery 1998, 64–65) 
This general sentiment is echoed in Ortiz: she cannot regain a foothold in 
life because the world that she is expected to live in simply does not appear 
real to her; at any rate it is far less real than the world of torture (Ortiz 
2004, ix, 70f, 442), because it seems to her that what people expect of her 
is to continue her old life, after an appropriate time of recovery, but for her 
that would be living as if nothing had happened, and as if torture were not a 
real possibility in the world (e.g. Ortiz 2004, 78). Survivors of torture often 
say that the problem of return is attenuated by others’ unwillingness to face 
the reality of what has happened, and for the survivor that is a reminder of 
the secrecy of the torture, where their point of view also counted for 
nothing. Returning to a shareable world means the survivors face a 
different world from the one they left, because it is a world that includes 
the reality of torture and therefore its continued possibility. Recognizing 
this, that their view of the world is based on reality and not on pathology, is 
the first step towards a merging of worlds and offers the possibility of 
sharedness which is a structural element of trust. It is not the survivor, but 
the rest of the world who must answer the question of whether it is possible 
to share enough of a world again to make it a meaningful place to live for a 
human being, and a place where one can trust. In a peculiar fashion 
Lévinas’ philosophical aspiration and life’s work mirror the quest that 
survivors of torture must undertake, namely to find a way to believe that 
the world is not essentially evil. He begins Totality and Infinity with the 
question: are we duped by morality? Is moral life a mere fantasy 
entertained by those who are unable to face the harsh reality of human 
nature? Are those believing in a moral world simply naively overlooking 
the true basis of reality, i.e. the war of self-interested beings which “renders 
morality derisory”, and is itself the “very exercise of reason”? (TI, 21). The 
urgency of his analysis reflects the importance of the answer. Writing and 
thinking in such close proximity to the reign of National Socialism in 
Germany, the question presents more than intellectual curiosity. It is a 
matter of the value of life itself: is the world one where good exists, or are 
we truly only wolves to each other? 
2.2.1 The person in pain 
Torture aims at destroying the person through inflicting bodily pain: 
“Torture, from Latin torquere, to twist. What a visual instruction in 
etymology!” (Amery 1998, 32). Torture twists the body, and in doing so it 
reaches the psyche and inflicts great harm. Pain is not exclusively, or even 
primarily, a physical phenomenon, but pinpoints the senselessness of 
separating body and mind. The one who suffers does not declare that the 
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body cannot go on; it is the me that cannot go on. The interrelatedness 
between the physical harm and the harm done to the person highlights the 
bodily nature of the self and its inextricable boundedness to experience and 
to an experiential life that takes place with and among other bodily beings 
in a shared world. The boundaries of the self are permeable to the actions 
and intentions of those others with whom it shares a world, and the self’s 
non-self-contained nature must be borne in mind if we are to understand 
the nature of the harm which torture inflicts and which induces alterations, 
sometimes chronic, in the self-relation and mental well-being of the self 
(see e.g. Carlsson et al. 2010). Scarry argues that pain differs from other 
experiences in one particular way: where our emotional, somatic and 
perceptual states otherwise take an object – that is, move beyond the 
boundaries of interiority into a shareable world by way of always being 
intentional – physical pain has no referential content. You have fear of or 
hunger for, but pain, she holds, is neither of nor for anything (Scarry 1985, 
5). It has no object and hence is fundamentally inaccessible to language. 
While one is undergoing the kind of extreme physical pain that occurs in 
torture there are no words, but afterwards it is possible to look for 
descriptions. If one can find an objective reference for the pain, it can to 
some extent be made accessible to language and communicated; it also 
becomes manageable in a different way. In hospitals, for instance, much 
effort is put into developing a language that can approach the experience 
that patients have of physical pain.
37
 Scarry calls this wording of pain 
world-making: the invention of a language that makes the experience 
comprehensible and shareable. Similarly, torture is the unmaking of the 
personal world. Pain severs the relationship between self and world: 
If from the experience of torture any knowledge at all remains that goes beyond the 
plain nightmarish, it is that of a great amazement and a foreignness in the world that 
cannot be compensated by any sort of subsequent human communication. [...] in this 
world there can be the other as absolute sovereign, and sovereignty revealed itself as 
the power to inflict suffering and to destroy. (Amery 1998, 39)  
What largely make torture what it is are the terror and helplessness before 
absolute sovereignty. The world of the tortured is reduced to a couple of 
rooms and a few people; its rules are new and ungraspable and there is no 
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 These efforts properly started with the development of the McGill Pain 
Questionnaire, a clinical tool for evaluation the type and intensity of pain in patients. 
See for instance Melzack, R. “The McGill Pain Questionnaire: major properties and 
scoring methods” in Pain 1975, 1 pp. 277–299; Melzack, R. and Torgerson, W.S. “On 
the language of pain”, in Anesthesiology 1971, 34 pp. 50 –59.  
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humanity there, that is, none of the normal responses to our psychological 
and physical states that we have come to expect. It is not a world where 
you are not understood: on the contrary, you are known, entirely 
transparent, and the keen attention that your torturers pay you is always 
used against you.  
Intense physical pain causes one to lose contact with the external world as 
it rids the mind of referential content. The world collapses, dissolves, and 
reality seems to congeal at the very place in the body that undergoes the 
experience of pain. Isolation becomes so profound that it stays with the 
victims afterwards as a disruption of the relationship between self and 
world: a relationship that is normally made up of our experiential 
relatedness, that is, of meaningfulness which lets us be part of a shared and 
shareable world. Torture confines the person to interiority by eliminating 
all awareness of the external world, but whereas it is in some way an 
extreme presencing of the self to the self, this same confinement also 
eliminates the sense of self by destroying all conscious content and, for as 
long as the pain lasts, the ability to call up any thought or memory. Torture 
shows that the body is not an accident befalling pure contemplation, but 
“the organ of a truly free contemplation transforming itself into power, an 
organ of transcendence par excellence, passing from intention to act, and 
transgressing the predelineated limits of structure” (IS, 148–149). 
Incarnation is the seat of self-transcendence, because it is as a body that we 
stand to attention in response to the other’s call, holding ourselves erect in 
readiness to give. Physical blows aimed at the body will strike the self as a 
whole, that is, a self constitutively related to others and to the world. 
2.2.2 Losing meaning 
It would be totally senseless to try and describe here the pain that was inflicted on 
me. [...] The pain was what it was. Beyond that there is nothing to say. Qualities of 
feeling are as incomparable as they are indescribable. They mark the limit of the 
language to communicate. If someone wanted to impart his physical pain, he would 
be forced to inflict it and thereby become a torturer himself. (Amery 1998, 33) 
The incommunicability of the torture experience comes both from the 
privacy of pain and from the distance between self and others that torture 
creates. One element of this, of course, is mistrust: 
Torture is calculated to destroy trust and the ability to communicate; in an 
atmosphere of mistrust and silence, organizing [one’s thoughts] becomes impossible. 
Predictably, one of the ripple effects of my torture was that communication broke 
down. I had lost my sense of trust, so I confided in almost no one. (Ortiz 2004, 80) 
The problem goes deeper than an unwillingness to confide, however. 
Language has broken down, and meaning refuses to fit itself into the 
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categories and structures with which it used to suit itself to the world. The 
English language seems foreign to Ortiz, and much of it she cannot make 
sense of. She does not want her therapist to realize how little of ordinary 
talk she can comprehend, because then she would have to explain just how 
fragmented and disoriented she feels, and she fears that he might then find 
her mad – a prospect that fills her with shame and dread. If she were to stop 
him and ask him to explain something he might assume that English was 
not her first language, and she would have to confide:  
”No, English is my native language, and I don’t remember the meanings of simple 
words. They sound familiar, I even find myself using them, but I don’t know what 
they mean.” […] Trauma does that sometimes. I know that now, but then I didn’t. I 
felt like a foreigner in my own country. […] The language of this world, in which 
some things are harmless, in which words are used to connect one person to another, 
for communication, not for degradation, this language was foreign and new. My 
tongue remembered it, but my mind couldn’t take it in or make sense of it. (Ortiz 
2004, 61) 
Words remain strange, unfamiliar and senseless – words that for others do 
not recall the torturers:  
We emerged from the camp stripped, robbed, emptied out, disoriented – and it was a 
long time before we were able to even learn the ordinary language of freedom. Still 
today, incidentally, we speak it with discomfort and without real trust in its validity. 
(Amery 1998, 20) 
The language of freedom is the language of someone who is in possession 
of her own body, who has sovereignty and can expect to be respected and 
recognized as a person by others. To speak for oneself is to assume that one 
is an agent in all of these ways.
38
 Like Ortiz, Améry cannot, deep down, 
regain the expectation that others will not harm him, and that freedom is 
not a temporary respite before he is again confined and punished for the 
pride of assuming that he has any say in life. In the mute world of violence 
where domination is total and the very notion of resistance is meaningless 
we encounter what in Lévinas’ terms is the totality of Being. The 
totalitarian notion of being is characterized by the lack of what is properly 
human, namely distinctiveness of one person before another in terms of 
agency and accepted responsibility. The isolation of this mute world has no 
place for language, meaning and human transcendence. What remains is 
only the weight of Being’s indifference: 
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 The relationship between selfhood, freedom, self-transcendence and the ability to 
speak for oneself is a central theme for Lévinas and treated more fully in chapter three 
(see e.g. RPT, 100ff; 1999, 65f). 
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Being is all, a Being in which nothing finishes and nothing begins. Nothing stands 
opposed to it, and no one judges it. It is an anonymous neuter, an impersonal 
universe, a universe without language. We can no longer speak, for how can we 
guarantee the value of a proposition which, however, no one can answer for. (DF, 
207)  
An impersonal universe is a senseless universe because only in relation to 
other persons and in the modality of shareability do things present 
themselves as meaningful. The isolation of an impersonal world affording 
no meaning to the individual does not offer an easy escape. When torture 
survivors tell of how they feel unreal, and link this to lack of trust in the 
world, they describe a loss of the ability to orient themselves which appears 
to be caused by a disturbance in intersubjectivity
39
 following from the 
nature of the torture experience. Given that this disturbed relatedness to 
others forms part of basic reflectivity, which enables us to orient ourselves 
in a world that contains trustworthy and untrustworthy elements, survivors 
are faced with the task of finding their bearings in an alien and disturbing 
world. Agency as that which allows one a sense of control over one’s 
future is central to the reestablishment of a sense of self, but it is also 
wrought with complications. 
2.2.3 Selfhood, transcendence, agency 
One of the most private experiences a human being can have is pain. When 
we feel pain we are thrown back upon our finite existence, unavoidably 
confronted with our vulnerability and powerlessness. When we are 
confined to this impotence by someone intentionally inflicting pain on us, 
then the desolateness of our situation – a confined body in pain – seems 
infinitely far removed from the humanity that we experience and enact in a 
shared meaningful world. To define the ethical essence of human existence 
as (self)transcendence, as Lévinas does, or as natality, like Arendt, is to 
equate humanity with the ability to interrupt the anonymous natural world 
of cause and effect by positing something new and entirely irreducible to 
what preceded it. When torture descends, this aspect seems all but gone, 
and only the finite helplessness of a creature bound to its natural existence 
remains. Similarly, Améry also defines humanity in terms of the ability to 
transcend the causality and habituality of a natural and social world, and 
thus morality as the will and responsibility to do so:  
Whoever submerges his individuality in society and is able to comprehend himself 
only as a function of the social, that is, the insensitive and indifferent person, really 
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 I owe the notion of ‘intersubjective disturbance’ or ‘other-disturbance’ to Claudia 
Welz.  
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does forgive. He calmly allows what happened to remain what it was. As the popular 
saying goes, he lets time heal his wounds. His time-sense is not dis-ordered, that is to 
say, it has not moved out of the biological and social sphere into the moral sphere. 
As a deindividualized, interchangeable, part of the social mechanism he lives with it 
consentingly. (Amery 1998, 71) 
We are thrown into existence and find ourselves situated in a history that 
we did not author, but which is also not the ultimate author of our lives. 
Morality begins when we take it upon ourselves to take charge of our 
situation and to resist that part of reality which we find unacceptable. This 
is how we distinguish ourselves and stand out as unique, singularly 
resistant to what is and to the synchronic temporality of natural and 
historical procession:  
Man has the right and privilege to declare himself to be in disagreement with every 
natural occurrence, including the biological healing that time brings about. What 
happened, happened. This sentence is just as true as it is hostile to morals and 
intellect. The moral power to resist contains the protest, the revolt against reality, 
which is rational only so long as it is moral. The moral person demands the 
annulment of time. (Amery 1998, 72) 
This quarrel with reality, as it were, is of central ethical importance. We 
resist that which we find morally wrong and thereby transcend the 
conditions that we are placed in by way of critical moral judgment. For 
Arendt this resistance is understood as a refusal to coordinate with a reality 
which is morally objectionable, a refusal which is at the same time an 
insistence that things ought to be and can be different. Arendt, like Améry, 
stresses that contrary to being irrational, the denial of the force of reality or 
of immanent synchronic time is the very definition of morality:  
The conviction that everything that happens on earth must be comprehensible to man 
can lead to interpreting history by commonplaces. Comprehension does not mean 
denying the outrageous, deducing the unprecedented from precedents, or explaining 
phenomena by such analogies and generalities that the impact of reality and the 
shock of experience are no longer felt. It means, rather, examining and bearing 
consciously the burden which our century has placed on us – neither denying its 
existence nor submitting meekly to its weight. Comprehension, in short, means the 
unpremeditated, attentive facing up to, and resisting of, reality – whatever it may be. 
(Arendt 1973, viii) 
Under torture the freedom to stand out as more than a natural being is 
eliminated, and the person is reduced to a “bundle of reactions”.40 In 
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 This is Arendt’s phrase, used on several occasions where she discusses how 
totalitarianism must be hostile to human individuality in the sense of the human moral 
capacity to transcend the given, which she also calls natality. E.g.: “Those who aspire to 
(continued) 
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overwhelming pain, the tortured is “only a body, and nothing else beside 
that. […] In self-negation, his flesh becomes a total reality” (Amery 1998, 
33). By this, Améry means that the person – the one capable of control over 
the flesh and what happens to him – disappears. Similarly Arendt, for 
whom: 
“man’s “nature” is only “human” in so far as it opens up to man the possibility of 
becoming something highly unnatural, that is, a man [with the] power to begin 
something new out of his own resources, something that cannot be explained on the 
basis of reactions to environment and events” (Arendt 1973, 455).  
Under torture a person is reduced to flesh, and the involuntary reaction of 
our flesh exposes us to an all-knowing, all-powerful and jeering sovereign 
other, not indifferent to the naked suffering, but smirking contemptuously. 
The loss of control is absolute, and the body itself betrays its owner and 
cooperates with the torturers who have wrested it from the control of the 
person’s mind and will: 
It’s hard to explain why the scars provoked such shame, and why they still do. Each 
scar is like a thumbprint to me. As an artist who works with clay leaves fingerprints 
in the finished piece – or as the aboriginal artists of Australia sign their rock art with 
a handprint – the torturers, leaving scars, declared that they made me, remade me. 
They owned me. My own skin declared that I was inextricably bound up with them. 
(Ortiz 2004, 204) 
Agency holds a special role in recovery from torture because it becomes 
synonymous with regaining possession of one’s own body and mind as 
well as with attaining some modicum of power over one’s future, which 
implies that the world has become meaningful again. One way to counter 
the helplessness that is part of the world-destroying power of torture is 
through regaining a sense of control. Having a sense of yourself as a person 
who can make reasonable choices on your own behalf and be held 
responsible for them is a crucial part of what it means to be a whole person 
– to be seen as a trustworthy deliberator by yourself and others – and often 
survivors of violence are brought to doubt their sanity as well as their 
power to make a difference in their own life because of the helplessness 
 
                                                                                                                           
total domination must liquidate all spontaneity, such as the mere existence of 
individuality will always engender, and track it down in its most private form, 
regardless of how unpolitical and harmless these may seem. Pavlov’s dog, the human 
specimen reduced to the most elementary reactions, the bundle of reactions that can 
always be liquidated and replaced by other bundles of reactions that behave in exactly 
the same way, is the model “citizen” of a totalitarian state; and such a citizen can be 
produced only imperfectly outside of the camps” (Arendt 1973, 456). Or, we might add, 
outside the torture chamber. We shall return to this point in chapter four.  
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and meaninglessness they have experienced. Agency implies responsibility, 
however, and responsibility in particular is a difficult notion to struggle 
with in a situation where shame and guilt can be overpowering.  
Self-blame among survivors of violent abuse is common and can be 
debilitating. Ortiz almost perishes from self-loathing because she feels she 
should have been stronger under torture, and for Améry, twenty years after, 
it is clear that “One can shake off torture as little as the question of the 
possibilities and limits of the power to resist it” (Amery 1998, 36); the 
doubts about complicity and resistance common to all survivors of torture 
are deeply rooted in guilt at being alive at all when others are not (Herman 
1997, 53f). Brison suggests, however, that there is another dynamic at play 
too, namely a survival strategy brought about by the need to regain a sense 
of control in the midst of a chaos that one did not oneself create (Brison 
2002, 74).
41
 It can be difficult to understand for those who haven’t 
experienced it, she says, but “it can be less painful to believe that you did 
something blameworthy than it is to think that you live in a world where 
you can be attacked at any time, in any place” (Brison 2002, 13). To 
assume responsibility is also to posit agency and to thereby give a measure 
of predictability to the future. Herman refers to a study on kidnapped 
school children where it was found that the children afterwards came to 
imagine that there had been signs warning them of the kidnapping; and 
although Herman sees in this an indication that traumatized people often 
lose trust in their own ability to judge appropriately about the future, 
leading to “increased superstition and magical thinking” (Herman 1997, 
46), it does, I think, equally testify to our need to view our world as 
predictable.  
In the narrative of her struggle for recovery, Ortiz singles out an occurrence 
that gives her back a feeling of control and ownership of her life. For a long 
time it was as if the torturers had passed a death sentence upon her, and that 
she might still be in their power and would act to carry it out, simply 
because the world now seemed to be their world through and through, 
entirely owned by evil (e.g. Ortiz 2004, 81). When she is committed to a 
psychiatric hospital for a time by worried Sisters who fear she might hurt 
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 Susan Brison is an associate professor of philosophy at Dartmouth College, New 
Hampshire. In 1990 she barely survived rape and attempted murder, and in her book 
Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of a Self (2002) she attempts to communicate 
what it is like to be in the world afterwards as she tries to establish a place for herself 
again. The philosophically rich analysis is valuable for our attempt to understand the 
effects that torture has on the sense of self even though Brison’s experience is of 
another kind.  
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herself, the protective atmosphere of the place makes her feel powerless 
and subjected to the will of people she does not understand or trust, 
surrounded by frightened and crying people like herself. The involuntary 
hospitalization is retraumatizing, and between the mandatory therapy 
sessions, the supervision of her eating habits owing to continuing weight 
loss, and the monitoring of her (lack of) social habits she feels trapped and 
reality again slides away:  
Everyone seemed to have been drugged or flogged into compliance – maybe even 
surgically altered. I wondered momentarily if they were the same people I had heard 
screaming in the building in Guatemala, people who’d been tortured and broken. 
They had that look. (Ortiz 2004, 89) 
One day she meets a woman who has managed to smuggle in two 
razorblades. The woman gives one to her. In the night, she sneaks out to the 
bathroom and contemplates suicide: 
Even if it was fear that prevented me from taking my life, having the means to die 
and choosing not to gave me strength. With the razor blade I was no longer the 
victim of the torturer’s decision to let me live. I was no longer the victim of the 
sisters’ decision to hospitalize me or of Snodgrass’s assessment that I was suicidal. I 
had control over whether I would live or die. And I was defining myself by choosing 
to live. (Ortiz 2004, 92) 
The feelings of guilt that plague torture survivors often have to do with 
what they were made to witness or even participate in without being able to 
stop or protest against it. “You’re one of us. You’ll never be free”, the 
torturers tell Ortiz, and that feeling, of complicity and of being remade 
through and through by humiliation and pain, stays with her (Ortiz 2004, 
79). It seems that survivors experience guilt over something that they had 
no power to control and no part of bringing about. However, they may find 
themselves in a double bind: in coming to believe that they are not guilty 
and have no reason to feel so they may at the same time be undermining 
their already severely shattered sense of being a true person, with 
responsibility and agency, who should be treated as worthy of 
accountability. If friends, family or therapist insist that the survivor should 
not feel responsible at all, they may be overlooking the crucial role that 
regaining a feeling of agency has for a return to oneself and the world, and 
ultimately risk reinforcing the victim’s experience of being annihilated as a 
person. As Herman puts it, “Trauma robs the victim of power and control; 
the guiding principle of recovery is to restore power and control to the 
survivor” (Herman 1997, 159). Such is the background of the transitional 
survival skills spoken of by Ortiz as she explains that “Survivors have long 
noted the tendency of family members and mental health professionals to 
interpret certain behaviors as self-destructive, when in fact they are 
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strategies for staying alive” (Ortiz 2001, 23). There are indeed forms of 
behaviour that prima facie appear unsound but seem to help survivors of 
torture regain a claim on the world and themselves. As Laing puts it:  
If the individual cannot take the realness, aliveness, autonomy and identity of himself 
and others for granted, then he has to become absorbed in contriving ways of trying 
to be real, of keeping himself or others alive, of preserving his identity, in efforts, as 
he will often put it, to prevent himself losing his very self. (Laing 1990, 42–43) 
A world that makes sense to us is a world in which we can act. The sense 
of ownership and belonging that survivors have lost and seek to regain 
cannot come about without a sense of agency. The belief that human 
dignity relies on freedom in terms of transcendence is a challenge for 
survivors: they cannot let go of the idea of responsibility without also 
letting go of the last remnants of autonomy and subjecting themselves to 
the torturers as truly being nothing but their victims. It is an impossible 
situation. Langer, in his seminal work with survivors from the Nazi 
concentration camps, shows how common it is that a person, even decades 
later, will recall with undiminished pain and shame some incident where 
they felt responsible for someone else’s suffering or faced a side of 
themselves that was less than respectful.
42
 Again and again, Langer points 
out, these incidents press themselves into the foreground of the testimonies 
of survivors so that it becomes clear that something important is at stake 
here. I suggest that what is at stake is whether to surrender completely to a 
view of oneself as a victim, and how a sense of self can be upheld in these 
circumstances without at the same time seeing this self as complicit.  
2.2.4 Self-betrayal and distrust of self 
In chapter one I argued that trust as an intersubjective relation differs from 
other comparable feelings because it entails a feeling of betrayal when it is 
broken. Yet can we in that case say that we trust ourselves? Can we let 
ourselves down, betray ourselves, or are such expressions merely figures of 
speech? Steinbock would argue that trust is necessarily a relationship to the 
other. He gives the example of someone who goes rock climbing and stops 
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 E.g.: “Of course there are all kinds of difficult periods that you cannot … for 
example, in that camp of Langenstein [a Nazi labor camp] I was so hungry that I don’t 
know what I would have ate. We were sleeping on the floor and next to me was another 
camp inmate. I don’t know how old he was – he looked old. And we just got our ration 
of bread, and he was already so sick that he couldn’t eat that bread and I was laying next 
to him, waiting that he should die, so that I can [prolonged pause] grab his bread.” 
(Langer 1991, 83) 
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at a familiar spot halfway up to rest, implicitly trusting the solid placement 
of feet and hands: 
Now, the rock beneath my foot slips, or my fingers get tired and they lose their grip. 
Do I experience a violation of trust? Did the rock betray my trust? Did my fingers 
violate my trust in them? I do not think that we can meaningfully speak of violation 
or betrayal in this instance, and likewise of trust in a genuine sense. (Steinbock 2010, 
88) 
The crucial point in Steinbock’s account is the subjective experience – do 
we feel betrayed in this situation? – and he is probably right in presuming 
that ordinarily we would not. In terms of experience, however, it is 
certainly a different situation that faces torture survivors, who very often 
indeed express a powerful sense of having betrayed themselves, 
accompanied by feelings of shame and resentment in some respects 
comparable to those that form part of the intersubjective betrayal. What is 
at stake here, then? How are we to make sense of such a paradoxical 
situation while at the same time taking these experiences seriously? 
Perhaps the experience of self-betrayal testifies to what is brought out in 
Arendt’s thought, namely that we become persons in the true sense only by 
manifesting ourselves in action and speech before others, in which case that 
which is betrayed is the self-relation that we can only come to have with 
others. When I betray myself, then, I not only betray my self-image or the 
values that I strive to express with my existence, but the me that is realized 
fully in the company of others, the me that distinguishes itself from the 
anonymity of natural existence by owning up to its responsibility before the 
other’s gaze. This is not a superficial me heteronomously giving way to 
arbitrary social norms, but the basis for my existence as a singular, free 
human being, and therefore truer than whatever I may be in the 
incomprehensible isolation of torture and imprisonment. If it is understood 
in this way we can make sense of a feeling of self-betrayal, even though it 
differs essentially from intersubjective betrayal because the “betrayer” is 
not blameworthy. Torture is an experience of helplessness, and it is in such 
helplessness that one betrays oneself. Consequently, although while self-
betrayal is the term chosen by many survivors to make sense of how they 
feel, it is still a phenomenon in an entirely different register from that of 
intersubjective betrayal where responsibility and blame are relevant in a 
different way. Self-betrayal is comparable to a distrust of oneself that is 
also often a theme for survivors. For Ortiz it causes her to isolate herself 
from others, thinking that the horrible things she has experienced and been 
made a part of have taken residence in her and can now put others in 
danger or infect them, and even that she herself may be so severely infected 
with evil that she can only be a source of hurt (Ortiz 2004, 70, 129, 325f, 
415). As we saw, distrusting one’s own senses and mental powers follows 
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from the isolation that torture effects on the self; and in addition to these 
two forms of distrust – of oneself as a person capable of goodness and of 
the reliability of one’s experience and memory – there is the distrust of 
one’s judgment about what really happened. The contrast between the 
torture experience and the normality of everyday life that others seem 
capable of living, a life that the survivors themselves used to 
unproblematically belong to, forces the belief that one of the two worlds 
must be an illusion. One the one hand, the unshareability of the torture 
experience makes it ungraspable and nightmarish; but on the other hand its 
concrete reality is so undeniable as to render the ordinary life that seems 
oblivious to its existence unbelievable. Améry describes this by saying that 
time has stopped or that temporal reality is looped:  
It was over for a while. It still is not over. Twenty-two years later I am still dangling 
over the ground by dislocated arms, panting, and accusing myself. (Amery 1998, 36) 
Ortiz repeatedly experiences the nearness of the other world, and 
sometimes it overtakes perceivable reality. She feels that her torturers are 
hiding behind familiar faces, ready to peel off their masks and resume the 
torture (e.g. Ortiz 2004, 52, 85, 206). As for Améry, the torture is not over:  
I still didn’t believe completely in resurrection, not Christ’s, not my own. I was still 
sealed up in a dark cave. Some days, when I felt better, it was more like a translucent 
bubble. But I was separated from others, walled in, numb and half-dead. I had never 
completely walked out of that prison. I’d brought it with me. (Ortiz 2004, 132)  
Delbo states very simply and clearly the underlying premise of Ortiz’s and 
Améry’s lives: 
I’ve come back from another world / to this world / I had not left / and I know not / 
which one is real / tell me did I really come back / from the other world? / As far as 
I’m concerned / I’m still there / dying there / a little more each day / dying over again 
/ the death of those who died / and I no longer know which is the real one / this 
world, right here / or the world over there. (Delbo 1997, 224) 
That the world’s reality is fragile and uncertain – not to be trusted – is a 
consequence of the isolation that ensues from and defines the torture 
experience. This relationship will be developed further in chapter four.  
2.2.5 Intimacy and alienation  
As we have seen, the self-estrangement of torture survivors is accompanied 
by acute self-awareness and hypersensitivity towards their surroundings. 
Their self-relation is one of intimacy and alienation, where they are 
simultaneously very present in their bodily existence and absent to the 
point of feeling unreal. This disturbance of the self-relation, I suggest, 
should be seen as the fundamental problem of their continuing existence. I 
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would also like to suggest that this problematic self-relatedness is closely 
connected to the problematic other-relatedness created in the torture 
experience, where the intersubjective relation was one of alienation built on 
an invasive and unwanted intimacy. The nature of existence after torture is 
inextricably bound up with that which created it, and this is not simply pain 
and suffering itself but, much more importantly, the means of its infliction, 
which is essentially the perpetrator’s recognition of the victim as human, 
without which the perpetrator would have no reason to torture. What sets 
torture apart from for instance random assault and makes it much more 
difficult to overcome is its particular brand of intersubjectivity: on the one 
hand, the victim of torture experiences the most extreme isolation 
imaginable; on the other, torture is essentially intersubjective. On the one 
hand, the victim’s humanity, dignity and destitution are disregarded; on the 
other, it is exactly by virtue of recognizing the physical and mental 
suffering of the victim that torture functions. On the one hand it is the 
victim’s person that is targeted and destroyed; on the other the victim’s 
person is entirely irrelevant since nothing that is said or done will effect a 
difference in the staged interrogation. The victim experiences the reality of 
this absurd space which is “the inversion of the social world, in which we 
can live only if we grant our fellow man life, ease his suffering, bridle the 
desire of our ego to expand” (Amery 1998, 35). Neither torture nor its 
consequences for the self can be explained without taking into account its 
essential perverted intersubjectivity.  
2.2.6 Distrust and lack of trust 
The philosophical discussions of trust often get caught up in the difficult 
assessment of the relationship between trusting and knowledge; what do we 
need to know about someone to trust them, and how are we put at risk by 
the uncertainty of trust? With Lévinas, we can see another kind of trusting 
relationship, namely one that shares characteristics with his view of the 
ethical relationship, most obviously the elusiveness of the other. For 
Lévinas, the other person can never fully come into view and cannot be 
grasped by the knowing gaze that we utilize when understanding objects. 
We may attempt to grasp other persons in the same manner, but the very 
quality of otherness that pertains to the other human being cannot be seen 
or understood objectively; it can only be felt as the faint echo of a call. 
Ethics comes about as a relationship between radically separate beings, 
mediated not by conceptual instruments, but by a primordial call, issued by 
the other, to responsibility. Lévinas calls this proximity; the relationship 
between absolutely separate entities that are nevertheless not rendered 
irrelevant to one another: 
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Proximity is to be described as extending the subject in its very subjectivity, which is 
both a relationship and a term of this relationship. […] Nor is it fusion; it is contact 
with the other. To be in contact is neither to invest the other and annul his alterity, 
nor to supress myself in the other. In contact itself the touching and the touched 
separate, as though the touched moved off, was always already other, did not have 
anything in common with me. As though its singularity, thus non-anticipatable and 
consequently non-representable, responded only to designation. (OB, 86) 
In proximity I am capable of apprehending the ethical import of a situation 
without it being adequate for anticipatory conceptual understanding (OB, 
26, 46). I suggest that the same structure asserts itself with regard to the 
trusting relationship: the trusted person is an other in the Lévinasian sense. 
Undecidability is a constituent feature of the trusting relationship because 
the other exceeds my knowing grasp, and the vulnerability that is essential 
to it is derived from the ineliminable otherness of the other. The trace of 
alterity at the origin of selfhood instates the self-distanciation that is a part 
of the reflective judgment behind trusting and distrusting, which, because it 
is grounded in the ethical relationship, is not arbitrary just as it is also not 
objective.  
Remarkably in our context, one does not often find the word distrust in the 
testimonies of the survivors. They speak of the loss of trust and the 
inability to trust, but somehow the term distrust does not insert itself very 
often in their attempts to convey to others what it is like to life afterwards 
(e.g. Delbo 1997, 323; Ortiz 2004, 423; Amery 1998, 95; Brison 2002, 
139). One explanation could be that distrust lends itself better to 
descriptions of concrete interpersonal relationships than to general ones, 
because it applies more readily to particular persons than to non-specific 
contexts. Phenomenologically it may be difficult to distinguish between a 
pervasive mistrust and a pervasive lack of trust, yet the difference is that 
the first is a positive assumption about something whereas the second is a 
disinclination or reluctance. To distrust is to presume something – 
untrustworthiness – similarly to how trustworthiness is assumed when we 
trust.  
Lack of trust does not amount to a neutral stance of awaiting, but is a lack 
of ability to make the kind of assertion inherent in trusting. My claim here, 
however, is that the ability to distrust is similarly jeopardized when a 
person is subjected to the kind of traumatic violence at the hands of a 
fellow human being that destroys trust. A lack of trust is a lack of ability to 
make the assertion inherent in trusting, but in that situation we are equally 
unable to make the assertion behind distrusting, and therefore we are 
stranded with a disoriented lack of judgment. Not being able to trust is a 
profoundly more disturbing experience because it signals the severing of 
the bond between self and world on which we depend; yet if we have lost 
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the ability to trust appropriately, we have simultaneously lost the ability to 
distrust appropriately. Seen in this way they are lost at the same time 
because they are part of the same orientational ability.  
2.2.7 Disorientation 
As we lose trust, we lose our capacity for making our way in the world. 
The confused and disoriented nature of that experience tells us that the 
sense of self and the reality of the world have to do with the capacity to 
orient ourselves in a world that can be made sense of. Making sense of the 
world is a work of orientation, and it is through this work that selfhood is 
constituted in terms of a sense of agency and emplacement among fellow 
human beings in a shared world. That selfhood is situated is a core idea of 
phenomenological thought, but also in Kant we find the acknowledgement 
that our experiences occur as a here, and that this being-here is the bodily, 
worldly self that is the zero point of orientation for our dealings with the 
world (Husserl 1973, 80; Heidegger 2006, § 22–23; WOT, 8:133–146). 
That I – my bodily self – am the absolute here, the point of reference of all 
orientation, does not entail a self-absorbed or self-enclosed subject. On the 
contrary, the here exists as an open and active engagement with the world. 
From the narratives of torture survivors it emerges that the feeling of 
realness is dependent upon our relatedness to others, and it seems that only 
a very short period of isolation is required before we lose it. That is why we 
take solitary confinement in our prisons seriously and regulate it heavily, 
and it is why one of the most brutal strategies of teasing and bullying 
among adults as well as children is simply to ignore a person.
43
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 Research on the consequences of sensory deprivation is vast, not least because of an 
extensive US government-funded research programme that holds some responsibility 
for CIA’s infamous and still partly censored KUBARK interrogation manual from the 
early 1960s. Historian Alfred McCoy in A Question of Torture (2006) described and 
documented the extent to which American academia was involved (with or without 
knowledge of the implications) in state-sponsored research of this kind, such as the 
1958 Harvard Symposium on sensory deprivation (Phillip Solomon (ed.), Sensory 
Deprivation, Harvard University Press 1961). To quote from a paper by one of the 
participants in the symposium: “let me remind you of the parallel findings on prolonged 
sensory deprivation in adult organisms that have the effect of disorganizing cognitive 
function, upsetting the constancies, even disrupting the perception of continuous 
contours that extend beyond the immediate focus of attention at the center of the visual 
field. I remind you of these matters in advance of setting forth some speculations to 
underline the likelihood that perception and cognitive activity generally depend upon a 
dynamically stable though ultimately disruptible equilibrium that depends, even in adult 
life, upon contact with stimulus heterogeneity and a shifting environment.” He 
continues: “later sensory deprivation in normal adults disrupts the vital evaluation 
process by which one constantly monitors and corrects the models and strategies one 
(continued) 
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Arendt describes the relationship between the quality of realness and the 
self-world relation in terms of common sense by way of a parallel with the 
five senses: 
To each of our five senses corresponds a specific, sensorial perceptible property of 
the world. Our world is visible because we have vision, audible because we have 
hearing, touchable and full of odours and tastes because we have touch, smell and 
taste. The sixth’s sense’s [common sense] corresponding worldly property is 
realness. (Arendt 1981, 50) 
If I am rendered alone in the world, suddenly isolated and living next to 
everyone else, my sense of reality and belonging suffers. When selfhood is 
disturbed it affects the sense of time and even the dependability of one’s 
senses. Améry describes this nexus of trust, mental capacities, and selfhood 
as follows:  
Yet I am certain that with the very first blow that descends on him he loses 
something we will perhaps temporarily call 'trust in the world'. Trust in the world 
includes all sorts of things: the irrational and logically unjustifiable belief in 
absolute causality perhaps, or the likewise blind belief in the validity of the inductive 
inference. (Amery 1998, 28, italics added)  
That which is challenged when we are exiled from the sensus communis is 
not simply an uncomplicated dwelling that we had otherwise enjoyed, but 
also and in addition something far deeper, part of which is the ability to 
hold on to epistemic consistency. The sensus communis has a long tradition 
within philosophical thought, but it is in a Kantian sense that it is relevant 
here. In the third Critique, Kant gives to the sensus communis the role of 
bestowing what he calls subjective universality to our judgments of taste. It 
is an a priori principle of aesthetic judgment and explains why we can 
assume that our judgments of taste should be shared by others. The 
relevance of this in relation to trust will be discussed in more detail in 
chapter four; here, a few words will suffice.  
Kant distinguishes his notion from that of the Aristotelian tradition where 
the sensus communis forms part of the individual’s perception as a faculty 
that recognizes the representations supplied by the different senses as 
belonging to the same object, thereby synthesizing a coherent whole. For 
Kant such a synthesis would require a concept, and as he is looking for a 
faculty that can make a representation communicable without the mediation 
of a concept, the Aristotelian stance will not do. Instead, the sensus 
 
                                                                                                                           
has learned to employ in dealing with the environment” (Bruner 1959, 91; Bruner in 
Solomon et al. 1961, 207). 
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communis, understood as part of a reflective power of judgment, lets the 
non-conceptual feeling of pleasure involved in the free play of the 
imagination and the understanding be communicated as part of the 
workings of this judgment (CPJ, 5:295–296, 40). Sensus communis is a 
relationship between our powers of judgment and the (possible) judgments 
of others. It is a term for a way to transcend arbitrary subjectivity, and as 
such it has a role to play in relation to enlightenment, because it is a way in 
which we can challenge our own prejudices and superstitions by 
imaginatively putting ourselves in the place of others and engaging with 
their possible points of view. As we will return to, the significance of this 
for the discussion of trauma and trust can be seen in how Kant makes the 
ability to obtain validity for one’s judgments in this respect depend on their 
formal shareability, that is, on a posited intersubjectivity.
44
 The loss of 
world that occurs with trauma can be understood as the loss of the 
connectedness that is the sensus communis and, seen like this, the 
significance that sensus communis has for Arendt and Kant can give us a 
lead in understanding the world-shattering effects of the loss of trust. Albeit 
in a context where he discusses the understanding and not reflective 
judgment as such, it is still interesting to see Kant draw a parallel between 
sensus communis and the ability to find order in experience:  
The only universal characteristic of madness is the loss of common sense (sensus 
communis) and its replacement with logical private sense (sensus privatus). … For it 
is a subjectively necessary touchstone of the correctness of our judgments generally, 
and consequently also of the soundness of our understanding, that we also restrain 
our understanding by the understanding of others, instead of isolating ourselves with 
our own understanding and judging publicly with our private representations, so to 
speak. (AP, 7:219, 53) 
I venture to make the claim that trust presupposes common sense; that we 
must, in other words, presume that we share the world with the other in at 
least a formal and very minimal sense for trust to make sense. In the third 
Critique Kant explains how the faculty of common sense can detect the 
form of communicability in what is at first glance purely subjective, and it 
is something like this ability that I suggest trust to be an expression of. The 
connectedness inherent in our mental capacities through their reliance on 
common sense will serve as a model for understanding how we are 
connected to others in trust, and for understanding the importance of this 
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 In the third Critique, Kant’s primary concern is with the validity of a non-conceptual 
feeling of pleasure, not of thoughts. Yet in section forty he digresses into the realm of 
thought as well in order to point out how the fundamental principles of the sensus 
communis are those of enlarged mentality or broad-minded thinking.  
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connectedness in upholding a sense of self. On the basis of a Lévinasian 
reading of Kant I argue that that trust shows the fundamental relatedness of 
self and world because it expresses the reflective discrimination that 
grounds it and that I call basic reflectivity.  
Taking a view of trust as a mediated response to a kind of judgment, in 
opposition to seeing it as an immediate and entirely pre-reflective state, 
also helps to account for another feature of the phenomenology of trusting, 
namely its connection with vulnerability. Vulnerability is one of the few 
features that almost all accounts of trust can agree on, whether strategic and 
cognitive accounts or pre-reflective and affective ones, and indeed one 
would be hard-pressed to find a philosophical account that did not include 
vulnerability among its defining features. But as we saw earlier, there is 
disagreement as to whether the trusting person can become aware of this 
inherent vulnerability and still be able to trust, or whether such an 
awareness amounts to being sceptic and hence to something more akin to 
distrust. On the one hand we have those who privilege a pre-reflective kind 
of trust, claiming that trust is an unconscious state and is only made 
intelligible after it has been broken, posthumously as it were. On the other 
we find those who, advocating strategic trust, quite deliberately reserve the 
notion of trust for a situation in which we consciously assess and accept 
risk. The view taken here attempts to accommodate the insights of both of 
these positions by claiming that although trusting does not come about 
purely as a result of a conscious risk assessment but has an affective 
element as well as a less than absolutely voluntary character, it is also not 
entirely averse to critical thought but can coexist with the awareness of its 
existence as well as with a discriminatory relationship to the world. There 
is always activity in trusting and distrusting, not only passive receptivity, 
even if we are not necessarily always aware of the judgment itself or its 
grounds. Trust as a mediated stance is mediated by not being a mechanical 
response to stimuli, but a reflective response to experience. It is not 
arbitrary, but warranted: it has grounds, but these grounds are not made up 
of facts and reasons, since trust is not something we have because we can 
be certain of its appropriateness. The undecidability inherent in trusting, 
and in distrusting, is what sets it apart from feeling certain or from 
knowing. If we could be completely certain about what the other would do, 
trusting would be irrelevant to the situation. Still further, if it were possible 
to be certain we would no longer have to deal with the kind of relationship 
in which trust and distrust take place.  
 Trust and torture 95 
 
2.3 Implications 
A philosophical explanation of the signification of trust and distrust must 
be able to account for the subjective experiences related by torture 
survivors. Such experiences require that we see trust as the result of an 
understanding endeavour: a discerning yet non-determinate manner of 
orientation. It is hardly surprising that one of the consequences of being 
subjected to intentional violence and humiliation at the hands of other 
human beings is a loss of trust. When we trust others, we enter into a 
relation of openness that creates or allows a common world to exist, a 
world that is constituted by the assumption of shared responsiveness. As 
this relationality is lost, survivors feel isolated and estranged. When “lack 
of trust” is invoked as the most fitting description of what it is like to exist 
afterwards, it denotes a pervasive feeling of being alone and remote, barred 
from human company.  
The purpose of torture is to break people down. Its target could be said to 
be the self, if by selfhood one understands a feeling of being real and the 
ability to trust in one’s mental faculties. We have analysed the testimonies 
of people who have lost the ability to trust because they have been 
subjected to grave violence at the hands of other people, and from them we 
have learned what they mean when they mention trust as something that 
they are no longer capable of. What emerges in this chapter is that lack of 
trust is intimately linked to self-estrangement and a feeling of being unreal. 
The bond with others that comes from inhabiting a shared world is broken, 
and this profound banishment threatens the fabric of selfhood. From this 
we gather that the capacity to judge trustworthiness is entwined with our 
innermost being, and in the pages above I have tried to develop this 
argument with a view to what it says about how we, as selves, are 
connected to a world that we share with others. Both trusting and 
distrusting, I claim, is derived from a basic kind of judgment that is 
indispensable to selfhood, and loss of trust can perhaps be spoken of as a 
loss of orientation or of the conditions of possibility for passing such a 
judgment.  
The preceding pages have suggested that selfhood is dependent on sharing 
a world with others, and in the following chapters we will be looking for an 
answer as to what this dependence amounts to. My claim, which I shall 
substantiate in the following, is that distrust as well as trust expresses the 
basic orientational capacities of the self which again relies on the social 
connectedness that is destroyed by torture. Trusting and distrusting, then, 
are connected to a judging activity, and the nature of this connection and of 
the judging activity itself are among the questions raised by this chapter 
and answered in the following.  
3 Problematic selfhood 
Self-consciousness is not an inoffensive action in which the self takes note of its 
being; it is inseparable from a consciousness of justice and injustice. (DF, 16) 
Can the alterity of the other not bestow sense otherwise, in the positive modality of 
the unique and incomparable? (Levinas quoted in Drabinski 2001, 8) 
The overall issue under investigation is the nature of the relationship that I 
have with others through trusting and distrusting. Chapter one outlines 
some of the problems that trust gives rise to for an account that reduces it to 
either purely pre-reflective affectivity or to the product of strategic 
assessment. In chapter two we saw the interdependence of what we deemed 
‘trust in the world’ and a sense of self; and we saw that our relatedness to 
others, inherent in our trust in the world, is crucial for a self that is 
essentially orientational. The objective of this chapter is to establish an 
account of the self and of the intersubjective relationship. The title of the 
chapter, ‘Problematic Selfhood’, illustrates that the self is not something 
we can define before we investigate its relatedness to others and to the 
world in terms of trusting and distrusting – it does not constitute the 
independent variable grounding the investigation – but is itself in question. 
To be a self is to be actively engaged in making sense of experience and in 
self-critically taking responsibility for this sense-making. The possibility of 
self-critique – of transcending the interiority of knowledge – comes from 
the encounter with the other who calls upon us to account for ourselves. 
Since experience begins with responsibility its modality is ethical, and in 
the following we shall unfold the significance of this for trust and distrust. 
Building on Lévinas, this chapter presents a model of ethical 
intersubjectivity that can accommodate the kind of relatedness that we see 
in trusting and distrusting. Following Lévinas we will speak of the 
proximity of the relationship in terms of responsibility and signification. 
The trusting relationship is not identical to the ethical relationship: in 
trusting, there is something that allows for and to some extent demands 
justification. Although it is not the kind of justification possible in 
objective matters, such as when I hold a certain belief, it still seems that 
trust is not entirely beyond accountability. It can be rightly and wrongly 
placed and its appropriateness can be discussed, even if it cannot be finally 
determined in the manner of factual truth. Is not ethics also in the end a 
matter of justification? With Lévinas I will argue below that reason arises 
out of the ethical need to account for oneself before the other, and 
consequently the demand for self-justification is already evident in ethics. 
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There is justification of a sort in ethics, then, but it remains unthematized 
and is manifest only in the urge to respond to and for the other, that is, in 
active existence.
45
 The possible justification for trusting and distrusting can 
be partially thematized even though it originates with the first unthematized 
justification. The present chapter aims at providing the philosophical means 
for explaining intersubjective trust as a relationship that falls between 
intentionality and ethics, or, in other words, as a relationship that emerges 
out of the primordial call to responsibility into initial reflection. In 
proximity such an ethical form of knowledge can begin:  
Proximity thus signifies a reason before the thematization of signification by a 
thinking subject, before the assembling of terms in a present, a pre-original reason 
that does not proceed from any initiative of the subject, an anarchic reason. It is a 
reason before the beginning, before any present, for my responsibility for the other 
commands me before any decision, any deliberation. (OB, 166) 
The starting point for the following Lévinasian exposition is my assertions 
that the trusting relationship: (i) brings out elements basic to the human 
condition because it contains a reference to our vulnerability and how we 
are at the same time bound to a world and free from this world in a radical 
sense; (ii) points to how the other person cannot be explained exhaustively 
in terms of understanding and consciousness; and, finally, (iii) leads to the 
insight that we, as bodily and finite beings who are always already related 
to infinity, are not transparent to ourselves and cannot be understood in 
terms of identity, or even of the identity of identity and non-identity, that is, 
of a dialectics that ends up as a totality (TI, 148).
46
 Selfhood is, at its core, a 
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 In Otherwise than Being Lévinas abandons the term justification. Instead he speaks of 
apology in somewhat the same sense, namely as the exercise of a self that has been 
awakened to responsibility. The change of terms presumably serves to underline the 
eternal debt of subjectivity and to avoid the self-preoccupied implication of a term like 
justification. I retain the term in the present context, however, where the topic is not the 
ethical relationship in itself but how it resonates in trust and distrust. 
46
 One of the very few direct quotes included in Lévinas’ writings is this one from The 
Phenomenology of Spirit: “”I distinguish myself from myself; and therein I am 
immediately aware that this factor distinguished from me is not distinguished. I, the 
selfsame being, thrust myself away from myself; but this which is distinguished, which 
is set up as unlike me, is immediately on its being distinguished no distinction for me”” 
(TI, 36–37; Hegel 1955, 211). The French is: “Je me distingue moi-même de moi-même 
et, dans ce processus, il est immédiatement (évident) pour moi que ce qui est distinct 
n'est pas distinct. Moi, l'Homonyme, j e me repousse moi-même, mais ce qui a été 
distingué et pose comme différent est, en tant qu'immédiatement distingué, dépourvu 
pour moi de toute difference” ((TeI, 25–26. Levinas gives his source as 
Phénoménologie de l’Esprit, Traduction Hyppolite, pp. 139-40). 
 Problematic selfhood 99 
 
self-relation that exceeds what it can itself contain. Transcendence is a key 
feature of intersubjectivity as well as of selfhood: not only does the other 
transcend the relationships that exist between us, but I myself, as a self, 
transcend my self-relation and that which I make of myself and recognize 
as me. These two forms of transcendence, of subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity, are not separate issues, but emerge as each other’s 
constitutive conditions. As we shall see below, the self-transcendence 
inherent in a self that is already related to an other implies a double status 
of subjectivity, namely it ability to move beyond that which it is (Grøn 
2007, 11). It does this by way of ethics: it is through being related to an 
other that we move beyond ourselves, because thereby the self “contains in 
itself what it can neither contain nor receive solely by virtue of its identity” 
since “[t]o contain more than one’s capacity is to shatter at every moment 
the framework of a content that is thought, to cross the barriers of 
immanence – but without this descent into being reducing itself anew to a 
concept of content” (TI, 27). The irreducibly personal relationship of trust 
demonstrates how intersubjectivity is exactly a relation, which means that 
its terms are not indifferent to each other, but in their relatedness still retain 
independence from the relation. In the trusting relationship I am revealed to 
you and you to me, but we are not entirely transparent to each other. There 
is still, as it were, a secret to subjectivity (TI, 118).
47
  
It is a central part of my argument that ethics is beyond the distinction 
between pre-reflective immediacy and reflectively mediated knowledge, 
belonging to neither category. To say that it is in between is also 
inaccurate, but it may be a helpful starting point. The ethical relationship is 
not one of immediate twosomeness. The story of ethics versus knowledge 
in Lévinas is not one of primordial harmony between persons that is broken 
when thought and reflection enters; instead, ethics enters as a break with 
any possibility of self-sufficiency and self-coincidence. Lévinas mentions 
immediacy as something that characterizes the “ease of enjoyment 
[jouissance]” (OB, 64) of a life that is concerned only with its own 
continuation, but since he also holds that ethics is at the point of origin of 
selfhood (e.g. TI, 215), and that the possibility of meaningfulness at all 
stems from the anarchic meaning inherent in the non-immediacy of ethics, 
it would seem that even at the most fundamental level of selfhood I do not 
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 It is often noted that Lévinas presents his work as a defence of subjectivity (TI, 26), 
and this is sometimes seen as a paradox because of his vehement criticism of what he 
sees as the unremediated solipsism of most philosophical accounts (Hegel and Husserl 
being most often targeted). See a discussion of this apparent paradox and its critics in 
Overgaard (2007; 2003).  
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stand in an immediate relationship either to myself or to the world; 
proximity is not fusion, he insists (OB, 86). Since ethics is primary, all my 
other relations to the world are after the fact, so to speak. In this original 
relationship of non-immediate proximity one person can come to trust or 
distrust another.  
The analysis of trust and distrust that follows in chapter four is rooted in 
the account of selfhood and intersubjectivity that emerges here and will 
particularly focus on the nature of the evaluative and orientational 
relationship between self and world that is inherent in trusting and 
distrusting. Following Lévinas we may say that the trusting relationship 
takes place in or as proximity, and that here there is a possibility for a form 
of understanding and meaning that originates differently from objectivity 
and intentionality. In other words, trust and distrust are part of how I 
experience the signification of a situation. The understanding of the other 
inherent in my trust or distrust – how the other signifies – is what Lévinas 
will help us explicate below. First a brief comment on the relationality of 
ethical proximity followed by a look at how our Lévinasian perspective is 
situated within contemporary phenomenological discussions.  
3.1 What is a relationship? 
How can a being enter into relation with the other without allowing its very self to be 
crushed by the other? (TO, 77) 
But how can the same, produced as egoism, enter into relationship with an other 
without immediately divesting it of its alterity? What is the nature of this 
relationship? (TI, 38) 
First off it is helpful to clarify what it means that trust and distrust take 
place in a relationship or as a relationship. The relationship that takes place 
in or is expressed as trusting or distrusting, in which I come to understand 
something about the other, is structured as proximity and responsibility, 
and in the following I will present the philosophical account that Lévinas 
provides of the conditions of possibility of a responsible relationship 
between me and the other. The word relationship denotes a situation in 
which two (or more) terms are brought together without thereby losing 
their separateness. Clearly, there must be something in common between 
the terms – a common ground – if we are to talk about a relation, and at the 
same time there must also be a part of each term that is kept out of the 
relationship and separate because otherwise the relationship would turn into 
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conflation and cease to exist; identity would supersede difference. The 
terms of the relationship must transcend the relationship; the relationship is 
not adequate or equal to its terms, even if it is their origin.
48
 But how can 
we understand a relationship between separated terms? If there is truly to 
be a separation, then that part of the terms that is kept out of the relation 
must be radically incommensurable. If not, common ground would assert 
itself and difference would vanish into mere appearance, leading to a world 
that has no place for the personal and truly singular.
49
 This, Lévinas holds, 
characterizes much of philosophy as an inability to account for – and as 
blindness to – radical exteriority.50 If separation is to be real and not simply 
schein that will finally fall away before the unified likeness of a totality, 
otherness in the shape of radical transcendence must truly go to the core of 
existence: the I and the other are fundamentally incommensurable.
51
 The 
ethical relationship that Lévinas describes as the origin of selfhood and of 
 
                                           
48
 For an exposition of the argument that in being a self we relate to ourselves, and in 
relating we are this relation, see Grøn 2004 and 2007. Alterity is always already at the 
scene: “Self is to relate to oneself, but a self only relates to itself in relating to others 
and to a shared world” (Grøn 2004, 137), and “Subjectivity in the full sense requires 
transcendence as an alterity that cannot be integrated into subjectivity” (Grøn 2007, 33). 
This last claim will be unfolded below.  
49
 As I will argue below, if we cannot relate specifically to what is singular in a situation 
we cannot properly make sense of trust: if, when we judge, we manage only to make the 
general, i.e. universal or objective, features of the situation present to our judgment we 
cannot meaningfully claim that our trust or distrust concerns the one we are confronted 
with, i.e. the particular person. We need to be able to relate to the radically singular if 
we are to connect to real-life situations in our judgments, and although this may be a 
tautology (the previous sentence actually says that we need to be able to relate to the 
radically singular if we are to say anything about it), it seems to me that philosophy 
loses itself completely to solipsistic idealism if it does not make precisely that 
achievement its ambition. Chapter four seeks to spell out how we may judge the 
singular in its non-phenomenality.  
50
 When asked, in 1981, about the relationship between the two words in the title of 
Totality and Infinity Lévinas answered: “In the critique of totality born by the very 
association of these two words, there is a reference to the history of philosophy. This 
history can be interpreted as an attempt at universal synthesis, a reduction of all 
experience, of all that is reasonable, to a totality wherein consciousness embraces the 
world, leaves nothing other outside of itself and thus becomes absolute thought. The 
consciousness of self is at the same time the consciousness of the whole. There have 
been few protestations in the history of philosophy against this totalization” (EI, 75, cf. 
GCM, 56).  
51
 “There is no ipseity common to me and the others; ‘me’ is the exclusion from this 
possibility of comparison, as soon as comparison is set up” (OB, 127, cf. TI, 39, 120, 
180).  
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meaning is one in which the absolute alterity of the other is not relative to 
the I; nor the other way around. Lévinas credits Descartes with having 
understood this, saying that it is in the Cartesian notion of the infinite that 
we find a “relation with a being that maintains its total exteriority with 
respect to him who thinks it” (TI, 50). In the same way, I shall claim, other 
persons remain exterior to my thought even as I think of them as 
trustworthy. 
Intersubjectivity thus understood is a matter of a relationship between two 
distinct terms: I only become unique by way of this relation, as a response 
to a call or as an awakening: 
The ‘me’ does not begin in the self-affection of a sovereign I, susceptible in a second 
moment to feeling compassion for the other; instead, it begins through the trauma 
without beginning, prior to every self-affection, of the upsurge of another. Here, the 
one is affected by the other. There is an inspiration of the one by the other that cannot 
be thought in terms of causality. (GDT, 178) 
Selfhood emerges in relatedness, constituted in its openness towards the 
other, and even in this very opening it stands out from the relationship as 
irreducibly singular. The self is oriented towards alterity from the first, 
disturbed by the other’s exclusive exteriority, called into question by it and 
compelled to speak (TI, 88). The self is essentially responsivity, which is a 
primordial openness before thoughts about prudence, vulnerability, and 
desert are possible. Responsivity is deeper than the active self can reach, 
deeper than self-mastery; it is the absolute passivity of exposure and 
unguarded nakedness (e.g. OB, 15f, 50f, 72f): 
Subjectivity, locus and null-site of this breakup, comes to pass [se passe] as a 
passivity more passive than all passivity. To the diachronic past, which cannot be 
recuperated by representation effected by memory or history, that is, 
incommensurable with the present, corresponds or answers the unassemblable 
passivity of the self [la passivité inassumable du soi]. (OB, 14)  
The self’s anarchic openness and passivity are made into wakefulness and 
responsivity by the other’s call. It is to this first movement of responsivity, 
where the self directs its response to another and finds meaning in such 
directedness, that we will look in order to understand how the self cannot 
be presupposed, but must be explained alongside proximity. Selfhood is, 
“to put it concisely, not a matter of observation, but of orientation and 
obligation” (Grøn 2004, 141). Invested with the responsibility for the world 
before the other, selfhood begins as the ethical task of assuming the 
responsibility that is already a fact. Experience becomes meaningful with 
reference to this task; and it is within this dynamic that trust and distrust 
becomes means of orientation. 
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3.2 The self in contemporary phenomenology 
What I have against the present way [of the phenomenology of the other person] is 
that the other is presented as a kinsman, a collaborator, or someone with whom I 
come to terms, that is, whose words I can interpret and who can interpret mine. What 
I have not seen is the other person whose alterity would consist in being “more” than 
me. […] If the moral means that situation in which the other is more than me, in 
which, consequently, there is no pure and simple reciprocity in my relation with the 
other, I arrive at a notion in which “I”, the subject, am founded on something that is 
not me, that is outside. And perhaps that is where everything that is offensive in the 
notion of subject will be overcome. But all this is not in Husserl’s phenomenology. 
(RPT, 109) 
The concept of the self that forms the background for the analyses that 
follow is of a phenomenological nature. I rely to some extent on recent 
philosophical work defining the (minimal) self in terms of an experiential 
character of mineness, taking, as did Lévinas, its cue from Husserl. I 
present a Lévinasian correction to a field that tends to favour a too abstract 
view of the self, extracting from the complex whole of a situation only 
certain structures that do not, or so I claim, add up to a viable notion of 
selfhood because it cannot explain how we come to experience and act in 
the world. As already indicated, we need a view of the self as always 
already disturbed in its self-immediacy to account for the role that the 
trusting relationship – as a relationship that is also not one of pure 
unreflected immediacy – plays in the exercise of selfhood. It is a relational 
concept of selfhood in that it depends on interaction with a world: being 
someone requires that I am body as well as mind and that I am engaging 
with a world that is meaningful to me only because I share it with others. 
The role of sociality – of the other – in perception, thought and action is of 
primary concern here as it is therein that we will find an explanation of the 
importance of trust for the self.  
That selfhood is tied to experiencing is advocated today by a number of 
contemporary philosophers, as witnessed by the recently published Oxford 
Handbook of the Self (Parnas and Sass 2011), who for their part draw on 
classical thinkers such as Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Michel 
Henry. The dominant assertion underlying this claim is that selfhood is 
manifest in the first person givenness of all experience. Any experience is 
accompanied by a non-intentional and non-inferential quality of mineness 
that identifies it as my experience and me as the one having it, and it is 
through experiencing that we maintain and consolidate a sense of a 
continuous and consistent self:  
The crucial idea propounded by all of these phenomenologists is that an 
understanding of what it means to be a self calls for an examination of the structure 
of experience, and vice versa. Thus, the self is not something that stands opposed to 
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the stream of consciousness, but is, rather, immersed in conscious life; it is an 
integral part of its structure. […] In short, the self is conceived as the invariant 
dimension of first-personal givenness in the multitude of changing experiences. 
(Gallagher and Zahavi 2007, 204) 
And:  
Basic self-feeling is not a product or object of observation or reflection, of an ‘inner 
perception’ understood as a form of introspection. Rather, it is a peculiar non-
relational relation inherent in experience, in which the ‘what’ and the ‘for whom’ 
constitute a single, inseparable term. (Parnas and Sass 2011, 529) 
This mineness does not just accompany experience but permeates it and 
renders it possible. The sense that there is an I or a me who experiences 
also renders me present to myself in a non-objective manner, what Husserl 
calls the zero point of orientation (Husserl 1973, 80; Overgaard 2004, 157f) 
and as at one with myself. Objects only manifest themselves to me through 
the medium of my sense of self and only receive their significance and 
order from this relationship, which brings us to a question that sets our 
Lévinasian approach apart from those that view the minimal self as a 
purely formal and empty condition of experience, namely: what is implied 
in this notion of mineness? What does it include? How much self, so to 
speak, is needed? Or, in other words, how substantial is the me inherent in 
mineness?
52
 
I shall argue that there is more to the me than a formal condition; that the 
sense of self is dependent on having experiences of something – the 
mineness is also a for-me-ness of something – which means that it depends 
on having a world in a more substantial way. The world does not confront 
me as a set of neutral objects: it is a world of meaning and direction, 
structured by the intentions and projects inherent in my very experience of 
it. Take a game of chess as an example. When I perceive the knight at E4 I 
 
                                           
52
 That one can coherently speak of a formal and empty minimal self is not challenged 
here; on the contrary, such a notion is a helpful abstraction for investigating the 
necessary correlation of experience and subjectivity and of the manifestation of 
selfhood in experience. Parnas and Sass caution: “Yet, saying that the minimal self is 
necessary may be conductive to an erroneous assumption that it is a sort of prior 
foundation, the pre-existing ground for the subsequent stages in a diachronic 
development. In reality, the ontogenetic development of selfhood is likely to be 
complex from the very outset, in the sense of being dependent on the infant’s or child’s 
bodily needs, structure, and dispositions, and co-constituted through intersubjective 
interactions” (Parnas and Sass 2011, 525). Likewise: “In other words, the notion of 
minimal self seems to be excessively abstracted out of a complex, relational whole” 
(Parnas 2007, 68, cf. 63). 
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do not simply see a piece of wood of a certain colour and size, but see its 
position in relation to a whole in which it has a certain significance and 
potential for me and my fellow player. The knight’s potential positions are 
a modality of my perception of it from the first in its objectivity, and these 
potentialities influence my self-relation. The knight is never just a wooden 
object with a certain mass and set of proportions – unless we perform a 
complex abstraction to arrive at such an image – but is constituted as part 
of my relations to others. I can only experience a phenomenon as it takes its 
place in the referential whole that I inhabit, as a phenomenal for-me-ness, 
and part of the experience is the possibilities that are afforded to me only 
because the phenomenon is experienced as part of a shared world, with a 
shareable meaningfulness. The knight is also experiences in its potential 
significance for the other in the game we share: the meaning that 
constitutes phenomenal experience is such that I cannot be the sole author 
of it. It is a meaningfulness that holds not just objective characteristics, but 
includes the possibilities that they afford, and such possibilities are 
inherently social. I perceive an object, then, not just as making something 
possible for me (drinking from this glass, say), but from the first as relating 
me and the others (water is thirst-quenching for us all in this hot room). In 
short, the meaningfulness that is a prerequisite for experience and for a 
sense of self cannot be produced by an isolated consciousness and pertains 
not only to me. Experience has a modal structure which already takes 
others into account. As Ratcliffe puts it, “The world is experienced as a 
dynamic space of significant possibilities in virtue of our potential and 
actual relations with [others]” (Ratcliffe Forthcoming, 17).53  
It follows from the necessarily meaningful structure (the for-me-ness) of 
the experienced world that the basic sense of self is agentic. Since the 
world presents itself as a “field of certain possibilities, opportunities and 
obstacles” (Parnas 2007, 62) in which I am oriented, the sense of agency is 
not distinct from experience, but is part of the way an experience is given 
to me as mine. In my very being-here I am directed, not only at the level of 
conscious interests and designs, but as a precondition for relating to things 
at all.
54
 Selfhood, then, is always actively engaged in understanding a world 
 
                                           
53
 Ratcliffe’s text is forthcoming. The page numbers refer to the available online 
version, and a link is provided in the bibliography. 
54
 The discussion of the role of agency in relation to perceptual experience is interesting 
to note and not irrelevant to our present concerns, although it is not treated 
independently here. The underlying suggestion is that we simply cannot make sense of 
the contents of experience without relating to it as agentic beings, i.e. beings that can 
effect changes. Comparably, Overgaard and Grünbaum argue that a subject’s ability to 
(continued) 
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that presents itself as a field of potentiality; in fact, we may say that 
selfhood is this world-making activity.  
As I have already indicated, the other is part of my experiential world in the 
way that it is given to me as my responsibility, i.e. as something that I can 
act with regard to. In making explicit the social dimension of experience 
we may contribute to the philosophical understanding of selfhood, because 
whereas the sine qua non of experience and embodiment is recognized in 
most contemporary phenomenological views of what constitutes the self, 
the equal indispensability of the other or of alterity is not. This critique 
might seem unwarranted, since phenomenological thought has explored the 
significance of intersubjectivity quite thoroughly, yet what I suggest here is 
that the constitutive role of the other for the self is not sufficiently 
appreciated. The relationship to an other person is rarely made a 
requirement for selfhood, which is what is attempted here. In Husserl, for 
instance, the encounter with the other person happens at the level of the 
embodied ego’s consciousness, and most Husserlian approaches, whatever 
their view of intersubjectivity may be, will hesitate to resituate the 
intersubjective encounter quite as radically as Lévinas ventures to do, even 
if, according to Crowell, it is the necessary next step from the Husserlian 
position: 
For Husserl, constitution of the Other does not merely add an item to the world; it 
informs the sense of everything I experience. The analogizing apperception that 
transforms Körper into Leib simultaneously transforms my sphere of ownness into an 
adumbration of “nature” - that is, an “objective world common to us all” (CM 84). In 
this way I too first become objective, an instance of the natural kind, “human being”. 
As Husserl puts it, “the Other’s” animate bodily organism [...] is, so to speak, the 
intrinsically first Object, just as the other man is constitutionally the intrinsically first 
<Objective> man” (CM 124). Thus, it is the Other who constitutes me as “man,” as 
belonging to the common world. What Husserl does not note – though it will be 
crucial for what follows – is that without this transformation, no genuine intentional 
content is possible at all. Husserl’s reference to an “objective world” does not, in the 
first instance, designate scientifically objective nature; rather, it points to the fact that 
the constitution of the Other supplies the necessary condition for any genuine 
reidentification of things in my own experience, and only if that is possible can I 
experience something as something. (Crowell 2010, 13–14, cf. Crowell 1999)55 
 
                                                                                                                           
perceive spatial objects presupposes that the subject can perform voluntary movements 
(Overgaard and Grünbaum 2007).  
55
 Crowell (2010) refers to a presentation given by Crowell in Freiburg in 2010 as part 
of the Colloquium Phaenomenologicum. The bibliography contains a link to the podcast 
as well as to a pdf-manuscript of the presentation. The page numbers refer to the 
manuscript.  
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Crowell points out that my shame when subjected to the gaze of another, 
which for Sartre is evidence of my recognition of the other as other (Sartre 
1992, 302), would not make sense if I did not already possess an ethical 
knowledge of what is owed to the other.
56
 Lévinas begins, Crowell says, 
with the realization that Sartre did not himself reach, namely that my shame 
bears witness to how the world is constituted as for-another before it is my 
own. Whereas Sartre explains the discomfort, which is associated with the 
sudden realization of another’s presence, by the feeling that the world was 
stolen from me (Sartre 1992, 343), Lévinas would say that the feeling 
signals my awareness that I have usurped the world from the other 
(Crowell 2010, 19). The self-transcendence sought by Sartre ends up 
overlooking that I was never self-sufficient to begin with, and that alterity 
is a necessary structural part of selfhood. With Welz we may point out that 
a self-transcendence that leads back to an ultimately self-sufficient self 
“becomes a self-encircling movement, for it remains restricted to the limits 
of one’s own capacities and possibilities” (Welz 2001, 61).57 Consequently, 
it is argued that subjectivity cannot be understood as a self-sufficient 
ground for experience. 
The other’s role in selfhood is a topic for phenomenology in two ways. The 
first is discussed under such headings as the question of other minds or 
mindreading and has to do with how we can come to understand the other 
as a minded being like ourselves as well as with how we can understand 
what they are experiencing. The second is the question of how 
intersubjectivity relates to the conditions of experience per se, that is, for 
how the self comes to experience the world as meaningful at all. 
Contemporary discussions of the problem of other minds typically 
presupposes a self that can be understood independently of the other, and 
for whom the possibility of having a relationship to another is itself a 
problem to be explained. The second issue, about the intersubjective 
grounds of experience, opens up the possibility of asking whether the 
presupposition of a self-standing self, conceived of as prior to contact with 
another, is not mistaken, and thereby of asking about the possible role of 
 
                                           
56
 ”Why should the original experience of the Other as subject be experienced precisely 
as shame? […] When properly generalized, the question really asks why it is that our 
experience of being an object for another subject is one of being judged by that subject. 
[…] For the argument that social reality is a permanent contest between me and the 
Other over who is to occupy the subject-position. i.e., pass judgment, overlooks the fact 
that I enter the space in which such conflict is possible at all only by acknowledging the 
Other’s normative claim on me” (Crowell 2010, 19,20,21).  
57
 Welz levers the critique at Heidegger in particular, but in its precision I find it 
appropriate here too. 
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the other in the genesis of the self. This latter course is the one taken by 
Lévinas, and the one we shall follow here. In his work on social cognition, 
Gallagher concludes that contemporary phenomenology displays a 
tendency towards what he denotes philosophical autism, by which he 
means that although the existence of others is of course duly noted, it is not 
allotted an appropriate explanatory role (Gallagher 2008; Gallagher 2009). 
In such accounts, he ventures, 
we would come to understand the fullness and complexity of human experience by 
first understanding how an isolated body, moving alone in the world, perceives non-
living objects, and then adding to this an analysis of how others fit into the picture. 
The phenomenal dimension of social interaction that characterizes human existence 
at least from birth, on this view, has nothing to do with the way we perceive objects. 
(Gallagher 2009, 299) 
In fact, our connectedness to others is styled as a problem and a paradox of 
perplexing dimensions: how can we understand others? How do we even 
know they have minds, let alone what they may be thinking and feeling? 
Indeed, it becomes quite difficult to explain our ability to feel with and for 
each other if one starts from an isolated and, in Gallagher’s words, autistic 
individual. The problem, however, is not so much that on such accounts we 
are barred from understanding others; what is left out is the role that the 
social relationship plays in the way the world is experienced; the 
intersubjective modality of experience makes the world an altogether 
different one, and, consequently, the self that is conceived as experiencing 
the world intersubjectively is a fundamentally different self. The 
connectedness to others is not an add-on to the development of our mental 
abilities but makes a real difference from the first. This does not mean that 
without others I would have neither experience nor world, but it does mean 
that experience and world would be qualitatively different for me had I not 
developed my perceptual and reasoning abilities with others. Within 
developmental psychology much work has been carried out in the attempt 
to understand what is called primary intersubjectivity (Rochat 2009; 
Trevarthen 1980; Gopnik, Meltzoff, and Kuhl 2000) which aims at 
explaining how infants are capable of showing a sense of socially shared 
experience from the age of six weeks (i.e. some form of socially mediated 
self-awareness) and can engage in what can only be called social 
interaction, albeit without deliberation or intentionality, from even earlier, 
to some extent even as neonates.
58
 It is an open question exactly what role 
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 In 1977 Meltzoff and Moore published the results of an experiment about infant 
capacity for imitating the facial gestures of adults, showing how infants are capable of 
social interaction of this kind much earlier than previously believed (Meltzoff and 
(continued) 
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this apparently innate ability to relate to and engage with others plays in the 
child’s very first experiences of the world. Rochat argues that co-awareness 
– experiencing the world together – is the primary way of accessing the 
world even for infants, and that an “autonomous, socially independent 
awareness is a myth” (Rochat 2004, 258). In fact, he holds, it is hard to 
imagine why a person who grew up without ever meeting another person 
would go to the trouble of finding words for thoughts and developing 
reasons and convictions in the usual meaning of such terms if there were no 
one to address them to (Rochat 2004). Lévinas presents a comparable 
argument for the necessity of plurality. He claims that if reason were 
universal, there would be no need for arguments and grounds, i.e. for 
communication beyond the simplest physical gestures:  
In this world without multiplicity language loses all social signification; interlocutors 
renounce their unicity not in desiring one another but in desiring the universal. (TI, 
217) 
In her account of what she calls second-hand moral knowledge, Jones 
addresses the interrelatedness of self and other in reason in the context of 
discussing the moral status of trusting something that is not fully 
understood. Trust is described as a way to establish a morally defensible 
basis for accepting the judgment of another on issues that we do not 
ourselves understand and therefore are not in a position to assess properly. 
That moral knowledge can be acquired by second-hand means may appear 
problematic at first glance because it undermines the demand for personal 
accountability, that is, for giving reasons of one’s own that one can support 
rationally. What Jones proposes is that we can sometimes be justified in 
believing and acting upon something “because my friend holds it as true”, 
even if this friend cannot make clear what the reasons are for adopting the 
belief. We can simply “borrow moral knowledge” (Jones 1999, 60), and 
trust is involved in the justified workings of this. She stresses that we do 
not borrow principles (say, all humans are equal), but sometimes we 
borrow the ability to see how the principles are implicated in a particular 
practise. The case for autonomy and against the validity of second-hand 
moral knowledge is persuasive at first glance, because the person who 
refuses it may very well show a “keen and admirable awareness of the 
importance of moral issues”, Jones explains. She gives the example of a 
person, Peter, who is uncomfortable following his housemates’ uneasiness 
 
                                                                                                                           
Moore 1977). Their work has been very influential in subsequent developmental 
psychology. A video demonstrating neonate imitative ability can be found at this link: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k2YdkQ1G5QI. 
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about a potential new resident in their cooperative house because he does 
not perceive the sexism that the women during the interview. In this case, 
Jones explains, Peter’s stance is based in moral considerations, since he is 
troubled by having to reject applicants on the basis of reasons that he is not 
in a position to endorse: 
Moreover, his desire to have, and to understand, morally adequate reasons for acting 
makes us fairly sure that, should Peter fall into morally bad circumstances, he will 
not be following the leader into error. This sort of independence – the independence 
of those who want to keep their moral beliefs in step with what they take to be cogent 
reasons – gives us a sense of the notion of autonomy which shows why autonomy is 
thought to be something valuable.” (Jones 1999, 62) 
In this particular case, however, Peter might have been morally justified in 
deferring to the women, because he is not in a position to discern with the 
same expertise. In fact, it seems to me that such instances where we can be 
said to have attained the proper sort of understanding to judge about a 
situation’s moral qualities entirely autonomously, i.e. without trusting in 
the understanding of others, are rare indeed. In the majority of cases it 
seems to be out of our power to bring about a situation where we can act on 
autonomous grounds in the way required by Peter in the quote above. 
Depending on the understanding of others seems a necessary part of the 
human condition. Where does that leave us, then? Barred from sufficient 
autonomy, are we then also barred from morally justified action? Indeed 
not. Like Jones, I take it that there is something about trust which makes it 
possible to act in a morally justified manner on borrowed knowledge, and 
that this is so because who we trust and distrust is not an arbitrary matter, 
but an expression of a moral insight.  
We trust when we borrow moral knowledge but, more importantly, there is 
something about how this borrowing can take place which is essential to 
the trusting relation; an openness of the self to the other on the level of 
basic reflectivity. When I trust someone I judge that they are trustworthy, 
which, as we saw, is to trust in their ability to judge appropriately about 
moral matters.
59
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 As Jones points out, the strength of the ideal of autonomy is that it seems to provide 
an impediment for the going along unquestioningly with the morally despicable which 
is certainly relevant since atrocious human acts are often found in situations where the 
culture of an institution or a social group somehow makes the moral reprehensibility 
less visible. My argument requires an account for the validity of trusting someone else’s 
judgments, i.e. of the judgment about trustworthiness that I perform when I borrow 
moral knowledge, in order to establish its non-arbitrary nature. This is the ambition of 
chapter four. As we shall see then, the subjunctive mode is relevant to this because 
(continued) 
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In chapter one it was described, with brief remarks on Orwell, that the 
dependence and vulnerability of human existence can lead us towards two 
ways of exit: the attempt to escape from it by way of pursuing absolute 
certainty, which, because of the impossibility of its objective, ends in 
violent destruction of otherness if unchecked; or the acceptance of and 
attempt to life with this unavoidable existential condition.
60
 Part of such an 
acceptance is the openness to learning from others also in matters of 
morality and trust. In trust the others are with me in a profound way as part 
of the world that I only experience as sensible because I am not isolated 
and autonomous. 
To explain experience properly we need to incorporate the recognition that 
our engagement with the world, i.e. the exercise of selfhood, takes place in 
the company of others and as part of a meaningful involvement that has the 
self-other relationship as a constituent factor. Gallagher mentions Sartre as 
an example of someone who has tried to “capture the ontological 
significance of the presence of others” (Gallagher 2009, 301), and with 
Lévinas we may follow this lead and explore how ontology, via a 
phenomenological analysis of experience, therefore becomes ethical. If we 
think back to the self-estrangement that follows torture we will remember 
that a correlation between a disturbed sense of self and a disturbance in 
intersubjectivity presented itself. In arguing for the other’s relevance for 
experience I have laid the ground for claiming that the self is constituted as 
responsiveness, and this claim I shall now, with the assistance of Lévinas, 
embark on defending.  
3.3 Signification and proximity 
Phenomenology is helpful for the philosophical investigation into trust 
because more than any other philosophical discipline or method it studies 
the manifold ways in which the self is related to the world. In Husserl we 
 
                                                                                                                           
trusting presumes a (presumed) shared human world; and the openness that is here 
deemed necessary will be explained in terms of sensus communis.  
60
 Seligman also describes this nicely in his Templeton Research Lecture (2008). 
Bernstein comparably describes how our attempt to avoid the need to trust, in for 
instance gated communities, is futile but because of its very futility becomes incessant 
and is borne by “fantasies of independence and omnipotence” (Bernstein 2011, 401) to 
which, I might add, much moral philosophy seems inclined. Also Nussbaum touches on 
how the origin of violence can be found in our attempt to cancel out the power of others 
over us (Nussbaum 2008), and this is of course also a prominent theme for Lévinas. 
Trust is an attitude if peace over against the war of an attitude of control.  
112 Problematic selfhood 
 
find the analysis of different modes of intentionality, each contributing a 
privileged form of world-relatedness that forms part of the meaningful 
world that we inhabit, from theoretical attitude aiming at objective 
knowledge to sensible intentionality, showing how in our feelings we also 
tend towards and are embedded in a world. Starting from Husserl, Lévinas 
attempts to push the language of intentionality even further in order to 
capture the nature of the ethical relationship, but quickly discovers, through 
phenomenological analysis, that when it comes to the relationship to the 
other, phenomenology has reached its limit. The intersubjective 
relationship is thus investigated as something that breaks with intentionality 
and instead is seen as underlying the kinds of meaning that can be obtained 
through phenomenological analysis. The break itself cannot be understood 
by phenomenological analysis because transcendental consciousness does 
not constitute the interruption it undergoes; it remains in-comprehensible. 
In contrast to Husserl’s search for the logos of the phenomenal, Lévinas, 
then, calls his own work a search for the phenomenology of the noumenal 
(FC, 21). 
It is often noted by Lévinas scholars that there is a distinct difference in 
tone and vocabulary between Lévinas’ two major works, Totality and 
Infinity and Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence,
61
 and indeed Lévinas 
himself recognized that the former was composed in the ontological 
language that he sought throughout his writings to go beyond (DF, 295). 
One occasionally sees references to an early or a later Lévinas, but for the 
most part the continuity of his thought prevails. For our purposes the 
difference is mainly one of emphasis; whereas Totality and Infinity is 
concerned with establishing the reality of singularity, separation, and 
otherness up and against systematic ambitions of totalizing philosophies, 
Otherwise than Being, building on the foundation of its predecessor, strives 
to explain what is after all the relatedness of the absolutely separate. Ethics 
is a real practice among concrete living human beings, and it is this practice 
that Lévinas in later work spells out in terms of signification, proximity, 
responsibility and substitution. 
There is always a double movement of familiarity and alienation in 
Lévinas. In thinking about the world we make of it a theme subjected to 
logos, yet at the same time our thinking is saturated with the excessive and 
incomprehensible character of all that manifests itself to thought. The 
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 Totalité and Infini was first published in 1961 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff), and 
Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence in 1974 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff). Both 
books are products of the mature thinker Lévinas, written well into his productive 
career. 
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excessive expressiveness of exteriority Lévinas calls saying (le dire); in its 
pure form it is a reverberant memory of a pre-originary event to which the 
subject bears witness, and as such it accompanies the experiential life of the 
subject and undermines the unifying ambition of consciousness, or what he 
terms the said (le dit). In our worldly engagement the saying and the said 
accompany each other, and this is what constitutes the Lévinasian concept 
of understanding: a comprehending thought thwarted, expanded and made 
to transcend itself in its encounter with radical exteriority that does not 
remain aloof from conscious experience but fractures and moulds it. 
Lévinas says:  
Thematization is inevitable, so that signification itself shows itself, but does so in the 
sophism with which philosophy begins, in the betrayal [trahison] which philosophy 
is called upon to reduce. This reduction always has to be attempted, because of the 
trace of sincerity which the words themselves bear and which they owe to saying as 
witness, even when the said dissimulates the saying in the correlation between the 
saying and the said. Saying always seeks to unsay that correlation, and this is its very 
veracity. (OB, 152) 
Importantly Lévinas does not, after identifying the primacy of ethics in 
relation to conceptuality, discard the latter in order to hail a human 
existence devoted to the purity of ethics. It is exactly the intersections of 
totality and infinity in thought that he is concerned with, because it is this 
unattainable unity that shapes our experiences and our actual existence.  
3.3.1 Starting from the subject anew 
In many ways Lévinas saw himself as continuing the philosophical 
tradition that starts from the subject in order to explain the possibility, and 
actuality, of ethics. It could be claimed that there are two inverted questions 
underlying his thought: what kind of ethics does our notion of subjectivity 
make possible? And what kind of subjectivity does our notion of ethics 
make possible and indeed necessary? Lévinas founds his philosophy on an 
analysis of subjectivity, and not on its deconstruction or its demise. It is in 
investigating what it means to be a self – a responsible human person – that 
he arrives at a conception of responsibility, just as the nature of 
responsibility then provokes a reinterpretation of what selfhood can be. In 
some of his early work, Lévinas is concerned with discussing and 
explaining Husserl to a French audience.
62
 In what is sometimes a simple 
exposition and sometimes a subtle reinterpretation he seeks those places in 
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 Published for instance in La théorie de l'intuition dans la phénoménologie de Husserl 
(Paris: Alcan Lévinas 1930) and En découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger 
(Paris: J. Vrin Lévinas 2001). 
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Husserl where the unruly resides.
63
 Husserl’s thought is otherwise elegantly 
ordered and to Lévinas’ mind lacks sensitivity to the ambivalent and 
murky, but this is nevertheless where he finds a starting-point for another 
notion of the relationship between self and world than one which can be 
explicated entirely in terms of consciousness, light and comprehension. The 
great originality of phenomenology and particularly of Husserl, according 
to Lévinas, lies in the fact that the world-related sense-making activity that 
is subjectivity is once and for all placed beyond the subject-object 
dichotomy. Intentionality is not a bridge between consciousness and object, 
and the phenomenon is not another kind of object: the relationship to the 
object is the phenomenon, and there is a bestowal of meaning inherent in 
and constitutive of the intentional relationship which gives the object not as 
representation, but in its actual existence as placed in the conscious and 
affective life that intends it. To think it otherwise makes it an abstraction. 
Intentionality describes a relation; and subjectivity is this relation. It is a 
relation, furthermore, that is not primarily cognitive and only secondarily 
coloured by the affective states of personal existence; intentionality is 
present even in feelings and desires that are non-theoretical, but which still 
tend towards something that is felt or desired (WEH, 60). Intentionality is 
the name for what Lévinas here calls the ‘supremely concrete in man’, 
namely the self’s transcendence in relation to itself, that is, the ability not to 
be confined to oneself but to be able to reach beyond what one already is 
into the external world (FHP, 34). The pairing of intentionality and 
knowledge – that intentionality is about something in a way that reveals it 
to thought – would seem to reserve it for relations of understanding, but as 
we have just seen feelings are also intentional even if they are not relations 
of knowledge in the same way (FHP, 35). So far Lévinas agrees with 
Husserl: our perception of phenomena does indeed have an intentional 
structure, and this intentional relatedness is constituent of consciousness as 
well as of the world. He credits Husserl with introducing into philosophy 
the idea that thought can have a meaning and “can intend something even 
when this something is absolutely undetermined [indéterminé] and is a 
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 Throughout the articles collected in English in Discovering Existence with Husserl 
Lévinas vacillates between, at one moment, ascribing to Husserl the philosophical 
discovery of the truly transcendent abilities of the ego and its ability to enter into 
relation with what is radically incommensurable with it, and, at the next, formulating 
these same insights as an (his own) overcoming of the limits of Husserlian thought. 
Often, just after having frankly attributed what are probably best described as his own 
views to Husserl, he begins the next sentence with the phrase “To be sure, …” and then 
point out how Husserl probably cannot after all entirely subscribe to the view he has just 
presented. See e.g. (RR, 114; IM, 124, 127; RPT, 94, 101; WEH, 65,67; CW, 159).  
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quasi-absence of object” (WEH, 61). Yet still there is something troubling 
for Lévinas in this sort of intentionality, because it does not, in the end, 
seem to allow consciousness to encounter the new. Even with sensuous 
intention the object is constituted, albeit in a non-intellectual or pre-
intellectual fashion, but the pre-intellectual world of sensation is still 
subordinated to the workings of identificatory intentionality that is the core 
of consciousness (WEH, 65ff). Lévinas asks this question of Husserl: 
“what is the significance of the presence of the act of identification at the 
basis of intentions that have nothing intellectual about them?” (WEH, 61). 
According to Lévinas, the self-evidence of intentionality is not the final or 
the first form of meaning. It will take some years before he entirely leaves 
behind the language of intentionality and being and looks for an ethical 
form of meaning outside its framework, but already in his early essays on 
Husserl his struggle with and against such language manifests itself. For 
instance, here is one definition of phenomenology that he presents:  
Phenomenology is a destruction of representation and the theoretical object. It 
denounces contemplation of the object (which it nevertheless seems to have 
promoted) as an abstraction, a partial vision of being, a forgetting [oubli] (as we 
might say in modern terms), of its truth. To intend the object, to represent it to 
oneself, is already to forget the being of its truth. (RPT, 94) 
Even when Lévinas uses such words as truth and being he is searching for a 
way out of representation and objectivity without thereby surrendering to 
irrationality. He aspires to move beyond words which can only intend an 
abstract reality and cannot capture, or coexist with, the ambiguity inherent 
in the kind of meaning he is pursuing: only such abstractions as takes place 
in the verbal and predicative relationship to objects can dispel the 
equivocation which is otherwise a necessary – and not an arbitrary and 
unfortunate – part of the relationship between mind and world. The price 
for clarity would be the loss of reality: the purely imaginary world of 
unremediated idealism. When phenomenology seeks to return to the things 
themselves, this return must, Lévinas insists, accept equivocation as a 
constitutive part of the world and not seek recourse from it in rigid 
abstraction. In the return to the things themselves sensibility plays the 
central role (RPT, 95) as the way towards properly transcending 
consciousness and language. Whereas here he here partly speaks through 
Husserl, he is himself already aware that he is moving away from what can 
be considered Husserlian in a strict sense (RPT, 101). Lévinas’ critique of 
phenomenology has to do with what he sees as its blindness to the unruly, 
the disorderly, the excess, the radicality of transcendence. In other words, 
that it cannot recognize that the opaqueness and imprecision that sneak into 
philosophical description are not a coincidental by-product of reasoning 
that can (in principle if not actually) with good systematic effort come to 
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appear with unequivocal clarity to consciousness. Instead it is a way that 
radical exteriority, which cannot be given as phenomenon for experience, 
can make itself felt within the ontological order of being. There is an 
openness in thought towards the infinite and unthinkable, and this openness 
can be experienced by the subject in its non-phenomenality, as a receding 
reality. We recall Lévinas:  
The relation with infinity will have to be stated in terms other than those of objective 
experience; but if experience precisely means a relation with the absolutely other, 
that is, with what always overflows thought, the relation with infinity accomplishes 
experience in the fullest sense of the word. (TI, 25) 
The integral relationship between subjectivity and meaning that is 
established by phenomenology is retained by Lévinas, but the notion of 
meaning is altered. Or rather, room is made in the relationship between self 
and world for another form of sense-making than that of understanding 
through intentionality. Lévinas concedes that intentionality is a way for 
thought to “ideally contain something other than itself”, and that it does not 
signify a relation between subject and object, but is “essentially the act of 
bestowing a meaning (the Sinngebung)” (WEH, 59), but even in its 
complexity the act of intentionality is ultimately an act of identification 
wherein the object is constituted. For Husserl, to think is to identify, and in 
the end all meaning is revealed as self-evidence: 
The act of positing an object, the objectifying act, is a synthesis of identification. 
Through this synthesis all mental life participates in representation; indeed, in the last 
analysis, Husserl determines the very notion of representation by that of synthesis. 
Thus representation is not a concept opposed to action or feeling; it is prior to them. 
(WEH, 60) 
Even the immediacy of the sensuous intuition is not for Husserl exempt 
from the basic condition of intentionality, namely that it is an act of 
constitution delivering the phenomenon to me as self-evident. Even when 
intentionality is defined as that which allows the mind to preside over 
something that is exterior to it, and which in some ways remains exterior, 
that is, transcendent to the mind, identification is still at its core. Thought 
can only enter into relationship with that which is adequate and permeable 
to it: being cannot shock it, and the mind can encounter nothing that is in 
principle incomprehensible to it (WEH, 68). Even forcing the different 
forms of intentionality to the limits of their meaning would not in the end 
give rise to the form of ethical relatedness that Lévinas will eventually call 
responsibility. In the end, for Lévinas, Husserl overemphasizes the self-
evidence and self-control of consciousness and hence ends up with an ego 
that is unsurpassed and to which every relationship to another (thing) has 
its point of origin in the subject, rendering everything that appears to 
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consciousness in principle fully intelligible. Since reality can be thought, 
and since thought on this account denies the irrational and encounters 
nothing that it cannot comprehend, the idealism of Husserl remains, in the 
end, founded on a supreme concept of subjectivity.
64
 The problem is 
exacerbated when Husserl turns to the social relationship, which is also 
accounted for within the structure of intentionality. Lévinas sums up the 
Husserlian view like this:  
The social relationship – before being an involvement of the subject prior to thought, 
and consequently an exceptional situation of the mind – is the meaning of a thought. 
(WEH, 83)  
The opposition between meaning and irrationality, and the equation of 
meaning with clarity, light, and full comprehensibility that presides for 
Husserl, leaves out that which Lévinas finds to be at the core of our 
relatedness to the world and to others, namely a form of meaning – which 
he will come to call signification or sensibility – that cannot be reduced to 
the self-evidence of the meaning produced by intentionality and by a self-
coincident ego (e.g. CW, 167). Ultimately, Husserl’s subject remains too 
indifferent to the world, too much in charge of itself and the meaning of 
which it is at the origin. Juxtaposing with Heidegger, Lévinas explains the 
difference between them like this:  
Therefore I do not think that Husserl’s intentionality, that is, the phenomenon of 
meaning itself, can be interpreted as Heidegger’s In-der-Welt-sein, still less as the 
flight of mind [fuite de l’esprit] outside itself. Heidegger’s In-der-Welt-sein affirms 
in the first instance that man, because of his existence, is always already 
overwhelmed [déjà débordé]. Intentionality, on the contrary, characterizes a monad; 
man retains the power to keep himself in reserve before the world [à l’égard du 
monde], and thus remain free to accomplish the phenomenological reduction. In a 
certain sense, intentionality is an Ausser-der-Welt-sein rather than an In-der-Welt-
sein of consciousness. (WEH, 85)  
Heidegger’s solution, however, does not solve the fundamental conundrum 
of establishing meaning and freedom for a subject that is engaged with, but 
not entirely engulfed by, its world. According to Lévinas he errs on the 
opposite side of Husserl because neither of them truly understands 
transcendence: that is, the relationship to something wholly other and 
exterior to me that cannot be reduced to the permeable and comprehensible, 
and which demands something of me that constitutes me as free. For 
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with the possibilities of reading Husserl with a more charitable eye for the other’s role. 
For work that deals with these points see e.g. Overgaard (2004; 2007)  
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Husserl, otherness vanishes before the omnipotence of the ego; for 
Heidegger, freedom vanishes as he situates the human being in a setting 
where we cannot properly answer for ourselves because we – as finite 
existence thrown into the world – are subjected to what overwhelms us (TI, 
303). Against this, Lévinas insists that we must account for both the power 
of the subject to be fully and meaningfully answerable for itself and for 
how we avoid reducing everything else to mere moments in the self’s 
mastery of itself. This is a central thrust of Lévinas’ thought: to explain the 
nature of a relation where I am both absolutely free and bound to 
exteriority with an obligation that does not rely on my consent. The way in 
which the simultaneity of freedom and belonging structures selfhood in 
Lévinas shows us a self that does not precede its encounter with that which 
commands it, i.e. with the other’s call to responsibility, but emerges in its 
freedom as oriented towards this exteriority (RR, 118). The intrinsic ethical 
nature of our existence is constituted as response-ability: as an openness to 
a world that makes itself of concern to us without being able to coerce us. 
This openness has meaning beyond intentionality, and a great part of e.g. 
Otherwise than Being is about exploring its nature. But what is the 
character of this mediated form of meaning that takes place in ethics?  
3.3.2 Reason arrives with the other 
Critique or philosophy is the essence of knowing. But what is proper to knowing is 
not its possibility of going onto an object, a movement by which it is akin to other 
acts; its prerogative consists in being able to put itself in question, in penetrating 
beneath its own conditions. (TI, 85) 
The ethical relationship is one in which the terms absolve themselves from 
the relationship and remain separate from, but not indifferent to, one 
another. This is a paradox at the heart of Lévinasian thought: a notion of 
subjectivity that is radically isolated and does not derive any part of its 
being from the other or from a universal, but which never-the-less is turned 
towards the other with its entire existence as its ability for self-awareness 
and critical thought depends on encountering the other. The subject and the 
other must remain separate, neither deriving their existence from each other 
or from history or nature, yet the subject is concerned for the other form the 
first if ethics is to be more than a derivate of deliberation. The need to 
account for both these claims – separate and related subjectivity – is the 
reason for the apparently contradictory passages in Lévinas writings, 
particularly in Totality and Infinity, where in one section he insists that 
subjectivity is at heart immanent, self-coincident and unreflected (TI, 138) 
and soon after explains how we only really become selves worthy of the 
name when transcendence intervenes and becomes the origin of thought 
and of ethics (TI, 85ff). The separate self is real – it is not simply a formal 
 Problematic selfhood 119 
 
requirement of his ethics – and it remains separate even when the ethical 
relationship emerges as its precondition. Yet the world takes on new 
meaning with the arrival of the other, and this meaning is not a layer that 
goes on top of the enjoyment-meaning it had before, but constitutes the 
world anew.  
Thought arrives with the other, and the world of thought is an ethical 
world. It is this world we live in as responsible selves, the uninhibited 
enjoyment of the immanent self an always precluded possibility. It is not 
clear whether Lévinas intends that the life of irresponsible enjoyment 
should be understood as a real experience that was left behind when we 
realized that others were truly others, that is, as a stage in a developmental 
account. In that case we would end up with an abrupt break in the 
development of the self when the other enters, making before and after 
incommensurable;
65
 however, the self that may be prior to ethics is a very 
limited and stunted self, given that even the ability for critical thought has 
not yet been instituted. Lévinas does not go into any such discussions but 
seems perfectly content to claim that the other has always been there, at the 
root of selfhood in an immemorial past, while also giving vivid and 
phenomenologically convincing descriptions of egoistic life. For the 
purpose of this thesis it is not necessary to settle for one or the other 
version except to point out that when ethics has entered, whenever this may 
be, the other was with me from the first. I shall explore the relationship 
between self and other and find in it an account of real concrete life where 
the self “has already the idea of infinity, that is, lives in society and 
represents things to himself” (TI, 139). Importantly, our representation of 
objects comes not just with characteristics such as colour and extension, 
but is constituted with possibilities and ownership as features. They belong 
to the other. In de Boer’s words:  
According to Lévinas there would be no objectivity if the other were not watching; it 
is he who interferes with our spontaneous naiveté and prompts critical awareness. 
This breach in natural dogmatism would not be possible without the presence of the 
other’s face, before whom arbitrariness shies back and is ashamed. This shock, this 
revelation of the arbitrariness and injustice of my spontaneous activity, is the origin 
of critical consciousness. (De Boer 1997, 16) 
De Boer´s ambition is to show how “the Other is the transcendental 
foundation of the same”, in particular of knowledge (De Boer 1997, 15), 
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the lines of contemporary analytical philosophy and philosophy of mind, e.g. his section 
on “McDowell’s Naturalism of Second Nature” (Morgan 2007, 247–254). 
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and with this ambition follows a natural propensity to focus on the 
justification of intentional or objective knowledge itself, but Lévinas does 
not simply claim that objective knowledge needs a basis in the non-
objective. It is part of his claim that the non-objective origin of the 
possibility of knowledge is not left behind entirely when we engage in 
intentional comprehension of the world. Even conceptual knowledge will 
carry the trace of that first original encounter as an echo that undercuts the 
possibility of the restful self-coincidence of concepts (e.g. TI, 60). This is 
the radical thrust of Lévinas’ thought which may be overlooked by de 
Boer: that there is no return to a knowledge that does not always carry with 
it a radical ethical demand.  
Whence comes my respect for objectivity, the authority I grant truth, and 
my preference for it over confusion and arbitrariness? For Lévinas, the 
answer is the other. An isolated consciousness would have no reason to and 
no means by which to break with natural dogmatism, deprived as it is of the 
awareness of the other before whom arbitrariness is ashamed.
66
 The way 
out of arbitrariness and subjective dogmatism lies for Lévinas in a turn to 
the other who shocks me into the realization that I need to account for 
myself. Through the other’s demand that I own up to my responsibility for 
reality such as it is – that is, always ethically invested – the self emerges as 
singular and as the only one who is there to lift just that responsibility. 
The way out of arbitrariness is the singularizing effect of the other’s 
demand. For Kant, whom we discuss in more detail later, the way out of 
arbitrariness is universality; it is the stripping away of concrete and 
contingent content from the individual and the situation. Like Kant, 
Lévinas finds that particular categories like ethnicity, gender, nationality, 
and any other distinction we can so name, are beside the point and can 
never get us beyond the impersonal and arbitrary, and for Lévinas they 
remain too general because they all refer to a common term befitting 
groups and not to individuals and consequently cannot be about persons in 
their singularity. We may say that where Kant abstracts the human being as 
much as possible from contingency, Lévinas deepens and radicalizes it 
until it becomes incommensurable singularity. Nevertheless the ambition is 
comparable in the two cases, and it has to do with the justification of 
morality and with its realizability; interestingly, both ways ultimately point 
beyond the experiential world towards supersensible exteriority. In chapter 
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 De Boer explores this theme nicely in a section that starts with: “To know is to 
exercise freedom’s power. Why, then, should this power be hampered by objectivity, 
why should it let itself be arrested by inconvenient truths?” (De Boer 1997, 15).  
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four this ambition is highlighted in the discussion of the kind of judgment 
that makes trust and distrust into ethical notions.  
The ethical relation in Lévinas is not meant to be isolated from – unsullied 
by – economic existence and objective thought, since in ethics I care for an 
actual other who has real needs, and ethical practice takes place in a world 
of things and thought. It is with a view to the needs of the other that I see 
the world, and hence it is inherent in the constitution of things that they are 
related to – indeed belong to – the other. That which I seize for myself is 
already usurped. The objectivity of objects establishes universality and 
community, but only on the basis of the ethical relation in which they are 
already given over to the other (TI, 76). From the anonymous non-sense of 
joyous use meaning emerges, grounded in the intervention of that which is 
not of me and which therefore breaks open the egoistic metabolism 
between me and senseless nature. With the other come perspective and the 
possibility for transcendence through critical thought; with the other comes 
freedom from my happy self-involved immanence. Lévinas argues that the 
way from perception to cognition cannot be traversed without such a 
critical perspective afforded by alterity’s intervention: “Objectivity 
coincides with the abolition of inalienable property - which presupposes the 
epiphany of the other” (TI, 76). Lévinas’ claim here brings to mind 
Rochat’s point that only faced with another human being would a person 
have reason to develop reasons and convictions at all (Rochat 2004). As 
Lévinas uses it here, then, objectivity is the challenge posed by the other’s 
presence with me in the world to my idiosyncratic existence. It is the urge 
that I feel to justify my existence, and as such it is the presumed existence 
of a truth that is beyond me, even if this is not an objective, necessary, and 
eternal truth, but the truth of the other’s authority over my egoism.  
Self-transcendence is the essence of knowledge, because it is the ability to 
question one’s own preconditions. This is the movement inherent in the 
sense-making activity of the mind: a disturbance of self-sufficiency leading 
to self-awareness and reflection or self-criticism. Objective experience is 
possible on the basis of the kind of experience that has this movement as its 
form, but it can never move entirely beyond the restlessness of it. 
Objectivity does not sever its connection to the infinite complexity of 
reality where the specific thing cannot be understood in isolation from the 
role it plays in my responsible comportment towards another; a clear 
definition of a phenomenon is an unstable abstraction. That self-awareness, 
critique and responsibility occur together means that selfhood in a certain 
sense emerges with this restless movement, which Lévinas also calls an 
aptitude for speech (TI, 23). 
Throughout the history of Western thought philosophers have striven to lift 
human existence out of the arbitrariness of natural life. The way out, the 
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consensus seems to have been, must be found in universal reason: an 
ambition that, as Lévinas sees it, culminates with the Hegelian achievement 
of an all-inclusive system that brings together will and reason and 
subjugates the offending singularity of individual incarnate will (TI, 87, 
203). As is well known, Lévinas challenges the primacy of objectivity and 
reason with regard to the relationship between self and world and insists, 
famously, that ethics is first philosophy. Critics have mistakenly taken this 
to mean that Lévinas endorses some form of mysticism or irrationalism in 
which human beings know the world in ways that cannot be accounted for, 
but his quarrel is not with rationality itself, but with: (i) the blindness 
towards how knowledge cannot be the achievement of an isolated 
consciousness going about its non-moral business of subsisting and; (ii) the 
limited conception of what it means to understand, to experience, and to 
exercise reason that is prevalent in philosophy. In other words, the fact that 
alterity itself is in-comprehensible and does not allow representation does 
not mean that philosophy should not undertake to account for how the 
unavoidable encounter with incomprehensible alterity is part of and shapes 
perception, thought and experience. 
Lévinas makes the careful argument that the arbitrary and non-rational life 
of the being who lives to eat and eats to live, as it were, and never looks up 
from such a life of cyclical participation in nature’s metabolism, is 
disturbed as alterity enters with the presence of the other, and with this 
disturbance the subject becomes self-aware and capable of critique; reason 
enters as the self-transcendence made possible by critique. The other 
questions me and my arbitrary freedom, and reason arises as a response. 
Reason is not the spontaneous activity of a mind that is wholly its own 
cause and ground, but is already ethical because it is shaped by the 
relationship to the one that presents me with the need to justify my 
existence. Ethics and reason arise together, the second conditioned by the 
first, for rationality is only possible as justification – as accountability 
before another, establishing a relation that lifts me out of arbitrariness – and 
justification is thinkable only where I am not the sole author and authority, 
but refer to an other. Reason is, Lévinas points out, the ability to come into 
contact with something new, something that did not originate with me, and 
therefore the subject alone cannot achieve it (TI, 219).  
In other words, plurality is needed for rationality, and not the kind of 
apparent plurality that is fated to disappear before the tribunal of universal 
reason, for if reason is truly one, then the plurality that adorns human 
existence can only be seen as an unhappy consequence of our faulty 
incarnate sensibility and should be disregarded to the best of our ability (TI, 
216ff). Singularity and plurality are two sides of the same coin, since both 
rely on the existence of truly separated beings that are not reducible to 
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moments in a system, but are themselves origin. Against idealism Lévinas 
insists that even as its proponents claim that subjective will and reason are 
illusory, the very possibility of such an illusion “attests the existence of an 
at least subterranean subjective source which the intelligible cannot dry up. 
[...] Moreover, the existence of the individual on the basis of the universal, 
or the fall from which it arises, remains unexplained [in Hegelian 
idealism]” (TI, 216, 218). The commitment to universal, atemporal reason 
that we find in idealism is, as Lévinas sees it, a result of the belief that all 
human sense-making activity is grounded in conceptual and 
representational thinking, and that besides this there can only be the 
irrational. Hence, one must either relinquish rationality or give singularity 
and concrete existence up to the subsumptive unity of universal reason. 
Again Heidegger and Husserl are placed on either side of the divide: 
Husserl resigning himself to a world of the general, and Heidegger 
choosing a pragmatic turn away from rational thought (TI, 109, 303). It is 
this dichotomy that Lévinas targets when he claims that rationality arises 
with the call to responsibility which invests the freedom of a singular 
reason and occasions its self-transcendence through self-critique. Out of 
arbitrary life come ethics and rationality, not opposed but together, the 
latter grounded in the first. Arbitrariness is dispensed with through the 
orientation of a freedom that has met the good. Without such a point of 
orientation, reason would remain arbitrary in its sense-making endeavours.  
The challenge for Lévinas, then, is to present a way to make sense of the 
world that is not formed by intentional consciousness. He claims that the 
first signification is that of the other to which all sense refers back; the 
encounter with the other is the “upsurge of the rational” (TI, 218) and that 
which makes the world intelligible. The result of Lévinas’ intervention is 
not a turn away from rationality, but a broadened and more detailed notion 
of understanding, experiencing and reasoning, that is, of our sense-making 
engagement with the world; one that permits experience of the other as 
other, without thereby rendering otherness in the form of the same (e.g. TI, 
73, 203). Rationality and objectivity depend on ethics; but ethics is neither 
objective nor rational in the sense that requires it to be appraisable from a 
third-person perspective. What sort of sense is it, then? Lévinas speaks of 
the signification of the sensible as something that is a proximity (OB, 61ff), 
the content of which cannot be rendered to a third-party observer. As I turn 
to the other with the attentive responsibility of self-awareness, alterity is 
revealed to me as non-phenomenally evading presence. I encounter the 
expression of the other’s alterity “from the society I maintain with him, and 
not by quitting this relation to reflect on its terms [...] an alterity that, 
belonging to the essence of the other, is nevertheless visible only from an 
I” (TI, 121).  
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3.3.3 Freedom as heteronomy 
The question of the possibility and nature of human freedom lies at the 
heart of Lévinasian ethics because only free beings are truly singular, i.e. 
beyond the full determination of history and nature. The concept of 
freedom that he puts forth is one that opposes the notion of a self-sufficient, 
autonomous and sovereign agent without dispensing with agency and 
responsibility, and his argument for the reality of human freedom in this 
form is made with and against in particular Kant, Heidegger and Husserl. 
His challenge, contra Kant, is to recognize the bindingness and authority of 
the ethical call of the other in its contingency and as heteronomy without 
losing separation and responsibility, and, contra phenomenology, to 
account for a way of associating with the experience of the other without 
allowing otherness to be subsumed by the intentionality of consciousness.
67
 
Against what he sees as phenomenology’s shortcomings Lévinas defends 
the view that we can indeed encounter the call of the other without it being 
subsumed under the structure of consciousness in proximity – and through 
contending with the Kantian view on morality he holds that the authority of 
the good persists alongside a real freedom to disregard it.
68
 This is captured 
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 “Intentionality […] becomes in Husserl the very liberation of man vis-à-vis the 
world” (WEH, 75), because it is only in intentionality that consciousness manages to 
stand back from experience and extricate itself by way of conceptual thought.  
68
 Lévinas agrees with Kosch’ diagnosis of Kant: ”The claim that the will is able freely 
and intentionally to choose the immoral over the moral (a claim that seems to be 
required if moral wrong is to be imputable) stands in tension with the identification of 
morality and rationality upon which Kant’s argument for the objective validity of the 
moral law, and hence the validity of the attribution of freedom to human agents, rests” 
(Kosch 2006, 16). Arendt points to the same conundrum ((Arendt 2003, 81f). This 
critique of Kant is based on the sentiment of certain passages, such as this from the 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: in “what, then, can freedom of the will be 
other than autonomy, that is, the will's property of being a law to itself? But the 
proposition, the will is in all its actions a law to itself, indicates only the principle, to act 
on no other maxim than that which can also have as object itself as a universal law. 
This, however, is precisely the formula of the categorical imperative and is the principle 
of morality; hence a free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same” (GMM, 
4:447). In other places, in particular in The Metaphysics of Morals and Religion within 
the Boundaries of Mere Reason, he explains at great length the possibility of free 
heteronomous acts in addition to free autonomous acts, through an elaboration of the 
difference between Wille (power of choice) and Willkür (will), which makes it possible 
to assign full responsibility to the person for all acts (RBR, 6:23ff; see e.g. MM, 213ff). 
The problem of evil / freedom in Kant’s moral philosophy will be abandoned for now. 
Even though Lévinas’ critical and appreciative relationship with it is certainly relevant 
and illuminating, it would take us too far astray. Suffice it to say that the critique from 
someone like Lévinas is not so much that Kant cannot account for freedom in relation to 
contingently motivated action, but that he overlooks that only contingency can truly be 
(continued) 
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in his notion of freedom as heteronomy, which is the situation of a self that 
is not antecedent to obligation, which would then come later as a decision, 
but finds itself obligated as part of the ability to make sense of the world 
(e.g. OB, 86f). The good is prior to subjectivity; we are not free to choose 
what the good is, but we are free to choose whether to obey the call of 
conscience. Whether we do so or not will, however, not influence the 
authority of the ethical. This is the original passivity, the being-pointed-at – 
appointed – that requires a response. The subject’s first act is a response, 
and even though it is not ex nihilo, it is still creative in setting the scene for 
the future while not being predetermined at all by causal relations of any 
kind. The action, response though it is, transcends the conditions that gave 
rise to its context. With a Lévinasian phrase we can speak of a “way of 
actualizing without beginning with the possible” (NTR, 43). As we saw 
above, Lévinas finds that Heidegger and Husserl err on different sides 
between freedom and boundedness or commitment, both thereby failing to 
account for responsibility, i.e. for a free self that can answer for itself 
before a moral demand the authority of which is not derived from or 
depend on the consent of the self. Husserlian freedom is accomplished in 
intentionality, because self-consciousness is not just an acknowledgement 
of intellection, but is intellection itself, and so constitutes the fact of 
meaning bestowal – thereby demonstrating how thought is free in relation 
to itself as well as to the world that it renders and constitutes, but does not 
simply construct (WEH, 76f):  
In the final analysis, the phenomenological ego [moi] does not appear in the history it 
constitutes, but in consciousness. And thus it is torn [arraché] from the totality. It 
can break with the past and is not, in this rupture with the past, in spite of itself 
[malgré lui], the continuator of that past, which a sociology or psychoanalysis will 
retrieve. It can break away, and consequently it can speak. (RPT, 100) 
With a nod to the phenomenological ego of Husserl, Lévinas holds that it is 
a condition of possibility for ethics that subjectivity can transcend its 
history. In breaking away from its history, the subject can speak - and 
answer for itself, as it were. The moral thrust of phenomenology is the 
establishment of a subject which can answer for itself, and this is only 
possible if it remains outside the totality of a system. What is speech, if not 
 
                                                                                                                           
the realm of freedom: what Kant calls autonomous and free action is for Lévinas and for 
Arendt a matter of obedience towards abstract principles that have no bearing on the 
irreducible truths of lived existence and actual intersubjective morality where one 
particular person is responsible for another particular person. I am much indebted to 
Carsten Fogh Nielsen for his help, always generous and excellent, in becoming better 
acquainted with yet another little corner of Kantian thought.  
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the power of detachment, asks Lévinas (RPT, 106). The subject can always 
speak because it is never absorbed in what it constitutes or what happens to 
it; it can stand away from everything, and hence it is the possibility of 
rupture. Therein lies the possibility of responsibility and of ethics. Yet, as 
we saw above, the sovereignty of Husserlian freedom misunderstands the 
boundedness of existence, the bindingness of the world, with the result that 
responsibility and freedom remain products of the mind’s ability to 
understand itself (Selbtsbesinnen) and consequently assume responsibility 
for itself and its freedom. Freedom and responsibility are allowed for only 
as a result of self-transparency and self-control (OI, 48; WEH, 76f, 81). 
Viewing freedom in this way, as comprehension and mastery, raises all 
sorts of questions about when we can be said to have the appropriate level 
of understanding and control to be free and hence responsible agents, yet 
for Lévinas this is not the reason for the Husserlian shortcoming. In his 
account, conscious self-control cannot be the starting point because it leads 
to freedom being equated with the absence of pre-given meaning, making 
freedom arbitrary. How can we be free if there is no meaning to anything 
we do? What does it mean to choose freely in a world that affords no 
independent meaning? If the world did not meet me as meaningful, with its 
own meaning that is not derived from me, I would not meet with anything 
that was truly other than me, and would be fated only to reproduce what I 
already am. Transcendence as the ability to break with totality can simply 
not be achieved within this Husserlian setting where the subject is never 
truly unseated from sovereignty and from a return to the same. 
For Lévinas, freedom requires that there be a form of meaning which 
supersedes conceptual cognition. And why is that? Why is it so important 
to establish an intersubjective relationship that is a non-objectifying sense-
making activity? The answer is that any sense-making activity which can 
be satisfyingly provided for in objective terms will end up as a return to the 
same. There is no way, through conceptual comprehension, to encounter 
what is truly new to one, because the categories of understanding that are 
utilized are ones that we already possess; we anticipate whatever we 
experience by means of them. Now, there is nothing wrong with conceptual 
understanding, but it cannot explain the possibility of meeting otherness. 
And a universe in which we cannot encounter anything but ourselves is a 
universe where freedom has no place. For freedom to be real, we need a 
subject that is capable of extricating its existence from that of a unified 
whole. If unity has the final word – if we are finally explicable within the 
framework of a single unified whole that allows for no outside – then 
freedom is lost. Freedom is only real if we are free to make of ourselves 
something new, something that is singular in a radical sense because it 
cannot be fitted into what is already there (e.g. TO, 54). Freedom requires 
that there is exteriority. And such exteriority is, in a manner of speaking, 
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realized in the ethical relationship. Lévinas’ argument for the necessity of 
exteriority for human freedom owes more than a little to Kant’s analysis of 
freedom, and he is himself the first to acknowledge this indebtedness to 
what he sees as Kant’s appreciation of the need for a non-objective 
exteriority that we partake in but cannot represent to ourselves (RPT, 102, 
cf. RPT, 95; CW, 124). For Kant, the possibility of freedom and hence of 
morality lies in the assumed existence of something that is beyond the 
causally regulated spatiotemporal world. A free being must exactly be free 
from the causally necessitated events of what appears around us; as human 
beings, we are transcendentally free because we participate in a noumenal 
existence where causality does not rule beyond the mere observable 
phenomenal world. Beyond the spatiotemporal world, however, there can 
be no objective judgment and hence no knowledge; the divide between the 
noumenal and the phenomenal is unbridgeable. Not so for Lévinas, who 
intends to explain the nature of the relationship between the radical 
incomprehensibility of ethics on the one hand and the way we think and 
know on the other. It is not enough, he contends, to realize that there must 
be two such orders of human being, namely ontology and ethics; the 
relationship between them must be pursued, because that is where human 
life for the most part takes place. When Lévinas claims that there is 
meaning beyond logos and that it is by being beyond logos entirely that the 
ethical nature of such meaning can be upheld, he therefore does not mean 
that we must not attempt to understand how logos can be affected by this 
underlying meaningfulness. On the contrary: it is the relationship between 
them that is the core interest of much of Lévinas’ work. This also explains 
why he starts from Husserl. With phenomenology as his background 
Lévinas can question the nature of meaning and search for forms of sense-
making that allow the subject to relate to its world and to others differently 
than through objective thought. It is phenomenology that leads us to this 
originary non-phenomenal meaning. In other words, if one seeks a 
philosophical account of freedom by creating a “phenomenological ego” 
that is torn from its history and its past, such as is described in the quote 
above (RPT, 100), the result is an all-consuming consciousness that 
eradicates otherness. Freedom from totality comes about not by the 
spontaneous assertion of a self-possessed subject, but by way of exteriority 
which manifests itself in the call of the other.  
Freedom can coexist with the orientation towards exteriority because there 
is no force in this exterior good. One still has to choose one’s response, and 
if one does not there is no consequence. There is no because and no or else 
in morality, Lévinas says, because that would exactly undermine ethics 
proper and replace it with obedience, which would make any recognizable 
definition of freedom and responsibility impossible, just as it would place a 
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selfish concern once again at the heart of morality. As Lévinas puts it in 
answer to a question about the power of good:  
The face is not a force. It is an authority. Authority is often without force. Your 
question seems to be based on the idea that God commands and demands. He is 
extremely powerful. If you try not doing what he tells you, he will punish you. That 
is a very recent notion. On the contrary, the first form, the unforgettable form, in my 
opinion, in the last analysis, he can not do anything at all. He is not a force but an 
authority. (PM, 169) 
Heteronomy in Lévinasian thought means simply this, that the good is there 
prior to me and that it has authority no matter whether I observe it or not. 
Exteriority communicates itself to the individual in the face of the other 
human being, and it does so not as knowledge, but as epiphany – a pure 
event that interrupts being without becoming part of the play of cause and 
effect. Exteriority affects the subject not as truth, not as a vision, but as 
obsession. One is touched by exteriority’s excess and is called upon to 
recognize the good and to choose it. This is the instant of passivity at the 
root of Lévinasian ethics.  
The ethical relation is one in which both I and the other remain separate 
and at a distance; the signifyingness of the other, signifying to me my 
responsibility, relates us otherwise than intentionality would, and Lévinas 
is fond of using terms such as revelation and epiphany to describe what he 
calls its unforeseeableness [l’imprévisibilité] (TI, 199) or its non-
anticipatory character. Without this structure, ethics would not be possible, 
because we would as individual selves be locked inside our own 
intentionality, and our only access to the other would be through 
anticipatory understanding. This, then, is for Lévinas the only way to 
account for the real existence of ethics and of something like moral 
obligation. Only the existence of an exteriority which commands me, but 
does not force me, can give meaning to freedom and responsibility. Being 
free shows itself as an inherently relational activity that has meaning only 
as a connection between a me who orient myself and that in which – and to 
which – I am oriented. Or, more precisely perhaps, between a me who 
emerges as orientation towards a call and that anarchic exteriority from 
which the call reaches me as a trace or an echo. Selfhood emerges as the 
absolute freedom of a being always already commanded to respond.  
3.3.4 The unicity of the I 
What can be meant by this exteriority rending the core of the intimate, this “soul 
within the soul”, this alterity, there where everything is coincidence with self or 
retrieval of self, this unreality in the heart of the lived? What can be meant by this 
exteriority that is not intentional ecstasis? (CW, 160–161) 
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So what is the nature of this sense-making that contains moral judging and 
understanding and emerges as a relationship to the other? Lévinas uses 
words like vigilance, wakefulness, inspiration and obsession to invoke the 
idea of what he is after (OB, 86ff). Note that we are talking about obsession 
by, not obsession with. The implication is that we should not understand his 
claim as if we are obsessed with, say, the other’s needs. Lévinas is not 
making the phenomenologically unrecognizable claim that we cannot seem 
to bring ourselves to ignore the other, which is clearly not the case in this 
world of ours. Instead, his argument concerns the constitution of selfhood 
as such. Obsession means that our souls are not our own. The voice of the 
other is what singles me out and has me emerge as someone irreplaceable 
out of the anonymity of being. This in-spiration of otherness, where I am 
brought into contact with the other and through this very contact realize the 
unbridgeable distance between us, is what brings about my singular and 
irreplaceable self. Lévinas explains that obsession comes about when the 
subject is affected without the source of the affection becoming a theme of 
representation (OB, 101):  
The neighbor assigns me before I designate him. This is a modality not of a knowing, 
but of an obsession, a shuddering [frémissement] of the human quite different from 
cognition. […] Consciousness is not interposed between me and the neighbour 
[prochain]; or, at least, it arises [surgit] only on the ground of this antecedent 
relationship of obsession which no consciousness could annul, and of which 
consciousness itself is a modification. (OB, 87)  
Subjectivity is inseparable from obsession. It does not exist prior to it, but 
recurs through the movement of will and desire that comes about in 
obsession. I am obsessed by the other because the other’s voice is there 
before me, before I inhabit and exert sovereignty over my own self. I am 
never entirely at home, alone, in private, because there is always that 
anarchic memory of the other’s interruptive and assignative voice. Lévinas 
explicitly tells us that “Ethics is the breakup of the originary unity of 
transcendental apperception, that is, it is the beyond of experience” (OB, 
148).  
Hereby he means to say that Kant overlooked something when he 
constructed the neat argument for the unity of selfhood in The Critique of 
Pure Reason; something which disturbs and disjoints the neatness. It is 
even something that Kant was himself aware of, but which did not make it 
properly into his epistemology, or so Lévinas holds; namely the existence 
of exteriority, of something beyond being, something utterly transcendent 
(GDT, 59ff). Kant had an inkling of that which transcends being and 
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interrupts it, but he did not make room for it in transcendental apperception 
when he introduced it as the principle of unity in cognition (PH, 43f).
69
 In 
fact, the unity of the I in Kant relies on experience being adequate to my 
representational abilities, and hence no unity of such an order would make 
sense if it were based on the inadequacy of thought for apprehending that 
which would perform the unification. That is nevertheless what Lévinas 
intends to claim. It is the call of the other that serves the purpose of 
unification, such as it is, for the Lévinasian self, and the call is alterity’s 
incomprehensible interruption of consciousness and is as such entirely 
beyond the grasp of representational thought. As the ungraspable somehow 
manages to impress itself on the self as a trace, or a lack, or an excess, the 
self is radically decentred. In Kant the precondition of any unity at all – 
whether in the understanding or in intuition – is that everything that 
appears to us is related to a perceiving self. It is in the activity of 
synthesizing a whole out of the manifold that a self or subject emerges. The 
unity of the I and the unification of the objects of experience, then, occur as 
a complex interdependence. Hence, if I experience something that does not 
lend itself to my grasp in any way but refuses and challenges me, like the 
other does for Lévinas, then the identity of the self is torn. A gap is created, 
and this gap is my confrontation with that which exceeds my understanding 
and is beyond my comprehension. For Lévinas, this challenge to 
unification does not result in anonymity or in a weakened self. Instead, the 
otherness that I am confronted with addresses me as me, as the unique one, 
irreplaceable, because only I am in a position to answer the call. The 
responsivity and response-ability are an assignation in which I emerge as a 
singular non-interchangeable self. In this view, the self is always already 
engaged in a normative way, already aware of the other. Our awareness of 
our surroundings is inherently intersubjective: 
The self is a sub-jectum: it is under the weight of the universe, responsible for 
everything. The unity of the universe is not what my gaze embraces in its unity of 
apperception, but what is incumbent on me from all sides, regards me in the two 
senses of the term, accuses me, is my affair. (OB, 116) 
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 E.g.: “Instances of hesitation about the place of the imagination in the system of 
faculties can be found throughout Kant’s writings: and we see him increasingly 
prompted to revise the very notion of subjectivity which he had accepted in dividing the 
soul into receptivity and spontaneity” (PH, 43). Also: “Kant, setting out from the duality 
between receptivity and spontaneity, would have made the discovery of the subject 
itself in its adequate mode of existing. He constantly draws back before the unknown 
whose veil he succeeded in lifting a little; he seeks refuge in traditional philosophy with 
its substance-subject and its linear time. This created the uncertainties and obscurity in 
the texts” (PH, 44). 
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For Lévinas, the unity that comes from perceiving the objects of the world, 
i.e. the Kantian unity, only lend me a general and at its core anonymous 
kind of unity because it is inherited from the objects and from objectivity; 
what he needs, and can find no way to attain in Kant or, ultimately, in 
phenomenology, is a unification that also grants uniqueness and provides 
for the singularity of the self. This can be had only through the call to 
responsibility; the call that pertains only to me and occasions my self-
transcendence. The unicity of the I comes about as the impossibility of 
evading appointment “which confers uniqueness on this ever failing 
identity of the oneself” (OB, 196 n22), and in this appointment the world is 
experienced as for-another as even “space belongs to the sense of my 
responsibility for the other”:  
The everywhere of space is the from everywhere of faces that concern me and put me 
in question, despite the indifference that seems to present itself to justice. Being will 
have a meaning as a universe, and the unity of the universe will be in me as subject 
to being. That means that the space of the universe will manifest itself as the 
dwelling place of the others. It is inasmuch as it is inhabited by the others that look at 
me that the pre-geometrical eidos of space is described. I support the universe. The 
self does not only form the unity of human society, which is one in my responsibility. 
The unity of being has to do with the self. (OB, 197 n22) 
Hence, the self that is at the beginning of Lévinasian philosophy is not a 
unified and stable self. The use of terms like obsession and delirium, and 
even here and there psychosis (OB, 142), to describe the self may seem 
hyperbolic, but the choice of words has a purpose. Selfhood commences in 
transcendence as the awakening of a relationship to the wholly other, and 
the difference opened in the deepest part of the self is a scission of identity 
that cannot be synthesized (e.g. CW, 162f). At the core of selfhood and of 
all meaning we do not find self-coincidence, self-transparency and self-
evidence, but disorder, anarchy, disequilibrium, a radical unassemblability 
endlessly undermining the synthesizing and ordering efforts of 
consciousness (GDT, 178). This rupture or interruption of immediacy, 
which does not occur in time, but prior to it, is the ethical moment. Ethical 
selfhood is possible by way of an interruption, because ethics occurs as this 
self-transcendence realized through the echo of the other. Obsession means 
a process of awakening that does not end, but is an “ever-recommencing 
awakening in wakefulness itself” (CW, 161), and this incessant call never 
leaves the subject to its own devices, so to speak, but alienates me from 
myself and thereby allows for a relationship-to-self to emerge that is the 
singularity of selfhood, mediated by the alterity that obsesses me from the 
first. Obsession is the key to this most fundamental exercise of selfhood 
where we answer the call of the other, because we are prompted to freedom 
and into a confrontation with the ethical demand through the singularizing 
provocation of the other. If responsibility is to exist as more than a mere 
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accident that can pertain to a situation if I elect it and consent to it, it must 
bind me before I am in possession of myself. Only if obsession is first, 
before the freedom of the sovereign self which is the master of its world, 
can ethics exist as anything more than an addendum to egoism. 
The other’s significance for the constitution of selfhood reminds us of the 
particular intersubjective structure of torture, its bizarre humanity, because 
torture is only directed at those beings that are granted the status of 
personhood. It is not from an ignorance of, but from the recognition of the 
other’s otherness that torture receives its particular nature, and 
consequently it rests on the same structure of proximity as ethics.
70
 
 Comparably:  
I can wish to kill only an existent absolutely independent, which exceeds my powers 
infinitely, and therefore does not oppose them but paralyzes the very power of 
power. The other is the sole being I can wish to kill. (TI, 198)  
The ethical nature of selfhood and the primordial nature of the call in no 
way preclude evil, but make it possible in a real sense. Of the peculiar 
recognition inherent in suffering Lévinas says:  
To inflict suffering is not to reduce the other to the rank of object, but on the contrary 
is to maintain him superbly in his subjectivity. In suffering the subject must know his 
reification, but in order to do so he must precisely remain a subject. Hatred wills both 
things. Whence the insatiable character of hatred; it is satisfied exactly when it is not 
satisfied, since the other satisfies it only by becoming an object, but can never 
become object enough, since at the same time as his fall, his lucidity and witness are 
demanded. In this lies the logical absurdity of hatred. (TI, 239) 
The logical absurdity of hatred which demands the destruction and the 
persistence of the other’s otherness (or humanity or dignity) becomes the 
impossibility of the survivor relating to the world in terms of its modality 
of possibility, because this modality comes into existence as 
intersubjectivity. What is termed unicity by philosophers loses coherence 
when the world cannot be experienced in the modality of intersubjective 
potentialities. The medium for such an experience – the connectedness to 
others that reveals the world to me as meaningful-for-us – is what I term 
basic reflectivity, and trust is its expression.  
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 For the purpose of the present discussion it is not necessary to determine whether 
there are such things as animal faces. Lévinas himself did not reject the thought but 
generally avoided the question. To the extent that animals have faces, our relationship to 
them follows the same structure as is presented here.  
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3.3.5 Saying and signification: the positive story 
To say that in sensibility this structure [the ontological structure of signification] is 
secondary, and that sensibility qua vulnerability never the less signifies, is to 
recognize a sense somewhere else than in ontology to this signification beyond 
essence. (OB, 64) 
[D]oes not sense, in senseful thought, possess, perhaps prior to presence or to re-
presentable presence, and to a greater extent than these – a meaning which is already 
determined and through which the very notion of sense comes to the mind before it is 
specified in terms of the formal structure of reference as it refers to a world unveiled, 
to a system, to an aim? (BI, 100) 
Infinity is beyond the scope of the unity of transcendental apperception, cannot be 
assembled into a present and refuses to be recollected. This negation of the present 
and of representation finds its positive form in proximity, responsibility and 
substitution. (OB, 151) 
Sensibility is the name for a way in which I am concerned by the other; it 
takes place in the attentive openness of proximity and is the source of a 
form of sense that is inherently ethical. Importantly it is not something that 
I as a pre-existing subject may attain a capacity for, but describes the way 
in which I am: ethics is the form my existence takes, the realization of 
selfhood-as-responsibility. Lévinas finds the beginning of a concern with it 
in Kant:  
Kantian philosophy was then reduced by Heidegger […] to the first radical 
exhibition of the finitude of being. But of the four questions posed in philosophy, 
according to Kant (What may I know? What must I do? What am I entitled to hope? 
What is man?), the second seems to surpass the first with all the breadth of the last 
two. […] In the second question, if we comprehend it formally, there is no reference 
to being. […] Kant thus shows the existence, in thought, of meanings that have a 
sense of their own, without being reduced to the epic of being. (GDT, 59, 60, 61) 
Explicating this form of sense is a – if not the – central motive for Lévinas. 
This other form of meaning is not a ‘knowing that’, nor is it a ‘knowing 
how’: it is not bound by the way in which a subjective consciousness 
structures perception. It is a meaning that overwhelms and intrudes upon 
consciousness and consequently goes behind the backs of our actively 
anticipating minds, as it were. This kind of sense he calls an anarchic 
saying which approaches us from outside being and has us listening, as if 
for a distant memory (OB, 82f). Lévinas’ turn to Kant is perhaps surprising, 
but he finds in Kant an opening towards the infinite that provides for a 
relationship between the thinking subject and that which is 
incomprehensible but not senseless. It is an openness within thought 
towards the infinite and unthinkable which can be experienced by the 
subject, albeit in a different way from the experiences that we can have by 
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way of conceptual understanding (GDT, 59ff; OB, 35,56,129,148). In 
chapter four I expand on the use that Lévinas makes of Kant in this regard. 
Sensibility is not based on understanding; it is not empathy or care or even 
love. It is an awareness of the otherness of the other – of his or her 
existence as someone whose needs may not resonate with me at all, but 
which calls to me to respond. It is respectful, hesitant, suspended; yet 
through it, the subject is poised for intervening with reality. Sensibility is 
not simply a source of data for intentionality, but a way out of 
intentionality altogether. Whereas Husserl is rightfully credited with the 
realization that sensibility does not just belong to the pre-intentional realm 
of irrationality that may be transported into the clarity of intentionality, but 
has its own form of meaning (“The senses make sense [Les sense ont un 
sens]” (RPT, 98)), Lévinas in the course of time comes to realize that the 
vocabulary of intentionality remains within a setting that fundamentally 
excludes the new and the radically other, that is, that which does not let 
itself be presented as adequate to consciousness. In the end we must go 
beyond even this kind of sense-making into another, and primordial, kind 
of sense that is neither pre-intentional nor pre-phenomenal (although it 
does precede and ground these (e.g. TI, 202f)), but non-intentional and 
non-phenomenal:  
[A] priori formal structures of the non-I are not necessarily structures of objectivity. 
[…] rather than taking sensations to be contents destined to fill apriori forms of 
objectivity, a transcendental function sui generis must be recognized in them [...]; 
The senses have a sense that is not predetermined as objectification. (TI, 188) 
“To analyze the intentionalities which constitute any given object is to do 
phenomenology” (FHP, 36), Lévinas says, pointing to what he finds to be 
phenomenology’s limitation, namely that it cannot speak about a 
relationship that cannot be adequately grasped as intentionality, but breaks 
open intentional thought. The relationship to the other human does not 
originate in how a human consciousness structures its world; instead, we 
need to understand a commencement that is wholly otherwise. As we saw 
above, ethics is not a realm of meaning next to and complementary to 
phenomenology, but is the origin of all sense. The consequence is that 
intentionality, thought and reason are not left undisturbed by the disruption 
of alterity, in their own right as it were, but are found to exceed themselves, 
already placed within a meaningfulness fundamentally influenced by 
exteriority. Even the thought directed at the object “thinks more than it 
thinks at the moment and, in this sense, is itself not immanent. […] We are 
beyond idealism and realism, since being is neither inside nor outside 
thought, but thought itself is outside itself” (RR, 120).  
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This sense that comes to the mind before synchronic representation 
receives the other as absolutely singular. The ethical experience is one in 
which I can think of the I and the other as singularities that remain 
absolved from the relationship of understanding which allows them to be 
non-indifferent to each other. That being so, it differs from the 
intentionality of Husserlian thought in that it does not re-join its own origin 
and become an act of identification and of constitution. The passivity of 
subjectivity in the relationship to something wholly other that comes to 
mind makes it possible for the mind to encounter the new that is non-
adequate to thought. It goes beyond objective knowing which can only 
“know the fact, the already happened, the passed by” (TI, 65).  
In Otherwise than Being Lévinas introduces the terms saying and said (le 
dire / le dit). Whereas saying is the original expression of exteriority – the 
face or the voice – the said is that which is already solidifying into 
representation and thematization; the two terms together describe the 
singular and its transformation into generality and abstraction. But the said 
can retain a trace and a memory of saying and thereby retain its openness:  
For thematization, in which being’s essence is conveyed before us, and theory and 
thought, its contemporaries, do not attest to some fall of the saying. They are 
motivated by the preoriginal vocation of the saying, by responsibility itself. (OB, 6) 
The possibility of a connection between exteriority and being is the crux of 
the matter: it is where Lévinas’ philosophy turns into more than a negative 
endeavour and embodies a positive account of human ethical coexistence – 
to the extent that it is possible, of course, which means formally, as 
possibility, and not as substantive content. It is in speech – in saying and in 
responding – that positivity becomes manifest:  
The impossibility of killing does not have a simply negative and formal signification; 
the relation with infinity, the idea of infinity in us, conditions it positively.” (TI, 199, 
cf. 172) 
The active side of subjectivity is this discourse of the ethical relation where 
alterity still reigns and where the saying is always at work unsaying the 
said, undoing the form presented (OB, 7; TI, 66).  
Proximity is not empathy, we have said, and it is not understanding or 
reciprocity or, yet, justice; the face is not a phenomenon, not an object, not 
a Thou; sense is not intentionality or reason or understanding. It is easy to 
enumerate things that Lévinasian ethics are not, but the challenge for 
someone who wants to understand his positive ambition is that it is not 
simply a matter of finding out what ethics is; it is exactly not, at least not in 
the conventional sense of a substance, recognizable in its presence. It is not 
being, but is otherwise than being and beyond essence. Language is 
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unhelpful here, and we will of course still need to speak about what alterity, 
saying, and selfhood are, but they should be understood not as tode ti, that 
is, as something that can be understood in a system of knowledge, but as 
kath auto, as the expression of an itself for-itself always absolved from any 
relation and incorruptible: 
Manifestation kath auto consists in a being telling itself to us independently of every 
position we would have taken in its regard, expressing itself. […] This way of 
undoing the form adequate to the same so as to present oneself as other is to signify 
or to have meaning. To present oneself by signifying is to speak. (TI, 65,66) 
And signification, Lévinas continues, is an original relation with 
exterioriority and the original source of sense. Note that the one who 
signifies here is the oneself, not the other. I myself also engage with the 
world from a position of exteriority, beyond synchronic time and natural 
causality, because the self is also not phenomenal, but expressive. We will 
see below that trustworthiness appears as the expression of the other in an 
ethical register, because to “give meaning to one’s presence is an event 
irreducible to evidence” (TI, 66), occurring as we account for ourselves 
before another.  
A reader familiar with Lévinas will at this point find my account overly 
activist; is not Lévinas first and foremost a thinker of passivity and of 
subjection? What is all this talk of critical subjectivity justified by? It is 
certainly true that up to now we have not spent much time on the question 
of passivity nor on how subjectivity as responsibility is grounded in 
passivity. The reason for that is that our account does not take place on the 
grounding level of selfhood, where the pure passivity of a diachronic past 
has priority. A subjectivity that can trust and distrust is an ethical 
subjectivity and hence commences in passivity, but the critical and 
responsible engagement with the world that takes place in trust and distrust 
does not belong to the originary moment of ethical disruption, but to where 
this disruption emerges into a reflective presence. Trust and distrust are a 
means of orientation for a self that is directed at alterity in its thinking 
about the world, and is as such not yet at the level of justice, knowledge 
and reciprocity, but it is also no more in the pure passivity of a mind just 
awakened to the call; although the call still reverberates in and as the 
signification of trust and distrust. Selfhood is a relation-to-self which has 
an evaluative nature: I question myself, speak for myself and seek 
justification, and this self-transcending self-relation is prompted by the 
obsession with my infinite responsibility, which ”regards me [me regarde] 
in the two senses of the term, accuses me, is my affair” (OB, 116). In a 
very particular sense, then, selfhood is a judging activity echoing the regard 
of the other: 
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The idea of infinity delivers the subjectivity from the judgment of history to declare 
it ready for judgment at every moment and, we shall show, called to participate in 
this judgment, impossible without it. (TI, 25) 
And: 
Justice is impossible without the one that renders it finding himself in proximity. His 
function is not limited to the “function of judgment”, the subsuming of particular 
cases under a general rule. The judge is not outside the conflict, but the law is in the 
midst of proximity. (OB, 159) 
This is freedom as heteronomy, when subjectivity emerges as participation 
in its self-judgment under the demands of responsibility (TI, 240ff). In 
proximity there is a form of non-predicative judgment that is not entirely 
our achievement but in which we are implicated. The genesis of this form 
of meaning beyond intentionality has been shown to be the awakening of 
the I through the interruption of exteriority. The form of it is a critical 
thinking otherwise that renders the other to me as irreducibly singular and 
in-comprehensible. The content, then, is this in-comprehensibility of a 
world that belongs to the other, and this awakening to a world in which I 
am homeless comes before the manifestation of the objects to the 
experiencing self: 
The neighbour excludes himself from the thought that seeks him, and this exclusion 
has a positive side to it: my exposure to him, antecedent to his appearing, my delay 
behind him, my undergoing, undo the core of what is identity in me. […] This 
difference is my non-indifference to the other. (OB, 89) 
This situation – the intersubjective relationship where the self’s emerges by 
way of a disturbance from beyond presence – is the background of the 
intersubjective relationship of trust and distrust. The form of this world-
relatedness that allows me to relate to the ab-solute and singular in a 
meaningful way is an orientational ability; it is, as I have suggested, a form 
of judgment that also founds trust and distrust. 
It is my argument that a Lévinasian positive account of the ethical 
engagement of the self with its world and for the other should be 
understood as basic reflectivity, which means a way of understanding the 
other without eliminating the separation between us or the 
incomprehensibility of otherness as such. On the basis of the presentation I 
have given here of Lévinasian ethical selfhood I will proceed in chapter 
four to make explicit what basic reflectivity is. Before turning to that, to 
what is in effect an interpretation of the positive task of the ethical self, I 
will attempt to flesh out what Lévinasian ethics could look like in real life, 
so to speak.  
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3.4 Excursion: the ambition to understand 
The imaginary proximity to the suffering inflicted on others that is granted by images 
suggest a link between the faraway sufferers […] and the privileged viewer that is 
simply untrue, that is yet one more mystification of our real relations to power. So far 
as we feel sympathy, we feel we are not accomplices to what caused the suffering. 
Our sympathy proclaims our innocence as well as our impotence. To that extent it 
can be (for all our good intentions) an impertinent – if not an inappropriate – 
response. (Sontag 2004, 102)  
In this chapter I have made Lévinas speak about sense beyond 
intentionality and about another kind of understanding. In the next chapter, 
following this excursion, we shall see trust introduced as indebted to this 
form of understanding otherwise. Given the antipathy that Lévinas shows 
towards a morality based on reciprocity and universal reason it may seem 
peculiar that he speaks of understanding and, consequently, that I choose 
that term when explaining how trust functions for experience, namely as 
bringing about sense in a different manner from determinate judgment. 
Nevertheless we will speak of understanding for two reasons. First I cannot 
readily think of a more appropriate term for a relationship between persons 
where one comes to have an insight with regard to the other; and, second, it 
is a point in itself for Lévinas that all kinds of understanding and reasoning 
in the end is derived from the first kind of ethical sense. Hence, the 
opposition between sense and intentionality, and between ethics and 
knowledge, is softened.  
That being said, however, I will for the sake of this excursion use the term 
understand more in the sense that Lévinas criticizes, that is, as the 
presumption of my ability to accomplish an unveiling and disclosing of the 
other. The purpose is to give a situated illustration of Lévinasian ethics, 
which I will do by showing how in concrete circumstances it may be 
ethically appropriate to refrain from attempting to understand the other’s 
position. Lévinas is notably vague on the how of ethics, and even those 
who find his position convincing often criticize it for its intangible and 
inapplicable character. His concern, however, is with establishing the 
possibility of an ethics that does not start from a pre-established reasonable 
subject, and part of the premise for this is that the ethical relationship we 
have with others cannot be spelled out exhaustively in comprehensible 
terms. Instead of a step-by-step recipe for ethical conduct – a check list for 
the correct moral act, as it were – Lévinas’ thought is better demonstrated 
by examples.  
When philosophers undertake to establish the possibility of ethics – not just 
of decency or of just conduct, but of moral subjectivity – the critical task is 
to explain how it is possible that subjectivity should genuinely care for 
another without this care being derived from self-interest. The strategic 
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assessment of right and wrong that we know from the moral philosophies 
of deontological or consequentialist persuasion will not accomplish this, 
because in their cases the subject that does the assessing is essentially 
concerned with self-preservation and the fulfilment of personal desire. 
From such a starting-point we could, as does Kant, account for the 
possibility of propriety and a just society, but not for the possibility of 
ethical selfhood as such.  
The problem is not dispensed with by proposing that the ability to care for 
another relies on empathy or recognition, i.e. on connecting with others in a 
way that lets me understand their emotional state or state of mind. If the 
inherently social activities of empathy and recognition are charged with the 
how of what we might call an ethics of understanding it then becomes a 
problem to account for exactly how I can get close enough, so to speak, to 
know the other mind. Do I project myself into the place of the other and 
imagine how I would feel? Does the emotional state of the other resonate 
with me immediately and without the need for simulation or implicit 
theorizing? Either way, the goal is for the ethical agent to come as close as 
possible to other people. But what about all the situations where I cannot 
possibly imagine what someone else is going through and what it is like to 
exist as them? No matter what strategy I opt for in order to attain access to 
the mental states of others it would seem that ethics is severely limited if it 
only manages to let me care about that which I recognize and understand. 
To understand something implies that it is found to be reasonable, because 
only that which makes sense to me based on my being – my personal 
resources and experiences – can be understood by me, and so it follows that 
in comprehension I implicitly nod agreement to and accept the other’s state 
of mind as sensible, and in this way ethics is based on my implied consent. 
It is, as Lévinas would have it, an ethics that can only care about the same 
and leaves out that which is foreign and incomprehensible to me, and 
where responsibility therefore seems to start only with comprehension. 
3.4.1 The failure of understanding as a basis of responsibility 
First, let me give two examples of how understanding or empathy fails to 
provide what we need before I show how a Lévinasian ethical moment 
might appear. One is about the limits of imagination when it comes to 
assessing the lives of others, and the other is of literary origin.  
Before releasing a draft list of ranked health care services in 1990, a 
committee mandated by the State of Oregon, USA, held two years of 
debate, community consultation, and public opinion polling to determine 
the appropriate way to prioritize health care services. One such poll 
presented a telephone survey of able-bodied individuals, of whom the 
majority expressed the conviction that they would rather be dead than 
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confined to a wheel chair. On the basis of this information, and triggering 
much controversy, the state of Oregon decided to limit access to health care 
for disabled people on the grounds of their having so severely impaired 
quality of life that it would really make no difference (this basis for 
rationing health care was subsequently judged unacceptable by the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services).
71
 The results of the survey 
highlight the dangers of basing morality on the attempted understanding of 
someone else’s perspective on life, and although this example features a 
miscomprehension so glaring that it was indeed corrected, it is possible that 
we misconstrue the perspectives of others more often than we are aware; 
and the individual is not in the best position to discover when this 
misconstruction takes place.
72
  
J. M. Coetzee’s novel Waiting for the Barbarians (1980) revolves around 
the central relationship between the magistrate of a tiny frontier settlement 
and a barbarian woman he has taken as his lover. She lives in his quarters, 
cooks and cleans and shares his bed, but throughout the book she remains 
oddly remote. We do not know her. We do not know whether she is fond of 
the magistrate or finds him disgusting, or whether she appreciates her life 
or pines for a return to her people. An intricate relationship of intimacy and 
alienation develops. He speaks to her; she answers. Yet she remains a 
blank. This only becomes truly manifest to the magistrate when he finally 
decides to deliver her back to her people. As a barbarian invasion is 
rumoured, the political entity known simply as The Empire declares a state 
of emergency, and Colonel Joll arrives to take charge of the settlement. The 
magistrate has come to feel an intense tenderness for the woman and 
decides to remove her from Joll’s brutal administration. As they arrive at 
the place where her people reside, after a long journey, he challenges the 
unspoken nature of their relationship for the first time and asks her to return 
with him. She declines without explanation. We are offered no insights, no 
clues, as to why she does not return with him or to her silence on the 
matter. Is she grieving? Horrified? Ashamed? Afraid? The reader knows as 
little as the magistrate, who returns to his city a broken man. Here he finds 
that he has grown accustomed to and deeply dependent on her living 
presence by his side, and regrets that he never managed to understand her; 
perhaps things could have ended differently. He accuses himself: most 
 
                                           
71
 For a summary of the case, see Silvers’ description (Silvers 1995).  
72
 Young uses this case to illustrate the need for what, with reference to Kant and 
Arendt, she terms the asymmetrical reciprocity of enlarged thought, meaning thereby to 
base morality on a hesitant and humble wonder towards the other. Young’s work 
diagnoses a problem similar to what Lévinas has in mind (Young 1997). 
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likely he was not properly committed to the task? Why did he never learn 
her language in all those evenings spent together? He regrets squandered 
opportunities and lost potentiality.  
What was the magistrate’s mistake? At what point in the story was he 
furthest from that imagined togetherness that he longed for, that mutual 
recognition? Was it when he disregarded her will and dignity as he kept her 
living with him without knowing her wishes, or was it when he fantasized 
about togetherness after the trip across the plains into barbarian territory? 
The Lévinasian answer is not simple: of course it is unethical for one 
person to rob another of liberty, and yet more so to treat them with the 
oddly half-indifferent fondness one might bestow on a pet. But as he 
imagines another possible course of events, one where he has managed to 
find her and to truly know her, his desire seems to be to possess her in a 
much more absolute sense. The story is one of aborted understanding, but 
not because the magistrate was not properly committed to understanding 
the woman; the understanding that he sought was never possible in the first 
place. It would at most amount to a grasping and possessive endeavour. 
Waiting for the Barbarians is a story about the impossibility of 
understanding – of uncovering the other fully – and of the futile fantasy of 
complete togetherness.  
3.4.2 A Lévinasian moment 
In the years following Ortiz’s returns from her torture experience she meets 
with several therapists, and the attitude towards understanding plays a 
problematic role in those meetings. It seems that some therapists want not 
just to hear and know about the others’ situation and experiences, but to 
understand them. If they cannot make sense of what they are told, they tend 
to search for other explanations than the ones put forward by the client. But 
who can imagine what it is like to have experienced torture – apart from the 
torture survivors themselves? During her two stays at Our Lady of Peace 
psychiatric hospital, Ortiz is treated by a Dr Snodgrass who, it emerges, is 
unhelpful to her recovery at the best of times and sometimes even 
detrimental to it. The dynamic between them is one where, instead of 
taking her at her word about how she is doing, he seems to see each 
utterance she makes as a sign to be interpreted to get to the hidden truth of 
her condition; a truth to which she is not seen as having any access. He 
systematically distrusts the assessments and proposals she ventures to 
make, and it emerges that he cannot grasp the coherence of her symptoms: 
he does not understand why she feels the way she does. Because her fear, 
guilt and self-loathing do not come together for him under a unifying 
caption that he recognizes as sensible, he misdiagnoses her as having some 
form of control issue and, as a consequence thereof, an eating disorder. 
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When at some point she tells him that she does not feel well enough to be 
discharged, he suggests that she is perhaps afraid of getting better and 
taking charge of her own life (Ortiz 2004, 68, 83). The complex nexus of 
emotions that accompany the torture survivor is entirely beyond him, yet he 
does not realize this and pursues the attempt to ground his treatment in an 
understanding of her.  
As already indicated, to understand what someone else experiences means 
that I have a sense of its coherence and reasonableness, and this in turn 
implies that I find it reasonable and that I can imagine feeling something 
similar. The limits of my imagination, however, then become the limits of 
care. From a first-person point of view it is all true when Baier writes that 
we come to realize what trust truly involves if our vulnerability is brought 
home to us by actual wounds (Baier 1986, 235), because the implicit 
vulnerability is then experienced as realized. The realization of the always 
implicit vulnerability differs from its implicit state to an infinite degree. 
Améry points out:  
But not because the occurrence, as one says, perhaps “goes beyond the imagination 
(it is not a quantitative question), but because it is reality and not phantasy. One can 
devote an entire life to comparing the imagined and the real, and still never 
accomplish anything by it. […] When an event places the most extreme demands on 
us, […] there is no longer any abstraction and never an imaginative power that could 
even approach its reality. (Amery 1998, 25–26) 
Some years after her return, Ortiz moves to Chicago to get help at the 
Marjorie Kovler Center, a treatment facility for torture survivors, and here 
she is introduced to Dr Antonio Martinez. After the lack of privacy and 
control by Dr Snodgrass at Our Lady of Peace, it comes as a complete 
surprise to her that Antonio Martinez let’s her determine the terms of their 
encounters:  
Antonio had agreed not to take notes about me then and had put his notebook away. I 
had almost laughed when he asked, respectfully, if meeting again on Wednesday 
would be convenient for me. (Ortiz 2004, 122)  
But most important was that he agreed to sit facing away from her and 
remain silent for many meetings:  
I had many more silent sessions with Antonio, staring at the bald spot on the back of 
his head. From time to time he would ask if I was OK. I would say yes and we would 
let the silence fill the space between us again. (Ortiz 2004, 123) 
The silence provided room for reflection that was, as it turned out, exactly 
what she needed to approach a topic that was particularly horrible. When 
she was imprisoned, Ortiz was introduced by her torturers to another 
captured and tortured woman. The torturers placed a knife in Ortiz’s hands, 
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held onto them and forced them downwards and the knife into the unknown 
woman’s body. For Ortiz, this woman in many ways remains more real and 
present than the people who surround her now. Her fate unknown, the 
woman accompanies her into the world and makes her work towards 
ending torture all the more important. In the quietness of Antonio 
Martinez’ consulting room Ortiz can connect with this memory:  
“I started bringing my Woman friend with me. In the silence, I went back to the 
room where she was, took her by the hand, brought her out of that building. I 
imagined her sitting by my side. No, I willed her to be there […] Bringing her to 
therapy was my way of conveying to her that not knowing her name didn’t keep me 
from remembering her and all she had suffered. She was and continues to be part of 
me. (Ortiz 2004, 123, 124)  
If Dianna Ortiz had been asked in advance what she thought would be most 
helpful to her in therapy she probably would not have known what to 
answer. It seemed impossible to her that anyone could help with her private 
torment because of its incomprehensible, incommunicable, and intensely 
shameful character. Perhaps Antonio Martinez had as little a concrete idea 
of how to bring about progress in her condition as she herself had. Martinez 
did not follow a template but took what appeared to be a respectful course 
in the situation. Letting Ortiz sit in silence session after session emerged as 
the right way of relating to her in the actual face-to-face encounter even if 
it could not have been anticipated beforehand how this gave her the chance 
to make a kind of peace with the woman and from then on be ready for 
therapeutic work. In comparison, who would have suspected that the gift of 
a razor blade would bring her back to life? The gift of a razor blade is 
exactly the kind of gesture that cannot be generalized. It would not have 
had the same effect at another time for Ortiz, and it will most certainly not 
be the right thing to do in any number of other cases. For Ortiz, the razor 
blade came to signify privacy and control over her life and death, all of 
which torture took away. Although it is difficult indeed to imagine how this 
singular event can be generalized in a way that lets us know what to do in 
another case, the best course is probably to ask those survivors who have 
regained a hold on life about it. Ortiz points to how what she calls 
‘transitional survival skills’ may seem like self-destructive behaviour to the 
outsider, and this is again a clue to the same: an outsider cannot imagine 
what a torture survivor needs, but the best way of getting a clue is to listen 
(Ortiz 2001, 23f). 
Since exposure, invasion, and public display of naked helplessness are 
employed as a technique to destroy the person undergoing torture, it is of 
vital significance that the survivor is allowed a measure of isolation and 
privacy during rehabilitation. Unlike other forms of trauma, where 
narrative reporting may be considered a therapeutic tool, torture survivors 
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will need distance and to some extent a ‘letting be’.73 To experience the 
other in the manner described by Lévinas is not an endeavour of empathy 
or understanding but of respectful attention to the presence of the other. In 
her description of the initial meetings with Martinez, Ortiz provides an 
example of a Lévinasian ethical situation: without anticipating, Martinez 
manages to attend to her unspoken and indeed unrealized needs simply by 
acting upon what seems in the circumstances to be the right and respectful 
insight. Sharing silent space with Ortiz appeared to Martinez to be the right 
course of action, and by adopting it – by thus responding to the silent 
demand on her part – he creates a rapport between them based on careful 
respect which is indispensable for the therapeutic process; indeed, the first 
step in therapeutic work is to provide a framework that makes it possible 
for a sense of self to arise, and this is done by showing careful respect for 
the privacy and autonomy of the survivor. 
3.5 Summing up: problematic orientation 
What is it to which we are oriented? For Lévinas the answer is exteriority, 
which influences us with the absolute authority of the other’s call. The 
form of experience is a standing at attention, awaiting the demand of the 
other without anticipating its content. In experience, the self stands back 
and allows the other to enter first, nodding in respect and signalling a 
“before you, Sir”, and therein answering an unspoken question by seeking 
to enable the other’s passage (EI, 89). This wakefulness is the modality of 
our existence, perpetually disturbed by infinity, which eludes us in the very 
trace it leaves. We are directed to alterity with an openness quite different 
from the investiture of the intentional gaze, “committed in the direction of 
height” which is the “ontological production and […] ineffable testimony” 
of our bodily existence (TI, 117). As I turn towards this point of 
orientation, the world that I inhabit takes on meaning, because it is related 
to the other’s needs before my own. The world received its significance 
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 Laing provides an excellent reflection on the existential threat presented by another’s 
attempted understanding to someone who experiences what he calls ontological 
insecurity. In connection with therapy he points out: “This anxiety accounts for one 
form of so-called ‘negative therapeutic reaction’ to apparently correct interpretation in 
psychotherapy. To be understood correctly is to be engulfed, to be enclosed, swallowed 
up, drowned, eaten up, smothered, stifled in or by another person’s supposed all-
embracing comprehension. It is lonely and painful to be always misunderstood, but 
there is at least from this point of view a measure of safety in isolation” (Laing 1990, 
45).  
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from the original sense of ethical relatedness: it becomes a world that I 
share with the other.  
In its orientation towards infinity, selfhood is itself never definite, but is 
openness and infinite realization of itself as responsibility. Yet exteriority is 
not simply a formal condition for critical thought, but constitutes a demand. 
Through being oriented we experience the non-phenomenality of goodness, 
for want of a better word, and are called upon to justify ourselves. 
Subjectivity becomes possible with the judgment of itself in which it is 
called to participate. In experience itself, cast in the modality of being-for-
the-other, I discern and discriminate, and this is in the end what it means to 
be a self: a problematic endeavour of assuming responsibility for a situation 
that I am not powerful enough to have created, but which I must 
nevertheless transcend in order for free and responsible, i.e. critical, 
subjectivity to exist. In experience itself I judge and am judged.  
Orientation is also discrimination. The reflection involved at this basic 
level of selfhood is not cognitive deliberation, but a kind of reflection that 
is prior to conceptual thought and instituted by the other’s call. This basic 
reflectivity is not identical to the original ethical encounter, but is grounded 
in it. In Lévinas, the encounter with exteriority provides us with a point of 
orientation outside the observable constellations of intentionality. The 
subject is decentered by this relationship with an exteriority which precedes 
it and is independent of it. Or, more precisely, subjectivity emerges as 
having a direction, as being oriented towards, even as it is a directedness 
that cannot be reduced to intentionality. In encountering the other we meet 
an “insurmountable difference, lacking a common ground, which 
nevertheless is non-in-difference. A difference insurmountable for 
intentionality, which only knows how to invest being with its thought” 
(GDT, 141). As a contrast to intentionality Lévinas sets a relationship that 
is an “awakening by the infinite – but an awakening that is produced 
concretely in the form of an irresistible call to responsibility” (GDT, 23). 
The uniqueness of the self comes about through assignations: as we are 
addressed and called to responsibility prior to self-consciousness, we 
emerge as irreplaceable, as the ones who can answer the specific call (OB, 
105). Being-called is, then, the precondition for the self, and it is as 
invested by the other that I come to be a distinct, singular self regarding the 
world with trust or distrust, judging about trustworthiness.  
The emergence of selfhood in Lévinas takes place as a disturbance and an 
awakening of the same by the other. The non-self-coincidence of selfhood 
is brought about by a rupture that is an inspiration, and this basic 
movement of selfhood – that is, the fact that even at its core the same is 
already disturbed and inspired by the other, or, simply ex-istence – Lévinas 
calls obsession. The relationship of ethical existence he calls proximity, 
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and it is in proximity that the ethical ground for trust and distrust is found. 
Trust – understood as a fundamental way for the self to relate to another – 
takes part in or retains the trace of primordial self-transcendence, this 
interruption of the temporality of logos that is freedom. Trust retains the 
trace of proximity’s diachronic origin in the other’s exteriority, affecting 
me without becoming a part of the play of cause and effect. In trust I am in 
contact with the non-phenomenality of the other, a contact that is not a 
fusion, but a disturbance of the attempted synchronicity of self and other.  
In this chapter I have aimed to provide an account of ethical selfhood that 
can serve as the basis for the coming discussion of the nature of trust and 
distrust. The opening that Lévinas finds in Kant towards the necessity of 
exteriority for human experience will be the starting-point of our 
Lévinasian reading of Kant’s third Critique in the next chapter, where I 
argue that trust and distrust are expressions of basic reflectivity.  
 
4 Basic reflectivity: from saying to the said 
These differences between the Other and me do not depend on different “properties” 
that would be inherent in the “I”, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, in the 
Other, nor on different psychological dispositions which their minds would take on 
from the encounter. They are due to the I-Other conjuncture, to the inevitable 
orientation of being “starting from oneself” toward “the Other.” The priority of this 
orientation over the terms that are placed in it (and which cannot arise without this 
orientation) summarizes the thesis of the present work. (TI, 215) 
In the following I shall argue that in judging trustworthiness we show 
ourselves as orientational beings and that this orientational mode of 
experience is intrinsic to selfhood because it is the form of its worldliness. I 
will discuss this way of judging trustworthiness under the term basic 
reflectivity. We have seen that selfhood is, in essence, relational and non-
immediate and that it presents with a reflective movement that begins in 
exteriority. Selfhood comes into being as orientation, initiated in 
responding to a demand for justification issued by the other’s non-
phenomenal presence; in this basic reflectivity, the self is concerned for the 
other. This chapter sets out to demonstrate that trust and distrust are 
expressions of basic reflectivity and that they express insights that come 
about through my being concerned by the other. The claim is that trust and 
distrust express the judging nature of basic reflectivity, namely the way in 
which it is about the others and the shared world in a meaningful way. The 
orientational and judging nature of selfhood depends on a primordial 
ethical responsivity, where the I is open towards the other’s investiture; and 
it is this deep-seated openness without reservation that is violated in 
torture. One consequence of presenting the orientational nature of selfhood 
as depending on the absolute passivity of responsivity is that 
intersubjectivity – the encounter with the other – becomes a precondition 
for the inherent reflectivity of selfhood. As we have seen, it is indeed the 
case for Lévinas that the other is with me from the first, and throughout the 
present chapter I aim to show how, in accordance with this, the judging 
activity necessary for trust and distrust cannot be conceived of without the 
primacy of the intervention of the other.  
This chapter builds on the Lévinasian account of selfhood that was given in 
the preceding chapter and introduces Kant’s idea of the power of aesthetic 
judgment as a way of giving a more fully fledged account of basic 
reflectivity, or of what I in other words have called the positive story about 
Lévinas’ ethics. By incorporating the judgment of beauty I mean to bring 
out what is already there in Lévinas in its contours, namely the possibility 
of understanding the other ethically, or understanding otherwise. As I have 
remark upon earlier, Lévinas applies a great deal of energy in Otherwise 
than Being in coming closer to a formulation of the relationship between 
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ethics and language, which is also the relationship between the absolute 
separateness of the ethical relationship and a responsible and just 
coexistence in the world. When he describes the relationship between 
saying and the said or between ethics and justice, it is his ambition to 
provide a more positive story, as it were, than the mere negative 
descriptions of responsibility that predominate much of his writing and that 
he in others denominate “propositions of negative theology” (OB, 151). In 
defining selfhood partly as basic reflectivity my aim is to focus on the 
moments following the anarchic instantiation of ethical responsibility in 
deepest passivity and bring out the way from there and to an understanding 
of the other that is not severed from ethics, but has left behind the absolute 
separateness of a relationship entirely beyond language. Moving into the 
realm of being and doing, the self in basic reflectivity must presume a 
certain shared essence between self and other in order to make the world 
communicable. So doing is a betrayal of the other’s otherness, but it is a 
betrayal that resonates with responsibility. Lévinas begins Otherwise than 
Being by asking about the possibility of such a responsible betrayal, 
proceeding to give to philosophy the task of attempting it (OB, 7) – and 
later he gives a positive answer:  
In proximity, in signification, in my giving of signs, already the Infinite speaks 
through the witness I bear of it, in my sincerity, in my saying without said, 
preoriginary saying which is said in the mouth of the very one that receives the 
witness [témoignage]. Its signification has let itself be betrayed in the logos only to 
convey itself before us. […] It thus retains in its statement the trace of the excession 
of transcendence of the beyond. (OB, 151) 
A betrayal of the other’s alterity is unavoidable in taking up one’s 
responsibility, but there are different forms and different degrees of 
betraying the saying. Lévinas continually states that it is possible to speak 
with a trace of sincerity that allows saying to continue to undermine the 
determinacy inherent in the said (OB, e.g. 152ff). Justice is possible as a 
real connection between the asymmetry of proximity and the reciprocity of 
representation, where the other appears as intelligible, but without this 
being a degradation of the other, diminution of the infinite, limitation of 
responsibility (OB, 159). So whereas the just passage from ethics to 
understanding is undoubtedly possible in Lévinas, he is less clear on the 
how, that is, on what it is that we do when proximity becomes knowing by 
taking on “a new meaning in the space of contiguity” (OB, 157). My 
interpretation of the nature of this ethically founded understanding 
otherwise is what will be given in the following. Naming it basic 
reflectivity, I venture an account of positive Lévinasian ethics by 
describing the very moment when we emerge from pure passivity into 
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actively thinking about the world, even as this thinking is still deferential to 
anarchic passivity.  
As we have seen, Lévinas more than once directly credits Kant with 
grasping what Descartes also grasped, namely that we have the experience 
of thinking more than we can think and of our thinking being overflowed 
by something that does not originate with us and which we cannot name or 
contain. Crowell finds a point of comparison for Kant and Lévinas here 
because for both “the notion of obligation does not derive from a picture of 
human flourishing, but precedes it: the good in this sense is beyond being” 
(Crowell 2002, 66).
74
 Crowell is not claiming that Kant and Lévinas are in 
agreement, for after all the Kantian fact of reason differs significantly from 
Lévinas’ encounter with infinity in the face of the other, not least because 
for Lévinas the other’s demand is what founds reason and makes it 
possible, wherefore obligation is prior to reason. For my purposes, the 
value of comparing them on this theme despite their differences is that they 
both find that our moral engagement with the world relies on how 
something supersensible comes to pass in experience, all the while 
remaining outside the dominion of apprehending thought. Since the 
supersensible is beyond all experience, reason cannot give a unified 
representation of it, but it (reason) is regulated by the necessity of assuming 
its existence. Lévinas may have found it fruitful to think of exteriority in 
this way as regulative for thought, and indeed if we think of the struggle to 
explain a way in which we may understand otherwise, that is, have an 
insight that is in some way about the other without it being, in fact, a 
representation of the other, Kant’s ideas may be of some help. Lévinas’ 
major objection to Kant is the latter’s determination to subjugate every 
meaningful event to the intelligibility of a system, which, in other words, is 
to criticize him for not taking his own discovery of the significance of the 
supersensible for human experience to its conclusion, i.e. integrating it into 
his epistemology. Like Descartes, Kant does not take the discovery of how 
the infinite disrupts thinking properly into consideration. Finally, for 
Lévinas, Kant would have to concede that transcendental apperception 
itself is interrupted and its self-coincidence made impossible, and that 
would be the starting point of an epistemology of free – noumenal – beings. 
Lévinas is fond of explaining his ambition by contrasting it with the notion 
of transcendental apperception. Take, for instance, this beautiful passage 
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 Whether a notion of human flourishing is more or less implicitly presumed by Kant 
and Lévinas will be a topic for discussion below. Although both are for their own 
reasons dismissive of the role of utilitarian-like considerations of pleasure and pain one 
might discuss whether an idea of fulfilment is not at play.  
150 Basic reflectivity: from saying to the said 
 
about how meaning, even the meaning of the said, comes with an overflow 
of inspiration that consciousness itself could not produce:  
Transcendence, the beyond essence which is also being-in-the-world, requires 
ambiguity, a blinking of meaning [clignotement de sens] which is not only a chance 
certainty, but a frontier both ineffaceable and finer than the tracing of an ideal line. It 
needs the diachrony that breaks the unity of transcendental apperception. (OB, 152) 
It appears from this passage that Lévinas wants his ethics to be found in 
everyday life, and that the manifestation of transcendence in the 
phenomenal world will appear as ambiguity, which means as indefinite, but 
true. The impression of abstract formality that his writing style at times 
gives to his topic is countered by his professed desire to understand how 
human beings matter to each other and how we are concerned by, for, and 
with both loved ones and strangers, and to describe it respectfully and 
accurately. In the blinking of meaning that gives rise to non-arbitrary 
insight I shall locate our understanding of the other’s trustworthiness: my 
trust or distrust is said in the Lévinasian sense of an infinite approach in the 
proximity of another that is not an attitude, but a witnessing. I do not 
assemble an image of the other’s trustworthiness, and my being affected by 
it is not even a failed representation, but is the restlessness occasioned by 
infinity coming to pass in the phenomenon. My ambition is to follow how 
saying solidifies and shows itself in order to give an interpretation of how 
this looks in concrete human existence, taking trusting and distrusting as 
examples of this ethical modality of understanding. In Lévinas’ terms:  
We then have to follow in signification or proximity or saying the latent birth of 
cognition [naissance latente de la connaissance] of the said, the latent birth of a 
question, in responsibility. Proximity becoming knowing would signify as an 
enigma, the dawn of a light which proximity changes into, without the other, the 
neighbor, being absorbed in the theme in which he shows himself. (OB, 157) 
Using Kant to illustrate or seek out the meaning of this Lévinasian 
undertaking may not seem an obvious pick, but as I have argued there is a 
deeply Kantian vein in the thinking of Lévinas. Kant’s appreciation of the 
supersensible’s influence on the mind provides Lévinas with an opening to 
read Kant back against himself, as it were, and I hope to show that the 
place in Kant where one can most profitably look for Lévinasian themes is 
the Critique of the Power of Judgement. Here, Kant defines reflective 
aesthetic judgment in its distinction from determinate conceptually based 
judgments in a manner that at times almost mirrors the Lévinasian concern 
with finding a way for meaning to emerge on different premises than those 
of knowledge. My reading of Kant is distinctly Lévinasian, which means 
that the irreconcilable differences between them that would be a problem if 
one wanted to present a joint account of the two on an equal footing are 
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avoided. I take the introduction of Lévinas from the preceding chapter as a 
frame of reference and introduce Kantian considerations as a helpful tool 
for furthering my overall agenda, namely to explain how we in trusting and 
distrusting are related to the other. 
4.1 Judging trustworthiness  
I propose that we begin by thinking of trustworthiness and its opposite as 
aesthetic representations in a Kantian sense, meaning that they are not 
properties of the person’s character and yet do still pertain to it. Trust and 
distrust, in being feelings that I have in representing the other’s 
trustworthiness or lack thereof to myself, also refer to the other’s character, 
and do so in a different way than how the concepts resulting from 
determinate judgment refer to objective properties. Judging trustworthiness 
is not identical to judging aesthetic representations in the Kantian sense, 
but his analysis will be taken as a model for it and will be followed as far as 
it will take us. Still, the discussion derives its framework from the thought 
of Lévinas, and it is through a Lévinasian discussion of Kant’s third 
Critique we will arrive at what I have called basic reflectivity by 
considering on the one hand the judgments of taste and on the other the 
relationship of proximity, signification and responsivity that structure 
Lévinas’ ethics. I will follow Kant in using the term judgment, but it is with 
reference to the rift that Lévinas identifies in Kant and seeks to prise open 
so as to give the infinite its proper significance in the relationship between 
self and other. As such, the terms already carry with them the disruption 
that follows from their origin in the obligation the other placed on me 
before the beginning of reason and understanding.  
I have argued that trust and distrust are expressions of the ethical modality 
of experience, and now I introduce the idea that they are aesthetically 
defined. For reasons that will, I hope, become clear, this is not 
contradictory, but provides the best starting point for understanding how 
we judge the singular in its singularity without subsuming it under general 
concepts, and therefore how we come to an understanding of the 
trustworthiness of others. The aim is to explicate a way in which the world 
– and in particular the other – can be of concern to me in a not primarily 
cognitive or perceptual manner while still providing me with a valid insight 
into, as it were, their moral significance. Another way of phrasing it would 
be that I provide an account of how the other can emerge as sensible to me 
by exploring how we experience the other in trusting and distrusting.  
But what does it mean that trusting expresses a judgment and that it 
provides a means for orientation? Arendt can give us an initial grasp of 
this, because although she does not say much directly about trust, her few 
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remarks on it are made in the context of how we judge about others and 
particularly about the relationship between this judgment and the use of 
reasons or knowledge in social life. One such instance was quoted in 
chapter one, where she refers to Nietzsche’s comments on the insufficiency 
of reasons for morality; here is another one in which she use Cicero’s 
writings:  
In the Tusculan Disputations, Cicero discusses the conflicting opinions of 
philosophers on certain issues [...] And when it comes to deciding which of them is 
right and which is wrong, he suddenly and quite unexpectedly introduces an 
altogether different criterion. He dismisses the question of objective truth and says 
that given the choice between the opinions of the Pythagoreans and of Plato, ”By 
God, I’d much rather go astray with Plato than hold true views with these people.” 
((Arendt 2003, 110)  
Arendt is making the point that when we choose our company in the world, 
in choosing who to associate with and spend our lives with, we do so less 
on the basis of conceptually based deliberation and more on the subjective 
criterion of a feeling of how something should be. It is not a choice 
between risking to go astray with Plato and risking to go astray with the 
Pythagoreans, but manifests another form of orientation altogether. The 
anecdote draws attention to the possibility for another form of validity in 
intersubjective affairs by claiming that Cicero’s is a valid choice that is not 
arbitrary or inferior. In following his taste in what company to keep, Cicero 
is not abandoning reason and autonomy in order to fall in with someone 
else’s stance out of idiosyncratic motives such as personal loyalty or 
fascination. On the contrary, he is employing another and just as valid form 
of critical judgment as the one directed at objective truth, namely one 
directed at what kind of person one should want to associate with and be 
associated with. For Arendt, the anecdote brings to mind how we go about 
orienting ourselves in our daily lives. She advances the thesis that to a large 
extent our social orientation is not regulated by questions of truth or 
falsehood but by what feels right and wrong. The tension between 
judgments of this indeterminate sort and the ones based on the giving of 
explicit reasons is brought forth in these lines from Kant:  
If one judges objects merely in accordance with concepts, then all representation of 
beauty is lost. Thus there can also be no rule in accordance with which someone 
could be compelled to acknowledge something as beautiful. Whether a garment, a 
house, a flower is beautiful: no one allows himself to be talked into his judgment 
about that by means of any grounds or fundamental principles. (CPJ, 5:215–216, 8) 
Aesthetic judgments are not grounded in reason and they are not reducible 
to liking and disliking, that is, to subjective preferences, but display a 
necessary validity. The technicalities of how this can be the case are laid 
out in the four movements of the analytic of the pure judgments of taste, 
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and these will structure the first part of this chapter’s discussion. 
Afterwards I discuss in more detail certain elements of aesthetic judgment 
that are of particular relevance to the trusting relationship, including the 
moral import of this kind of relationship between mind and world. The 
chapter’s last sections concern the morality of distrust and the effects of the 
loss of trust in light of the preceding discussion.  
4.1.1 The judging self 
An important commonality between Lévinas and Kant, and one reason that 
it is fruitful to bring them into contact for our present purposes, is that they 
conceive of subjectivity as an active bringing about of meaning through 
experience: in being selves, we are beings that find meaning in the world. 
For Kant, this means that we are beings who can judge. In The Critique of 
Pure Reason he holds that a judgment is the mind’s most basic cognition 
(Erkenntnis) and that we can have no thought about the world that is not a 
unity actively brought about by the faculty of judgment. The faculty for 
judging is essentially the same as the faculty for thinking, he famously 
claims (CPR, A80), because any thought that we can have about an object 
asserts something about it. To claim that this rose is red is a judgment 
about the rose, but so is the thought this is a rose, and, implicitly, this rose 
exists. In judging, the human mind’s various faculties and dynamic 
functions are brought together, and this coordinating ability makes us 
fundamentally judging beings.
75
 Judging is a mediated activity, and as 
such, the unified and functioning mind – the I think (this) of transcendental 
apperception – is already a mind actively engaged with understanding the 
world. For Lévinas, meaning is instituted with the arrival of the other and 
impossible without an experience that is “beyond the unity of apperception 
of the I think, which is actuality itself” (OB, 142). For Kant, objective 
experience precedes the experience of another person, and the powers of 
representation are constitutive for both. For Lévinas, on the contrary, the 
experience of alterity precedes objective experience and becomes a 
constitutive part of what we might call the ‘Lévinasian powers of 
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 Concisely described: “The power of judgment, while a non-basic faculty, is 
nevertheless the central cognitive faculty of the human mind. This is because judging 
brings together all the otherwise uncoordinated sub-acts and sub-contents of intuition, 
conceptualization, imagination, and reason, via apperception or rational self-
consciousness, for the purpose of generating a single cognitive product, the judgment, 
under the overarching pure concepts of the understanding or categories, thereby fully 
integrating the several distinct cognitive faculties and their several distinct sorts of 
representational information, and thereby also constituting a single rational animal. For 
Kant then, rational humans are judging animals” (Hanna 2011). 
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representation’, and therefore we meet the world as beings already directed 
by responsibility towards the other. In our most basic mode of existence, 
namely the very minimal sense of self achieved as a turning towards the 
other’s assignation, we are already mediated by exteriority, already in 
movement, reflective. In the Lévinasian reconception of the origin of 
selfhood, one still finds an element of what in my terminology can be 
called judging at its core as the mode of experience as such, even as this in 
Lévinas comes after the pure passivity of the anarchic exposure to 
exteriority. Here is an example from a passage where he attempts to explain 
how community and justice can arise from ethics:  
According to the myth of the Gorgias (523 c-d), in the absolute judgment borne on 
the other (in the direct relationship with him, which judgment is), he is ”stripped of 
all clothing”, that is, of every quality expressible by an attribute in a proposition, and 
of all that which, like clothing, establishes a “community” between the judge and the 
judged. In this judgment the judge pushes aside the screen “which is made of eyes, 
ears and the body as a whole” (that is, of the very ways of thematization). There is 
thus set aside from the other everything that creates between the judge and the 
judged – between me and the other – a community or a correlation, which absorbs 
proximity. This relationship of the judgment, which Plato designates, negatively, as 
that in which the dead judge the dead, remains judgment. In this suppression of all 
the conditions for knowledge, in this “contact” without the mediation of skin, a 
signifyingness remains. What we are calling the infinity of the for-the-other, or 
saying, is not “poorer” than the said. (OB, 199 n25)76,77  
Justice is founded on proximity, which is presented as a contact that does 
not depend on the empirical manifestation of the person. As alterity undoes 
the presence of the particular properties that the phenomenal other has, 
something beyond becomes available for judgment. We are beyond the 
ethical relationship and on our way towards knowledge here, and this is 
where I want to situate our judgments about the other’s trustworthiness. 
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 Lévinas continues: “But, quite remarkably, if the absence of any community between 
the judge and the judged is maintained in Minos, neither Asiatic nor European, and 
master of arbitration, the necessity of a “certain community” in the justice between the 
judge and the judged is expressed in Aeacus, a European who judges Europeans, and in 
Rhadamanthus, an Asiatic who judges Asiatics” (OB, 199 n25). The presumption of a 
certain community that Lévinas finds fit to mention here might be thought of as the 
necessity of presuming the shareability of the world, which, I will propose, is as a 
precondition for Lévinasian ethics (as it is for Kantian aesthetics) and of relevance to 
whether trust in the world can be maintained or is lost.  
77
 The term judgment is not introduced into Lévinas’ stable vocabulary and he uses it 
but sparsely, but when he does it is not deprecatorily. My use of it in this analysis 
reflects the way it figures in this quote, and this is what should be understood by the 
phrase judging trustworthiness. 
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Once again we may be reminded of both the similarity and the difference 
between Kant and Lévinas when we think of how Kant justifies judgments 
of taste by our ability to abstract from the “limitations that contingently 
attach to our own judging” and leave out as far as possible “everything in 
one’s representational state that is matter, i.e. sensation, and attending 
solely to the formal peculiarities of his representation or his 
representational state” (CPJ, 5:294, 40). Whereas for Kant the aim of 
subtracting the particular conditions of judging is to achieve a state of mind 
as close as possible to universal reason, Lévinas could be said to have the 
opposite in mind, namely to subtract the particulars in order to make way 
for unrepresentable singularity. For Kant, the particular – the instance of a 
genus – is too concrete, and for Lévinas it is too abstract, “even if that 
genus has no extension” (OB, 86). Both, however, are concerned with 
liberating the mind from the hold of phenomenality in order to make way 
for that which is ultimately unrepresentable to influence thought.  
For Kant, the power of judgment is foremost the ability to subsume a 
particular phenomenon under a general concept, or to think the particular as 
a case under a universal law. Kant distinguishes two main forms of judging 
in the third Critique, namely determinate and reflective judgment. The 
judging relation is determinate if we can make use of a concept appropriate 
to the phenomenon; in this case, the judgment is straightforwardly 
deductive and predicative. But even in cases where no concept is available 
we can still perform a non-determinate kind of judgment called reflective 
judgment. In such cases we judge as if there were available to us a 
universal rule under which to judge, wherefore such reflective judgments 
conform, prima facie, to the same structural principles as determinate 
judgment even as they do not have available the same means of attaining 
certainty.
78
 In the case of aesthetic reflective judgments, the experience of 
an aesthetic representation cannot be adequately and exhaustively 
described by a general concept, and in the incessant reflection upon the 
impossible, but attempted, categorization of the beautiful, a free play is 
occasioned between the understanding and the imagination that gives 
pleasure to the subject because it – in its indeterminacy and lack of purpose 
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 Makkreel provides a clear and convincing distinction between the use that Kant 
makes of the terms reflection and reflective judgment, where reflection is related to “the 
discursive task of understanding” while reflective judgment is an orientational capacity 
directed towards the “more comprehensive aims of reason” (Makkreel 2006, 225–226). 
Basic reflectivity is more in line with reflective judgment than with the concept directed 
representational activity of reflection. Chapter four will show how the independent 
capacity of the self that is named basic reflectivity compares to the reflective judgments 
of taste. 
156 Basic reflectivity: from saying to the said 
 
– suggests to the mind the sense of a unity in all experience (CPJ, 5:217, 9). 
The non-objective validity of the thus attained reflective aesthetic judgment 
is signalled by the distinct kind of satisfaction that it gives, which is a 
disinterested pleasure, and is demonstrated in the argument for the 
presupposition of sensus communis, which is also claimed to be an effect of 
such free play of our powers of representation (CPJ, 5:238, 20).
79
 In the 
first introduction to the third Critique, Kant gives this definition of 
determinate and reflective judgment:  
The power of judgment can be regarded either as a mere faculty for reflecting on a 
given representation, in accordance with a certain principle, for the sake of a concept 
that is thereby made possible, or as a faculty for determining an underlying concept 
through a given empirical representation. In the first case it is the reflecting, in the 
second case the determining power of judgment. To reflect (to consider), however, is 
to compare and to hold together a given representation either with others or with 
one’s faculty of cognition, in relation to a concept thereby made possible. The 
reflecting power of judgment is that which is also called the faculty of judging 
(facultas diiudicandi). (CPJ, 20:211) 
Despite its apparent status of “mere reflection”, the reflective judgment is 
rather more ambitious than that. Reflective judgments are not simply 
inductive supplements to determinate deduction but, in their unattainable 
demand for unity, point beyond the particular aesthetic experience to what 
we, borrowing a term from Pillow, can call indeterminate felt wholes 
(Pillow 2000, 7).
80
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 The Kantian claims I have here introduced will be analysed below through a 
discussion of their applicability to the judgement about trustworthiness. 
80
 I am very sympathetic to Pillow’s book Sublime Understanding (2000) and the 
sentiments of his reading of Kant expressed therein. His Hegelian version of sublime 
understanding forms an interesting and inspiring contrapuntal to my Lévinasian version 
of aesthetic understanding, or understanding otherwise, but given that his focus is on the 
sublime and not on the beautiful, an actual discussion of his analyses is left out here. 
The mutuality of our ambitions can be seen from this quote from his introduction: “I 
interpret reflective judgment as the Kantian subject’s means of situating and orienting 
itself in webs of meaning, in networks that make possible an interpretive sense for the 
whole, and understanding approached to living out a context” (Pillow 2000, 4). Pillow 
privileged the sublime over the beautiful because he finds the judgments of taste too 
formalistic. For my part, I find that his Hegelian rendering, even as it is of the uncanny 
and unruly sublime, lets the subject remain too much ‘at home’ in a world that can be 
given as meaningful through interpretation and imagination. For Pillow, it seems to me, 
disruption is in the end a means of (never attained) unification; my Lévinasian reading 
of Kant is meant to give disruption a stronger role, even as the confrontation between 
Kant and Lévinas also serves to lend a more positive account of the Lévinasian idea of 
understanding which, unavoidably, does lay a small sacrifice at the feet of unification.  
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Kant makes clear that a reflective judgment is not simply a confused and 
imprecise determinate judgment or something that we must content 
ourselves within the lack of an appropriate concept, but yields unique 
insights into the world. Lévinas would take this point a step further and 
argue that the kind of indeterminate understanding that is made possible in 
reflective aesthetic judgment must effect a change in the Kantian system as 
a whole, because it is in the reflective mode that one finds an openness 
towards the new and towards something that will not be fitted into our pre-
existing categories. Lévinas, in his own understanding, takes it upon 
himself to further unfold this incipient awareness in Kant of the need to 
account positively for exteriority (GDT, 59ff). According to him this crack 
in the Kantian system will turn out to reveal another and deeper foundation 
for reason and freedom than the active endeavour of transcendental 
apperception, which otherwise ends in self-coincidence and in the kind of 
reflection-of-the-same that one is presented with in a mirror (OB, 142). The 
crack in the mirror is the impossibility of apprehending exteriority that 
always overflows consciousness; what is returned to me is something more 
than what I contribute, and in this way my contribution is wholly altered. 
Experience is accompanied by a play of thwarted anticipation and 
overwhelmed reason, of the excess of infinity as it breaks down the images 
I form and gives them back to me differently. In this way I may have an 
experience that is mine without being my accomplishment. There is an 
intricate relationship of orientation and alienation in experience that gives 
the world to me as more and as less than reidentification, and here the 
irreducible exteriority of the other is felt as overflow and as inspiration 
(e.g. OB, 152; TI, 28).  
In the short text What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking Kant argues 
that the feeling of right and left provides the necessary orientation in space 
in a parallel way to how we orient ourselves “not merely in space, i.e. 
mathematically, but in thinking in general” (WOT, 8:136). Kant describes 
orientation in its most basic sense as a “feeling of a difference in my own 
subject, namely, the difference between my right and left hands” (WOT, 
8:134). To orient oneself in thinking takes place on a subjective ground of 
differentiation that lets the subject judge even in cases where objective 
principles of reason are insufficient. Taking note of how Kant speaks of 
these forms of orientation as relying on a certain kind of feeling that is 
rooted in our bodily selves Makkreel proceeds to develop the concept of 
orientation into one that is of particular relevance for the third Critique by 
claiming that aesthetic judgment allows us to discriminate in our 
surrounding world in much the same manner as the feeling of geographical 
orientation (Makkreel 1994, 154ff; see also Dalton 1999): 
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Aesthetic discrimination relates to reflective judgments about the world as the spatial 
feeling of right and left relates to determinant judgments about nature. Both are 
subjective, but constant, feelings that provide the necessary orientation as the 
imagination moves from what is directly given to what is only indirectly given. 
(Makkreel 1994, 156) 
Comparably, Kant says: 
Thus even with all the objective data of the sky, I orient myself geographically, only 
through a subjective ground of differentiation; and if all the constellations, though 
keeping the same shape and position relative to one another, were one day by a 
miracle to be reversed in their direction, so that what was east now became west, no 
human eye would notice the slightest alteration on the next bright starlit night, and 
even the astronomer – if he pays attention only to what he sees and not at the same 
time to what he feels – would inevitably become disoriented. But in fact the faculty 
of making distinctions through the feeling of right and left comes naturally to his aid 
… If only he fixes his eyes on the Pole Star, he will be able not only to notice the 
alteration which has taken place, but in spite of it he will also be able to orient 
himself. (WOT, 8:135) 
This landmark, one can argue, is given by our ability to think the 
supersensible (without thereby rendering it sensible) (WOT, 8:137,134) 
and to recognize it by how it elicits awe or respect or wonder.  
There is a correspondence between the ambition of the third Critique and 
that of Lévinas, namely to find a way of being related to the world that is 
essentially different from conceptually grounded consciousness but which 
nevertheless – and exactly because of it – provides me with valid insight. 
Anticipating briefly what I will argue below, we may say that in 
contemplating the possible judgments of sensus communis, which my 
particular aesthetic judgment is thought to exemplify, the subject reaches 
beyond mere phenomenality and gets a taste of, or so my Lévinasian 
interpretation argues, the moral vocation of a disinterested perspective, and 
as such I am delivered from the confinement of my own particularity. As 
the noumenal, or exteriority, impresses its formlessness upon the self, the 
self-coincidence of Kant’s transcendental apperception is fractured and the 
ethically reflecting self emerges.  
However, I am getting ahead of myself, here. The point that I want to make 
is that my suggestion to understand trust in an analogous manner to the 
pleasure of the beautiful, i.e. as situated in between subjective feelings and 
objective knowledge, is motivated by a basic phenomenological insight 
parallel to the one Kant presents as the basis of his work on aesthetic 
judgment, namely that it appears to us that people can be right and wrong 
in matters of beauty in a way that they are not in matters of private 
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preference.
81
 Kant finds that there is truth to how we might feel strongly 
that someone is wrong about finding a particular piece of music tedious, 
and that the beauty expressed by such a piece ought to be appreciated and 
even demands appreciation from all human beings. It is a feeling we may 
all recognize, namely that we do indeed find it relevant to debate over 
aesthetic matters such as these and try to convince each other of our 
opinions in a way that we would never attempt to do with likes and dislikes 
in for instance food. In a similar manner this chapter will argue that trust 
and distrust are not in the eyes of the beholder, but can demand agreement 
from others. Trust and distrust are not arbitrary, but hold a valid judgment, 
though without being open to justification through proofs, and in that they 
resemble the pleasure and displeasure pertaining to aesthetic 
representations; the antinomy of taste can be translated into an antinomy of 
trust. In order to explain what is at work between people in the trusting or 
distrusting relationship we must conceive of understanding in a broadened 
way that is not grounded in and cannot be exhausted by cognitive 
deliberation. By discussing Kant’s solution to the antinomy within a 
Lévinasian register we will arrive at the notion of basic reflectivity that is 
meant to accommodate this need. Presently, we shall look at Kant’s 
solution in his analytic of the aesthetic power of judgment. 
4.2 The four movements of the analytic of the beautiful 
The aesthetic judgment is the subject of Kant’s Critique of the Power of 
Judgment. His account of judgments of the beautiful and the sublime is 
based on the relationship that arises between the mental faculties when we 
reflect on an object or performance and the feeling of pleasure or distaste 
occasioned by, or perhaps identical to, that state.
82
 For Kant, when I reflect 
on a beautiful object, my imagination and understanding are brought into 
harmony with one another. This elicits what he calls a disinterested feeling 
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 This insight was a prevalent theme for the philosophical discussions on aesthetics at 
the time. Also Hume, for instance, took his departure from the need to explain this 
peculiar status of aesthetic value (Hume 1975). 
82
 There are significant structural differences in judging the beautiful and the sublime. 
For the present purposes it is central that Kant in distinguishing between them provides 
us with a way of understanding how we can experience ourselves as both belonging to 
and being slightly estranged from a world that in some ways fits our mental abilities and 
in others overwhelms them entirely. Although this aspect is included implicitly here and 
there in the following I have not made it an explicit theme. For an account that 
investigates how the beautiful and the sublime relates to morality by way of aesthetic 
judgment, see Bjerre (2010). 
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of pleasure: disinterested because what we feel is a pleasure in our own 
mental activity, a pleasure that is not connected to any desire we have for 
the object or for what the object may represent. The fourfold character of 
judgments of taste is: (i) its basis in disinterested satisfaction; (ii) its 
subjective, but universal validity that is not derived from a concept; (iii) its 
being grounded in nothing but the form of purposiveness of an object, (iv) 
and its being of a sort that can lawfully demand agreement from others. 
The four distinguishing features of the reflective aesthetic judgments of 
beauty together form its definition, and their meaning are made explicit as I 
work through them below.  
The Critique of the Power of Judgment is meant to show how the reflective 
judgments of taste are universally valid despite how they differ from 
determinate conceptually based judgments. Given the phenomenological 
starting point for the analytic of the beautiful, which tells us that there is 
more to matters of beauty than private, arbitrary preference, Kant must 
account for how validity is possible under the conditions of the aesthetic 
experience. As I have argued, the challenge that Kant poses to himself in 
the antinomy of taste is much similar to the challenge that our notion of 
ethical trust faces: how do we defend the claim that trust provides me with 
an experience of the other that is more than simply personal preference but 
which is also not knowledge about objective properties? The thesis that 
Kant needs to defend is that the pleasure that a subject feels upon 
encountering the beautiful or the sublime are not just a private matter, but 
entails an ought: that even barring the availability of a concept appropriate 
for the subsumption of the phenomenon we can still judge generally by 
way of an aesthetic feeling. Beauty and sublimity are realities that should 
be recognized by all no less than, albeit in a different way from, objects of 
perception or moral truths. The solution to the riddle of how we can 
consider judgments of taste binding without having a determinate ground 
on which to decide matters of disagreement is given via the faculty of the 
imagination and sensus communis. The validity of the judgment of taste 
implies, then, that my judgments about beauty ought to be shared by others. 
Following from this claim, two interrelated challenges present themselves: 
(i) how does my subjective feeling provide me with a significant relation to 
a particular object and not just a self-relation; (ii) and how does this 
signification acquire its universal validity? Kant’s answer to these 
questions will be instructive for our purpose because the argument we want 
to make is similar to Kant’s, which means that we need to clarify a tricky 
point, namely in what sense universality becomes a relevant issue for my 
trust or distrust of someone at all and, additionally, why it is in relation to 
this particular issue that trust can be distinguished from other comparable 
social feelings.  
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4.2.1 Disinterested and non-conceptual: the first movement 
Definition of the beautiful derived from the first moment. Taste is the faculty for 
judging an object or a kind of representation through a satisfaction or dissatisfaction 
without any interest. The object of such a satisfaction is called beautiful. (CPJ, 5:211, 
5) 
The argument for the disinterestedness of the judgments of beauty in the 
first movement maps onto the argument that such judgments are not based 
on concepts. The non-conceptual foundation of judgments of beauty is a 
theme throughout the analytic of the beautiful, and we will begin by 
considering it here and return to it as we proceed. What does it mean that 
an aesthetic judgment is non-conceptual? For Kant, it simply means that 
such judgments do not establish anything about the properties of the object, 
but it does not mean that my perception of the beautiful – say, of a 
completely still sea in the first light of dawn – belongs to a pre-conceptual 
immediacy that is foreign to thought. Thus, when I contemplate a beautiful 
morning I am very much aware of the pale translucency of sea and sky that 
comes as close to being completely colourless as I can imagine, and so 
concepts are certainly a part of my experience; but it is not through these 
concepts that my experience becomes one of beauty, and neither is beauty 
something that can, ultimately, be accounted for by reference to conceptual 
matters such as composition or the relation of parts to a whole. My 
judgment about beauty is grounded non-conceptually because it does not 
refer to a comparison with definite concepts for its justification. For Kant, a 
conceptual grounding would make the judgment unfree because it would 
involve measuring the particular up against a universal standard which then 
would determine its value, and in that case we would be in the realm of 
knowledge where disputes can be settled once and for all through 
argument. Such is not the case with what he calls reflective aesthetic 
judgments (CPJ, 5:210, 5). 
Similarly, the disinterestedness of the judgments of beauty does not 
preclude any personal interest in whatever it is I am judging, but this 
interest must not enter into the judgment itself. In other words, I may be 
interested in something because it is beautiful, but I do not find it beautiful 
because I am interested in it (CPJ, 5:205, 2). In addition to the reflective 
aesthetic judgments there are two other ways of judging aesthetically (i.e. 
on the basis of a sense of satisfaction), namely aesthetic-practical and 
aesthetic-pathological judgments, which are the conceptually based 
judgment of the good and the purely private inclination of the agreeable 
(CPJ, 20:231–232; CPJ, 5:209–210, 5). The three experiences all elicit 
satisfaction in some way, but they differ in how they attain validity. The 
agreeable does not raise questions of validity because it is a purely private 
matter: it is senseless to debate over our feelings about sensations be they 
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ever so weighty – as when we love or grieve – as such feelings are clearly 
neither right nor wrong. The good, on the other hand, is subject to the 
demands of practical reason, and its validity is based on a correspondence 
between an object and an idea whereby it amounts to objective and 
universal validity. The aesthetic judgments are in between. They are not 
merely subjective, but neither are they objective. Their intersubjective 
validity makes the feeling of pleasure that is elicited in aesthetic judgment 
into more than a private affair by drawing up the contours of an 
intersubjective space in which a non-objective attention – that is 
nevertheless not confined to a subjective stance – can take place. It is 
another and different way of understanding the world that is not derived 
from, nor is it an imperfect and confused form of, conceptual judgment that 
can in time and with good systematic effort be brought under the reign of 
conceptual clarity (CPJ, 5:228, 15). Kant says:  
[T]he satisfaction in beauty, however, is one that presupposes no concept, but is 
immediately combined with the representation through which the object is given (not 
through which it is thought). Now if the judgment of taste in regard to the latter is 
made dependent on the purpose in the former, as a judgment of reason, and is thereby 
restricted, then it is no longer free and a pure judgment of taste. (CPJ, 5:230, 16) 
Kant argues that if we want to understand the existence of beauty in this 
world as something that is neither just an elaborate, but not fundamentally 
different, type of the agreeable nor simply a species of what can be proven, 
such as the good, we must carefully avoid conflating it with these related, 
but essentially different judgments. Arguing about judgments of beauty is 
not irrational, Kant holds, even if disputing about them is, since rational 
dispute requires objectively definable standards as ground and the real 
possibility of final resolution. In contrast it is still sensible to argue about 
taste because we can still sensibly seek accordance, even as this accordance 
cannot be secured by proofs. Now, in order to seek accordance we will 
need a kind of concept, Kant admits, but the kind of concept that is 
involved in the aesthetic judgment is one from which “nothing can be 
cognized and proved with regard to the object, because it is in itself 
indeterminable and unfit for cognition” (CPJ, 5:340, 57).83 Kant identifies 
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 Whether this then alters the meaning of concept ’into something so far removed from 
the original as to make the solution of the antinomy nonsensical and consequently fail at 
establishing the ground for a more-than-private validity for the judgments of taste is in 
itself a major issue that certainly goes beyond the scope of the present work. Suffice it 
to say that Kant points to the fact that it is meaningful to disagree over matters of taste 
and to hold people accountable for their aesthetic judgments in a way that differs from 
‘normal’ feelings, so to speak, as well as from objective knowledge.  
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this kind of concept as the “pure rational concept of the supersensible” 
(CPJ, 5:340, 57) which, although there can be no experience corresponding 
to its qualities, still in this way is felt in experience only and exactly as the 
required indeterminability of the ground of our aesthetic judgments. Or, in 
other words, we, while “we still do not render it sensible, […] do at least 
think of something supersensible in a way which is serviceable to the 
experiential use of our reason” (WOT, 8:136–137). How this service is to 
be understood is a question we will return to.  
Like Lévinas, Kant is concerned with avoiding selfishness in morality; both 
thinkers find it paramount to eliminate the self’s concern for itself – for its 
own interests – when acting morally. Lévinas sets out to scourge ethical 
intersubjectivity for any remnants of self-investiture, or what he with 
reference to Spinoza terms conatus essendi, the preservation of one’s own 
being (TaI, 156).When Kant holds that the disinterested pleasure 
[uninteressierten Wohlgefallen] is necessary for a valid aesthetic judgment 
– one that does not hinge on my idiosyncratic sensations – it brings to mind 
Lévinas’ use of that same word – disinterest – in order to explain the 
possibility of an intersubjective attentiveness that originates elsewhere than 
in my concern for myself and manages to leave the other free of my 
anticipating grasp without making us irrelevant to each other. He speaks of 
this attentiveness as listening for the saying of the other:  
Saying approaches the other by breaking through the noema involved in 
intentionality. (…) The one assigned has to open to the point of separating itself from 
its own inwardness, adhering to esse; it must be dis-interested. (…) The passivity of 
the exposure responds to an assignation that identifies me as the unique one, not by 
reducing me to myself, but by stripping me of every identical quiddity, and thus of 
all form, all investiture, which would still slip into the assignation. (OB, 48–49) 
The parallel is strengthened by the fact that Kant explicitly links the 
difference between how we are affected by the pleasure of the beautiful and 
how we are affected by the agreeable or the good to whether we do not 
only have an invested interest in the existence of the object that affects us, 
but also the desire for more of the same (CPJ, 5:207, 3).
84
 As such, the 
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 In his notes to the Cambridge edition of the Critique of the Power of Judgment Guyer 
explains how Kant at times argues that disinterested pleasure should be understood as 
pleasure that is in no way dependent on how the consequences of the existence of the 
object relate to my projects and desires, and at others adopt the “more straightforward 
view of Shaftesbury that pleasure in beauty is independent of the possession of the 
object” (CPJ, 366 n4). It seems to me that the latter formulation is not truly more 
modest, since the ability to be disinterested about the possession of something implies 
the disinterest in the object in relation to my projects, plans and desires. In my view, 
Kant is in both instances claiming the complete independence of the pleasure in beauty 
(continued) 
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agreeable and the good are not judged by their aesthetic qualities, but by 
how they relate to my being, whereby they are coupled up with my being as 
inter-esse. Only the beautiful and the sublime are judged wholly without 
reference to being and to my interest, and are as such pure aesthetic 
judgments. The positive value attributed to leaving behind one’s self-
interest – and indeed that we are able to do this as human beings engaged 
with the world – is a central point of conjecture for Kant and Lévinas. It is 
in the analysis of pure aesthetic judgment that Kant brings forth this aspect 
of human experience that is quite comparable to the disinterest that is a 
precondition for ethics in Lévinas, and which he describes as a release from 
the dominion of being, effected by our confrontation with that which goes 
beyond experience:  
The idea of the Infinite is a thought released from consciousness, not according to the 
negative concept of the unconscious but according to the thought, perhaps the most 
profoundly considered thought, of the release with regard to being, of dis-inter-est: a 
relation without a hold on being and without subservience to the conatus essendi, 
contrary to knowledge and perception. (TaI, 156) 
The relationship between thought and the infinite, which bears as certain 
structural resemblance to how Kant imagines that the supersensible may be 
serviceable for reason, is a way out of self-coincident consciousness or 
pure immanence illuminated by the other’s call, that is, by the reality of 
another’s perspective. The role of the other’s perspective, rooted in the 
other’s inaccessible interiority and as such without content for me, but 
simply expressing the form of a gaze from alterity that calls upon me to 
account for why my being is not arbitrary, can be compared with how the 
universal validity of disinterested aesthetic judgment relies on how we can 
take into account the “merely possible judgments of others” that attends 
“solely to the formal peculiarities” of the representation at hand through the 
faculty of sensus communis, thus defined:  
By “sensus communis”, however, must be understood the idea of a communal sense, 
i.e. a faculty for judging that… takes account (a priori) of everyone else’s way of 
representing in thought, in order as it were to hold its judgment up to human reason 
as a whole and thereby avoid the illusion which, from subjective private conditions 
that could easily be held to be objective, would have a detrimental influence on the 
judgment. (CPJ, 5:293, 40) 
The sensus communis thus defined is a faculty for bearing in mind the 
possible judgments of an imagined community, and as such describes an a 
 
                                                                                                                           
on what it may signify for me. In this sense there is a parallel to Lévinas’ idea of dis-
inter-esse.  
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priori openness of the mind that serves a somewhat similar purpose as the 
gaze of the other does in Lévinas in so far as both are ways for the self to 
emerge out of private arbitrariness towards a non-actual, but imagined 
formal view. Such parallels serve to show that whereas there are many 
differences between the two thinkers’ projects, there are points of 
conjecture too, and those presented here will be important for showing how 
trusting and distrusting relate to the other and to the orientational capacity 
of the self, namely basic reflectivity.  
Notice that disinterestedness is required with regards to the grounds of the 
judgment, but it is not as such a problem if we have an interest in our own 
feeling of pleasure, say, and neither is it a valid objection to Kant to say 
that our urge to convince others of the rightness of our judgments counts 
against the claim to disinterestedness. The grounds for the judgment is the 
free play of imagination and understanding occasioned by beauty – by our 
attempt to engage with something that refuses determinate conceptuality – 
which is manifest in our feeling of pleasure. This ground is exactly 
disinterested; but at the same time, the pleasure entails, as Kant shows in 
the third movement, the furtherance of the free play of the faculties without 
any other end than itself, namely the contemplative pleasure of that 
occupation: 
We linger over the consideration of the beautiful because this consideration 
strengthens and reproduces itself, which is analogous to (yet not identical with) the 
way in which we linger when a charm in the representation of the object repeatedly 
attracts attention, where the mind is passive. (CPJ, 5:222, 12) 
Kant is aware of a certain kind of formal and contemplative interest in the 
continuing occupation of the mind with the representation of the beautiful, 
but because it is not an empirical interest in an object by way of its 
properties, and because the judgment does not depend on it – i.e. it is not 
what gives the beautiful its beauty – he does not consider it to be a problem 
for his disinterested account. Such remarks as these, however, show that 
the notion of disinterest is not as rigid as is often assumed when Kant is 
criticized for it.  
The descriptions provided by Kant in the first movement demonstrate why 
aesthetic judgment may be considered a good model for how we come to 
trust and distrust. As I argued in chapter one and attempted to illustrate in 
chapter two, trusting and distrusting are neither objective forms of 
knowledge nor purely private inclinations, but provide a valid insight that 
one can be held accountable for. In the Kantian vocabulary we may say that 
our trust and distrust are to be compared not with the judgment itself, but 
with the products of the judgment, which are the feeling of pleasure or 
displeasure. When judging trustworthiness we judge the other’s character, 
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which is ultimately beyond determinate knowledge, and the matter that is 
judged – trustworthiness itself – is not an objective property of the 
character. Keeping that in mind, I argue that there is an insight in trusting 
and distrusting that can be right and wrong in a similar manner to how 
beauty is non-disputable but open to argument (CPJ, 5:338f, 56f). Trust and 
distrust are not matters of incommunicable privacy such as, in Arendt’s 
words, when “No argument can persuade me to like oysters if I do not like 
them” (Arendt 1992, 66). Their insight is of a kind that is grounded in the 
discriminating faculty of basic reflectivity, and as such they are expressions 
of normative orientation. The challenge that Kant takes up in the third 
Critique, namely to account for the non-conceptual validity and non-
objective necessity of reflective aesthetic judgments, is one that faces us 
too, because one may rightly ask why trust should be considered more 
informative than my distaste for oysters or less determinable than my 
knowledge of their nutritional value. The need to provide an adequate 
explanation to meet this challenge grows out of the argument in chapter 
one about the rationality of trust, that is, about the mistake in seeing trust as 
exhaustively explained as either a species of belief or as irrational 
affectivity. As I argued, the fact that trust and distrust are not matters of 
determinate knowledge does not delegate them to the realm of the 
irrational; and this point – that there exists sense and meaning that is 
grounded differently than through conceptual determinacy – is one that 
Lévinas and Kant both subscribe to.  
4.2.2 Non-objective universality: the second movement 
The definition of the beautiful drawn from the second moment. That is beautiful 
which pleases universally without a concept. (CPJ, 5:219, 9) 
Kant begins his explication of the second movement by referring to how 
we in ordinary communication are perfectly happy to concede that matters 
of agreeableness are private – that assertions of agreeableness can 
uncontroversially be followed by a ‘to me’, i.e. ‘sparkling wine is agreeable 
to me’ (CPJ, 5:212, 7) – in a way that is not transportable to matters of 
beauty. Agreeableness is not a property of the object, but pertains, like 
beauty, to my relation to the object, but unlike beauty it does pertain to a 
property of the object that I can describe and define, such as when I prefer 
my white wine dry as bone. In this, the satisfaction of the agreeable differs 
from that arising from beauty, because the latter does not refer to objective 
properties at all. However, even as the non-objective universality exhibited 
by the judgments of taste do not provide for knowledge of objective 
properties, they do justify that we assert something about the object. As it 
happens, we are not confined to saying something about our judging 
consciousness, for “the judgment of taste consists precisely in the fact that 
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it calls a thing beautiful only in accordance with that quality in it by means 
of which it corresponds with our way of receiving it” (CPJ, 5:282, 32). If 
this were not so, the judgments of beauty could have no claim to 
universality, because they would amount to nothing but perfectly 
contingent products of a subject’s reaction to an experience. The 
experience must be about the beauty of the phenomenon in a non-arbitrary 
manner, and the possibility of such non-objective universality is what Kant 
needs to explain. This he does by two interrelated steps, namely by 
establishing the universalizability of (i) my mental powers in judging about 
matters of taste and (ii) the communicability of the judgment itself, which 
can be considered an expression and a demonstration of the universality of 
our judging faculties. It is the assumption here that we, when we trust or 
distrust others, judge their character in a similar manner, namely by the 
feeling they invoke in us of taste or distaste as our mental capacities are 
brought into motion by the confrontation with the indeterminate otherness 
of another person’s character. In The Fundamental Concepts of 
Metaphysics, Heidegger, as he analyses the feeling of boredom, gives a 
description of a relational feeling that can be compared with Kant’s idea of 
the pleasure of beauty as he explains how a feeling about something can 
entail a judgment (such as: this book is boring) that is not objective and 
does not demand universal consent (as would be the case for: this book is 
200 pages), yet is also not simply arbitrarily subjective (such as: red is a 
ghastly colour for books): 
For what does it mean that certain things and people cause boredom in us? […] Is it 
some kind of process, as when one billiard ball strikes another and thereby causes 
movement in the second? […] We are asking: what does boring mean? And are 
simultaneously asking: what kind of a property is this? Boring – by this we mean 
wearisome, tedious; it does not stimulate and excite, it does not give anything, has 
nothing to say to us, does not concern us in any way. This is not yet a determination 
of its essence, however, but merely an explanation that initially suggests itself. Yet if 
we explain whatever is boring in this way, we have indeed unexpectedly proceeded 
to interpret the initial objective character of the book’s boringness as something 
which concerns us in such and such a way and therefore stands in such and such a 
relation to us a subjects, to our subjectivity, influences us in such and such a way, 
determines our attunement. Then boringness is not some exclusively objective 
property of the book after all, such as its bad cover, for instance. The characteristic of 
‘boring’ thus belongs to the object and is at the same time related to the subject. 
(Heidegger 1996, 84) 
Two features of the quote strikes a chord. First, how boringness is 
described as both a relationship between self and object and as being about 
the object, and second, how boringness according to Heidegger is related to 
a hindrance of excitement and stimulation, being reminiscent of Kant’s 
feeling of life [Lebensgefühl], which is also of significance here, and which 
we will return to below. Heidegger’s thoughts illustrate well the difficulty 
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we are facing, namely in what way such a relationship between self, 
sensation and object can be understood. The faculty of aesthetic judgment 
is a form of thinking about something, and it is its capacity to pay attention 
to and be concerned by the world in a different way that makes the third 
Critique so helpful for matters of trust, because it describes a way of 
experiencing that is about both the form and the content of experience. It is 
indeed with trust and distrust as with boringness that it “concerns us in 
such and such a way ” while also imparting an insight into the other’s 
character. It is not up to us whether something is beautiful or not, or 
trustworthy or not: the judgments of taste demand agreement from all. 
Their universal validity is based on singular judgments about the form of 
empirical phenomena and the feelings they elicit in us; or, in Makkreel’s 
words: 
The aesthetic universal is not at first conceptual; it is a felt universal rooted in a 
sensus communis that intimated a universal idea without the constraint of any ideal of 
perfection. (Makkreel 1992, 50)  
Importantly, whereas the aesthetic judgment is not about properties of the 
object, it is also not unrelated to the nature of the representation that 
occasions it, and likewise with trust and distrust or with boringness in 
Heidegger’s example. In the last part of section nine Kant begins what he 
will later continue, namely the clarification of how judgments of taste 
“determines the object, independently of concepts”, i.e. to argue that the 
judgment of beauty is indeed about a particular beautiful object, because 
while the relation to the representation “can make itself known only 
through sensation […] it can still be sensed in its effect on the mind”, 
manifesting itself in the harmonious free play of the faculties that give 
disinterested pleasure (CPJ, 5:219, 9). It is clear from several passages that 
he means for the judgment of taste to be about the representation also, and 
not solely about my relationship to my own cognitive faculties (e.g. CPJ, 
5:221, 11).
85
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 Kant cannot provide a complete explanation of how the relational, non-conceptual 
feeling of pleasure is about the object, but perhaps that is in the end not so very different 
from how difficult it is to account for our access to the world as such, for Kant’s as for 
any other epistemology. Kant scholarship is widely divided on the question of how well 
Kant succeeds in grounding the possibility for attaining knowledge beyond that which 
we ourselves contribute through the categorical structure of our mental furniture. As an 
outstanding philosophical question, the problem of the possible existence of and access 
to a mind independent world is certainly a challenge for Kant, but not more so for his 
aesthetics than for his epistemology in general. It seems to be a question of larger 
consequence, and will not be given a systematic treatment here.  
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Such a representation shows itself to be in agreement with the conditions of 
universality, which in the case of aesthetic judgment is that the faculties of 
cognition enter into a well-proportioned relationship and thereby is 
regarded as valid for everyone. In reflective aesthetic judgment the 
relationship between the faculties is not subsumptive, such as it is in 
determinate judgments where the imagination serves the understanding. In 
reflective judgment, the harmony comes about when the imagination and 
the understanding coordinate freely, neither of them subjected to the other, 
whereby they bring about a sensation of disinterested pleasure occasioned 
by that which is seen as beautiful, but not applicable to it as a property nor 
pointing to an empirical feature of it which could be conceptualized. In 
reflective judgments of taste it is not the manifold of sense, but a state of 
mind that is unified, and it is this harmonization that the aesthetic object is 
seen as purposive for; a theme to which we will return (CPJ, 20:220f; 
Makkreel 1994, 53).  
For Kant, the judgment comes first and the feeling is its result (CPJ, 5:217f, 
9). We do not judge beauty by way of the feeling it invokes, but experience 
the feeling because we find something beautiful. In the same way, trust and 
distrust are products of our judgment, not the substance of it. We do not 
judge with trust and distrust; instead they are results of our judging and 
they show us that judging takes place in our relation to others in a way that 
leaves them free of purposiveness and perfection, of teleology and of 
truth.
86
 Our judgment is accompanied by a feeling of pleasure that 
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 Here, the limits of an account based on the static architecture of pure judgments are 
shown, at least with respect to my agenda. It would seem unconvincing if I should 
claim, with reference to Kant, that the product of the judgment can have no relation to 
the grounds of future such judgments, i.e. that my experience of trusting or distrusting 
in the present is irrelevant to future judgments about trustworthiness. Kant’s point is, as 
always, about that which grounds the judgment, which means not that my experience of 
a future rose or seaside cannot be coloured by my experience of such things in the past, 
but that the aesthetic value of the experience of the representations – their possible 
beauty – is not based on past judgments, but only on the present representation. In terms 
of trustworthiness, where we are dealing not with judging entities that can be clearly 
separated in space and time, but with the personality of human beings who over time 
both change and stay the same, a comparable division cannot be upheld. However, there 
is something important to Kant’s point even for us, namely that my judgments needs to 
be about that which I am experiencing more than it is about past experiences, for 
otherwise the relationship between the judgment and that which is judged is lost, and 
the very idea of judgment becomes nonsensical; meaning that trust and distrust is not 
mainly a product of my past – my culture or upbringing – but must occasioned by the 
nature of the concrete other person with some level of necessity. The interrelationship 
between trust and the kind of knowledge about someone that is gained through 
association and experience is difficult to spell out indeed. To explain it one would need 
(continued) 
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expresses the judgment; but as the judgment is the result of the free and 
harmonious play of understanding and imagination it is truly this process 
that gives pleasure, like a by-product that tells us about the judgment and 
its structure (CPJ, 5:218, 9). In this way Kant ensures that the pleasure is 
not derived from the subject’s sensation of a particular thing but from the 
mental capacities of the human being which are considered universal and 
given independently of empirical experience. For our purposes the Kantian 
approach to judgments about beauty has the strength that it endeavours to 
explain how an indeterminable experience can provide valid insight and 
give pleasure as its manifestation, and this model is very similar to what we 
are after. Comparatively, I would suggest that our judgments about 
trustworthiness are judgments about the other’s character, albeit a result of 
the indeterminate and implicit insight that something such as aesthetic 
judgment, or ethical understanding, or basic reflectivity, provides. The 
challenge for Kant is to provide arguments for why the feeling of pleasure 
that is the manifestation of our judgments about beauty is about the 
beautiful phenomenon while not being about its objective properties, and to 
explain how this feeling is more than an expression of a private inclination, 
and both of these are challenges that my account must also answer.  
The feeling of pleasure, then, is more than a private affair and can be 
communicated to others. The universal capacity for communicating the 
pleasure occasioned by beauty is presented as the ground of the judgment’s 
validity and as a part of what occasions pleasure in the first place. It is 
because we find it communicable through its being empty of what is 
agreeable to us in sensation that we have the pure feeling of disinterested 
pleasure (CPJ, 5:217, 9). That communicability is taken as part of what 
makes aesthetic judgments possible is significant for our agenda, because it 
underlines the social and normative dimension of this faculty which, as 
Kant remarks, is found to reveal “a property of our faculty of cognition that 
without this analysis would have remained unknown” (CPJ, 5:213, 8), that 
is, it points to how the a priori capacity for imagining communicability is 
of relevance to not just aesthetics, but to matters of morality and knowledge 
too. 
Recalling our ambition to account for trustworthiness as something that, 
although not being an objective fact that one can point to and decide about 
finally, is in a similar manner something that transcends the contingency of 
 
                                                                                                                           
to develop a dynamic notion of trusting and of the judgment about trustworthiness, and 
this would be a very relevant endeavour as it obviously captures something crucial 
about how we actually trust and distrust; however, it will for all that not be developed 
here, but must be a work for some other time.  
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a personal relationship of liking, we may appreciate how the second 
movement provides us with assistance. We may in a comparable way 
propose that the appropriateness of my trust or distrust should be 
recognized by others by how their own aesthetic feeling supports it, 
providing them with a judgment about my judgment that is also a judgment 
about my trustworthiness in turn. Being trustworthy in this understanding is 
not simply to be someone I find dependable in a certain respect (i.e. it 
cannot be explained in terms of the tripartite ‘A trusts B with C’-structure), 
but entails something like consistency of character and sound judgment. To 
be a trustworthy person means that one is as a person responsive to the 
morally relevant features of a situation and has the disposition to care about 
them and act accordingly.
87
 Here we may be reminded of Arendt’s insight 
into the expressive and creative character of action for the person: 
Action and speech go on between men, as they are directed towards them, and they 
retain their agent revealing capacity even if their content is exclusively “objective”, 
concerned with the matters of the world of things in which men move, which 
physically lies between them and out of which arises their specific, objective, 
worldly interests. […] Most action and speech is concerned with this in-between, 
which varies with each group of people, so that most words and deeds are about 
some worldly, objective reality in addition to being a disclosure of the acting and 
speaking agent. (Arendt 1999, 182) 
In Arendt’s reading of the third Critique, the role of sensus communis is 
emphasized as a site for the emergence of sense in a way that the singular 
thinker cannot attain. When we stand forth in public and expressively 
manifest our existence before a plurality of perspectives we are engaging 
with sensus communis in a way that serves broad-minded thinking by 
confronting us with the other’ questioning presence. Since human beings 
are not just so many instantiations of universal reason, but singular in their 
separateness as manifestations of natality – each the source of the new and 
radically different – their views on me and on the world differ from 
anything I could have come up with in isolation. By being seen by others 
my self-relatedness is altered in a way that would be impossible were I on 
my own, and which consist in a reflective movement of reidentification and 
its disturbance and derailing. Comparable to Lévinas we find here 
something that for our purposes amounts to the recognition that before I 
can judge the trustworthiness of the other with the use of my own powers 
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 This last part, the disposition to act in accordance with one’s moral insights, will be 
taken up again later, because it is not self-evident that moral insights motivate moral 
acts, nor do Kant and Lévinas take quite the same stance on the motivations for acting 
morally.  
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of thought I must receive this sense of myself from the other. To engage 
with common sense, then, is not to concern oneself with the 
correspondence between some form of existing normativity and one’s own 
private judgments, but to let one’s judgments be put into play by the 
multiplicity of the dialogue that arises when a plurality of singular and 
separate beings stand forth.  
4.2.3 The form of purposiveness: the third movement 
Definition of the beautiful inferred from this third moment. Beauty 
is the form of the purposiveness of an object, insofar as it is 
perceived in it without representation of an end. (CPJ, 5:236, 17) 
Purposiveness is a requisite for thinking in Kant, and in ordinary 
conceptual cognition the purpose of an object is the concept that constitutes 
its possibility. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant explains that it is a 
regulative necessity for the speculative interest of reason to “regard all 
order in the world as if it had originated in the purpose of a supreme 
reason” (CPR, A686/B714). In the First Introduction to the Critique of the 
Power of Judgment he poses it as a subjectively necessary transcendental 
presupposition that we assume a systematic unity in what we experience as 
being unbounded and manifold, and declares that any power of judgment 
must base its procedure on such an assumption of an a priori principle, 
which we have reason to make (CPJ, 20:204). In aesthetic thought, where 
the object is given indeterminately, the idea of its purpose correspondingly 
has an indeterminate form observable through reflection, and Kant calls 
this the subjective purposiveness in the representation of an object without 
any end, or the form of purposiveness (CPJ, 5:221, 11). In this sense, as 
reflective rather than regulative, purposiveness does not pertain to what 
constitutes the possibility of the object, and in fact has no causal relation to 
the actuality of that object, but is a matter of how the representation of it 
affects the relation of the powers of representation to each other.
88
 As such, 
it is purposiveness without purpose; unlike matters of knowledge, where 
the purpose is the concept, and matters of morality, where we assume 
perfection as the conceptual model and measure (CPJ, 5:180, 5:220ff, 10–
11, 15). In spite of its indeterminate nature, we assume that there is 
purposiveness behind the beautiful just like we assume that it is related to a 
universal that we can have no concept of. If pure judgments of beauty were 
based on how the perceiver catches a glimpse of perfection in the perceived 
it would rest on the notion of a purpose, because according to Kant, 
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 See Makkreel (1992) for an elaboration of the difference between regulative and 
reflective purposiveness in Kant.  
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perfection is related to how well something compares to that which it is 
supposed to be, and such measuring requires a determinate concept. 
Judging something against a standard of perfection is a judgment of a 
relative quality, then, because it pertains to how the judged measures up 
against its own purpose. Not so with beauty, which has no corresponding 
determination, and therefore judgments of beauty are not grounded on 
perfection.  
Kant does not entirely dispense with the idea of purposiveness, though, 
because there is something about the way that the form of the beautiful 
occasions the pleasing free play of the faculties that exhibits what he calls 
subjective purposiveness. When he explains that reflective judgments of 
taste are examples of a “universal rule that one cannot produce” (CPJ, 
5:237, 18), and in several places remarks that they rest on an indeterminate 
concept (CPJ, 5:244, 23; 5:339,341, 57), it ties in with the subjective 
purposiveness that is still needed for us to be able to appreciate the form of 
beauty. When reflective judgments consequently appeal to a notion of an 
unknown and unknowable universal in bringing about a judgment about the 
singular, it testifies to how Kant still retains the ordering and systematizing 
activity of the mind as the background of all judgment, even when 
objective purposes, concepts and universals are unavailable: such is the 
structure of our cognitive abilities, according to his view (CPJ, 20:208ff, 
VI). In comparison, Lévinas would reject the need for an ordering activity 
that presumes a non-given whole for singular judgments to be meaningful. 
It is his ambition to explain how judgments
89
 about the singular other are 
possible without reference to overarching, general concepts. Purposiveness 
is also given as the “lawfulness of the contingent as such” (CPJ, 20:217, cf. 
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 Whereas Lévinas makes sparing use of the term judgment, preferring terms such as 
understanding, experience, signification and sensibility, and it is my argument that in 
the minimal sense that judgment is used here, namely as the (morally) discriminatory 
ability of basic reflectivity, judgment is always present in the fabric of any experience. 
To this, one might ask if there is not a primordial moment in Lévinas, in the very first 
awareness of the other’s call before one begins turning towards it with the inherently 
ethical heteronomous spontaneity of the response and of substitution, where there is 
pure receptivity? There is that, indeed, but given that the self is called forth into being as 
it is called to responsibility it is not preceded by something like a potentially responsive 
self-absorbed self, waiting for actualization. If in the Kantian story the I emerges as 
unified in transcendental apperception, the Lévinasian story has subjectivity emerge as 
the form of responsiveness and alertness, and it is with this same self-transcending 
origin of the self that a world comes into sight as already belonging to another. Basic 
reflectivity is the name I have given to my reading of the basic field of responsivity and 
commitment that selfhood is, and as such this self is discriminating ethically from the 
very first.  
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20:228, 5:404, 76), a description that underlines the necessity of presuming 
a systematic order behind the apparent arbitrariness of empirical reality 
while still holding on to its indeterminate and indeterminable character.  
We will return to this juxtaposition of Kant and Lévinas below for the sake 
of considering whether it is necessary to presume purposefulness in order 
to make sense of judgments of trustworthiness.
90
 The question is whether 
we do, in a similar way as in aesthetic judgment, apply a non-determinate 
orientational capacity that has as a constituent feature the reference to a 
presumed, but formal and indefinable meaningful whole. What is 
particularly important, though, is that we are not talking about a form of 
sense that is simply prediscursive. We are not investigating the field of pre-
reflective indeterminacy as a source for and a necessary background of 
determinate judgment. The kind of sense that we are pursuing here is of 
another kind altogether, and neither can nor should end up in conceptual 
clarity.  
4.2.4 Subjective necessity: the fourth movement  
The definition of the beautiful drawn from the fourth moment. That is beautiful 
which is cognized without a concept as the object of a necessary satisfaction. (CPJ, 
5:240, 22) 
The modality of reflective aesthetic judgment – and consequently, on my 
account, for trusting and distrusting – is one of necessity. Since it is non-
determinate it does not display apodictic necessity, so although it cannot be 
established a priori that others will actually agree with my judgment, the 
structure of the relationship between pleasure or displeasure and the 
aesthetic object makes it possible to establish a priori that they ought to 
agree. We have grounds to expect others to assent to our judgments, yet 
since we do not have a universal rule to abide by, those grounds must be 
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 When discussing the possibility of an intellectual interest in and admiration for 
natural beauty Kant returns to the idea of purposiveness without an end that we “seek 
within ourselves” and which “constitutes the ultimate end of our existence, namely the 
moral vocation”, whereby he anticipates what will be a central discussion of the 
discussion of the teleological power of judgment (CPJ, 5:301, 42). I will only concern 
myself with the part on the aesthetic judgment, and though it would be interesting to 
work out how the issues of the latter part of the third Critique bear on the questions 
pursued here, such a venture is not undertaken, as the most important points about the 
nature of how we judge trustworthiness are brought out well by the four movements of 
the first part. For that reason, the discussion of the notion of purposiveness is thus 
limited.  
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found elsewhere. For Kant, aesthetic judgments of taste are entitled to 
necessity on the grounds of the common sense or sensus communis.  
Common sense is a result of, or is made possible by, the free play of the 
faculties in reflective aesthetic judgment. When the imagination and the 
understanding coordinate freely under an indeterminable conceptuality – 
that is also a presumed purposiveness with regard to the suitability of the 
world for the mental faculties of the human being – our perspective 
becomes decentred to the degree that we are capable of transcending our 
particular perspective and experience and judge, as it were, from the 
vantage point of an imagined community. A Lévinasian interpretation 
would be that the restlessness of the mental faculties in response to beauty 
corresponds to the awareness of responsibility for someone who is 
ultimately beyond determinate thought. When Kant claims that it is in this 
very restlessness or free play that common sense opens up,
91
 he seems to 
think that the unbounded thinking that such play amounts to in its 
unboundedness reaches beyond the personal perspective, and that it is 
therefore in being responsive to aesthetics that we can transcend the mere 
privacy that such a judgment would otherwise be consigned to. 
Encountering that which extends beyond determinate thought and about 
which we can say that its “ground itself may lie in the supersensible” (CPJ, 
20:218), namely the beautiful, wrests my thinking from the confinement of 
my private cognitive powers and lets me appreciate, however 
indeterminately, this beautiful thing in a non-private and non-objective 
modality. It is an experience of evasion, of something that eludes me but 
which I can still find words to describe, even as those words lose their truth 
as soon as they are uttered and their living signification unravels. I can 
attempt to find more words to serve the purpose, and when I do so they will 
suffer the same fate. Such is the experience of the alterity of the other in 
Lévinas, and in such a way one may interpret the experience of beauty in 
Kant. The indeterminate conceptuality that grounds the purposiveness 
without purpose of aesthetic judgment provides the minimal justification 
for assuming that we share enough of a world, so to speak, for it to make 
sense to attempt to understand alterity/beauty from within my register, 
opened towards exteriority to the best of my ability. In this way, as we shall 
see a little later, it is also through common sense that we can explicate the 
correlation between judgments about trustworthiness and a shared social 
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 E.g: “Thus only under the presupposition that there is a common sense (by which, 
however, we do not mean any external sense, but rather the effect of the free play of our 
cognitive powers), only under the presupposition of such a common sense, I say, can the 
judgment of taste be made” (CPJ, 5:238, 20, italics added). 
176 Basic reflectivity: from saying to the said 
 
world and in that way to some extent to matters of knowledge and 
conceptualizable experience.  
What is common sense that it can be the power behind all that? As is the 
case with many of Kant’s terms from the third Critique this one also 
represents a development from how it was introduced in the first two 
Critiques. Kant finds it helpful to discriminate between sensus communis 
logicus, which is a form of common understanding that rests on conceptual 
cognition, and sensus communis aestheticus, which is what we are after 
here, namely a non-arbitrary reflective and non-conceptual response to a 
representation (CPJ, 5:295, 40). Seen in one way, the sensus communis is 
the name for a relationship between persons because it designates the 
shareability of a feeling which arises out of the free play of the cognitive 
powers and is as such the non-private and communicable character inherent 
in the form of that feeling. At the same time, the sensus communis is also 
the imagined view from a possible formal community, and as such it 
becomes, as it were, a view from exteriority or from a noumenal 
community. On Kant’s account, sensus communis refers not to empirical 
opinions but to an a priori given capacity to judge with a certain 
intersubjective validity. Common sense makes it possible to relate our own 
standpoint to a larger perspective, and it thereby provides us with a mode 
of orientation that allows us to criticize our own standpoint. It does, in 
other words, allow me to take into account as well as transcend the 
tradition of thought in which I am embedded; I can gain some kind of 
leverage on it (Makkreel 1994, 159). With this in mind it becomes possible 
to speak about the imagined judgment of the sensus communis and to 
perform one’s own judgment as an exemplar of that: 
Thus the common sense, of whose judgment I here offer my judgment of taste as an 
example and on account of which I ascribe exemplary validity to it, is a merely ideal 
norm, under the presupposition of which one could rightfully make a judgment that 
agrees with it and the satisfaction in an object that is expressed in it into a rule for 
everyone. (CPJ, 5:239, 22)  
Interestingly, that which sets the aesthetic judgment apart from the 
apodictically necessary universal assent that one can demand in for 
instance objectively based moral judgments is that we “cannot be certain of 
having correctly subsumed under it” (CPJ, 5:239, 22). It is the sense of 
insecurity accompanying aesthetic judgments that shows them to be 
judgments of beauty, and as such the aesthetic judger’s mind-set displays a 
certain openness through uncertainty and through the desire to judge in 
accordance with common sense coupled with the knowledge of the 
impossibility of just that; an impossibility stemming not from a lack of 
understanding of the appropriate norms, but because they, as constitutively 
indeterminate, are principally unavailable. There is doubt and self-critical 
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reflection inherent in our power of reflective aesthetic judgment; the 
modality of necessity that is a defining feature of my pleasure and 
displeasure seems to provide the awareness of a truth that is independent of 
me and of my approval or disapproval, and which I can only strive to 
approach, but never ultimately reach, through the indeterminate free play of 
my mental faculties.  
Read in this way, there is a straightforward parallel to how Lévinas 
conceives of our encounter with alterity and of how we despite the radical 
otherness of the others is responsible for acting in their best interest, 
indeterminate as our grasp of the content of that must be. Furthermore, it 
seems to be a helpful way of understanding the peculiar relationship 
between our judgments about trustworthiness and our feelings of trust and 
distrust as one that is not based on determinate knowledge about the other’s 
competencies or prior actions (although these are of course a part of the 
experience of the trust relationship), but on a ultimately non-specifiable 
sense of the other’s character in terms of consistency and decency. Earlier I 
defined trust and distrust as expressions of a judgment of the other’s moral 
competency, understood as the other’s responsivity to moral matters. I 
showed how trusting is not something we reason ourselves into or out of, 
and that even when pressed for it, we cannot make explicit our reasons for 
trusting a friend, and indeed find the very idea of such a thing to be 
somewhat beside the point. What we trust when we find someone 
trustworthy is precisely an indeterminate quality of their person which has 
to do with how they, as responsible and free persons, understand and relate 
meaningfully to the ethical significance of a situation in thought and action. 
Implicit in the pleasure that I experience in trusting is a felt conviction of 
the rightness of that feeling extending beyond my immediate contentment. 
There is a sense in which we may speak of disinterestedness here, because 
the pleasure I feel in trust (and the disgust that occasions or is part of 
distrust) can be detached entirely from the particular use I can make of the 
other’s trustworthiness (although we may be forced to presume an 
indefinite purposiveness in its form). Whether or not this trustworthiness 
will benefit me is simply not part of what defines it as trustworthiness. Its 
commendability, or the opposite, does not change in the least if I at present 
am not engaged in any dealings with the person in question. The validity of 
my judgement about trustworthiness comes in part from this its non-
relativity to the judging person, and this characteristic sets it apart from 
certain other intersubjective relations. Following Kant, I propose that we 
consider a judgment about trustworthiness universally valid not because 
everyone agrees with it, but because they ought to. Trust and distrust stand 
in a necessary relation to the (trustworthiness of the) person who elicits it, 
then, by way of being the expression of an exemplary judgment that 
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exhibits the correct relationship between the faculties and that which is 
judged.  
The four movements of the analytic of beauty each in their way contribute 
to our understanding of how we come to trust and distrust. They serve to 
bring out the conditions for and the consequences of the view of trust and 
distrust that is presented here, namely that they are expressions of a form of 
judgment that relates me in a meaningful and disclosing way to others. A 
judgment about the trustworthiness of another human being is a different 
matter than a judgment about objective facts of the world, and the 
relationships (of understanding, of responsibility, of power, etc.) that I can 
have with a person are of a qualitatively different sort than the ones I can 
have with objects. Therefore, they should be understood as requiring 
different modes of mental attention, i.e. different sort of judgments. 
Lévinas’ suggestion as to how we may approach one another in an ethical 
register is helpful because it fully endorses, and recognizes the 
consequences of, the claim that the other is always given to me ethically, 
and that this shapes how I perceive the world. A Lévinasian reading of the 
analytic of the beautiful provides tools for understanding what it is that I do 
when I trust and distrust, and how those feelings are related to the person 
that they are about. The challenge to the view that I suggest comes with the 
problems that the role of purposiveness and sensus communis presents for 
our ultimately Lévinasian account. Would Lévinas deny the need for or 
possibility of the presumption of minimally shared worlds, i.e. for even the 
most formal, indeterminate, and unfinished whole? On first glance the 
answer would appear to be a clear yes. Yet, as we shall see, when the 
discussion turns to the motivation for acting morally and the just movement 
from ethics to knowledge the idea of purposiveness and of a presumed 
shareable world insists itself and challenges the boundaries of Lévinas’ 
thought. These questions, embodied in the issues of purposiveness and 
sensus communis, will be central to the discussion that sfollows in the next 
section, where the overall theme is the relationship between aesthetics and 
ethics.  
4.3 Morality, trust, and the aesthetic judge 
Kant himself arrived at the conclusion that there is a connection between 
aesthetics and morality, if for no other reason than that good taste is a sure 
sign of a good soul and “indicates a disposition of the mind that is 
favourable to the moral feeling” (CPJ, 5:299, 42). In discussing the 
communicability of aesthetic judgments he hints at how the possibility of 
an intellectual interest in the beautiful could explain not just how the 
feeling in the judgment appears as necessary for all and hence as a duty, but 
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also how the mental faculties are linked a priori; and finally he concludes 
that “the beautiful is a symbol of the morally good” (CPJ, 5:353, 59), and 
that “taste is at bottom a faculty for the judging of the sensible rendering of 
moral ideas” (CPJ, 356, 60). He establishes the moral relevance of aesthetic 
feelings by drawing an analogy with the reflective movement inherent in 
the judgment of both the moral and the beautiful, establishing an affinity 
between aesthetics and morality in how the latter occasions a state of mind 
that resembles that of the moral person. Taste, then, depends on a 
cultivation of the moral feeling, and Kant goes to great lengths and into 
very technical intricacy to explain the justification of this dependence. 
However, this route is not the one we will follow here for establishing the 
moral quality of aesthetic judgment; instead of granting moral status to 
taste by drawing it closer to conceptually determinate judgments, we will, 
with Lévinas in mind, argue that morality is better understood exactly as 
the kind of non-determinative sensitivity that is expressed in aesthetic 
judgment, and that trusting and distrusting may be seen as such points of 
connection, where the indeterminacy of a judgment of taste provides 
morally relevant insights and makes possible moral orientation. We will 
begin with Lévinas’ claim that all experience is intrinsically responsible, 
that is, constituted as an openness to being held accountable which is 
already ethical in that it accepts responsibility before another, and hence 
that the tribunal before which our perceptions, thoughts and actions must 
present themselves is not ultimately our own preconceptions of our moral 
duty, but is the demand from exteriority, i.e., the infinite and indefinite 
ethical responsibility. With this in mind we will follow the inherent 
sociality of the aesthetic judgment and bring out how it makes possible a 
self that is characterized by openness, and is, in that openness, responsive 
towards others and towards that which cannot be made present to thought.
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In the following I shall discuss in particular the sensus communis, the 
feeling of life, and the need for purposiveness, each in turn with respect to 
how they bear on the relationship between aesthetics and morality and 
consequently on how we may understand the morality of the judgment 
about trustworthiness. Finally I turn to a discussion of negative aesthetic 
judgments. 
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 Aligning the Lévinasian and Kantian frameworks in such a way necessarily results in 
a quite Lévinasian reading of the latter which will lead us in some for Kant 
objectionable directions. Whereas I do aspire to a certain level of faithfulness towards 
Kant’s text, my reading is directed by the systematic purpose of the argument as such; 
and it is of course quite open to dispute. 
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4.3.1 Sensus communis as a faculty for and a point of orientation 
Kant is adamant that we cannot be persuaded by reasons alone in matters of 
taste, but it is nevertheless possible for our aesthetic discrimination to be 
educated by others, namely by way of the exemplary judgments of sensus 
communis. Since good taste is not fully developed at birth, the education of 
the “taste of reflection” (CPJ, 5:214, 8) is required, and this can be 
accomplished not by exposure to reasons alone, but in taking up an attitude 
of responsivity towards others. Remembering Arendt’s anecdote from 
above, we can say that there is a validity claim inherent in the judgment 
that Cicero passes because he aims at learning from how Plato judges. 
Trust and distrust, then, form part of a way of approaching the world that 
does not give precedence to the conceptual grasp of determinate thought, 
and exactly therefore lets us learn something about how to judge 
appropriately. It is a way of orienting ourselves towards exemplary 
judgments that is linked to the social structure of the judging faculty itself 
through sensus communis.  
The sensus communis is an a priori principle of aesthetic judgment by way 
of which their universal necessity is given. In the use I will make of it here 
I attempt to bring out its social significance to an extent that Kant did not 
intend, but which can still be teased out of his text. More specifically, I 
offer – supporting myself on Arendt and Makkreel – a reading that focuses 
on how the judgment of taste can be seen as dependent on intersubjective 
relationships of meaning of a not entirely a priori character. On this view, 
the sensus communis manifests the peculiar character of being both a 
faculty – namely our ability to think along with others, or to come to feel 
that our pleasure is felt in community with others – and an empirical as 
well as intelligible form of public opinion against which we measure our 
judgments (Arendt 1992, 70ff; Makkreel 1994, chap. 8). It is important 
here to keep in mind that the empirical form of sensus communis is not 
simply arbitrary, but expresses the transcendence inherent in social 
coexistence, and as such is something more than what is historically and 
culturally relative. The essence of human being is natality, and social 
coexistence makes possible the revelation of the singular person as well as 
the instantiation of the absolutely new in a manner that the person alone 
could not have effected. With Arendt we can claim that sensus communis 
makes possible a relation-to-self that transcends any self-relation I could 
have brought about without the intersection of others, thereby highlighting 
sociality’s significance for selfhood as well as the non-separateness of 
immanence and transcendence, of noumenal and phenomenal, or of 
exteriority and interiority. In other words, we do not sacrifice the 
transcendent foundation of the judgments of beauty – or of Lévinasian 
ethics – by this reading of the sensus communis as the correlation of 
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empirical and formal taste, but seek to show how the finite and the infinite 
aspects of human existence are always present alongside each other in life. 
When discussing the sensus communis below, then, it is in one of two 
senses; either in the sense of a formal or contingent public opinion, or as 
our ability to broaden our thinking in order to establish accord with this 
imagined public opinion, and it is precisely the tension between the two 
that will be of use for our account of trusting and distrusting.  
When discussing the sensus communis, Kant also simply calls it taste and 
describes it as a reflective faculty which, as it judges about a 
representation, also judges about the communicability of the feelings of 
pleasure and displeasure occasioned by it, and therefore of their validity. In 
this way, Kant makes it difficult to assess where aesthetic judgment begins 
and sensus communis ends, but it seems that it is through partaking in the 
mental ability of reflectively comparing the pleasure of a judgment to the 
possible judgments of others that aesthetic judgments can be established as 
pure (CPJ, 5:293ff, 40). As Arendt brings to our attention, Kant’s choice of 
the sense of taste as the label for the pure aesthetic judgments shows his 
deep sensitivity to how there is something “nonsubjective to what seems to 
be the most private and subjective sense” (Arendt 1992, 67), namely taste. 
Whereas matters of taste seem to have a core of incommunicability in that 
they cannot ultimately be made explicit in language or even in thought,
93
 it 
is nevertheless clear that our taste for the beautiful is in essence an 
intersubjective affair because it aims at communication: “For himself alone 
a human being abandoned on a desert island would not adorn either his hut 
or himself” (CPJ, 5:297, 41). Makkreel’s hermeneutic interpretation of 
reflective judgment highlights its reliance on exemplary models as the 
vehicles of communicability that, on his reading, are enlightened 
precedential judgments, based in sensus communis. The foremost tension in 
the exercise of good taste is then to navigate between exemplary precedents 
and unjustified prejudices while forming autonomous judgments about the 
singular. On this view, the public role of sensus communis in justifying the 
normative universality of judgments of taste goes beyond a formal appeal 
to an imagined we or they and implies that there is a constitutive role to 
play for the actual common sense of a society.  
Makkreel introduces the contingent into the justification of aesthetic 
judgments while endowing the self with the powers of orientation that 
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 “Only where the imagination in its freedom arouses the understanding, and the latter, 
without concepts, sets the imagination into regular play is the representation 
communicable, not as a thought, but as the inner feeling of a purposive state” (CPJ, 
5:296, 40). 
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allow us to discern what is exemplary and what is arbitrary in public 
opinion; and it is possible to refrain from taking this expansive step 
towards contingent actuality – condescending to arbitrariness, as it were – 
when accounting for the pivotal role that Kant assigns to sensus communis. 
If we see the appeal as being made not to an actual public opinion, but to an 
abstract or formal – perhaps noumenal – otherness which ensures that I 
cannot remain isolated and content within my own arbitrary view, we can 
hold on to the strict formality and necessity of taste. Just how freedom must 
presuppose our noumenal essence in order to make sense of the possibility 
and reality of free will and responsible selfhood, Kant could be seen to 
necessarily presume the influence of a noumenal community on my mental 
faculties in order to wrench from me the self-incurred minority of someone 
who has never needed to account for herself before others. Critical self-
reflection and the transcendence of one’s own perspective as well as that of 
one’s culture and tradition can be interpreted as requiring an appeal to a 
supersensible otherness, thereby elevating the second of the fundamental 
principles of free thinking above the others and making it their logical 
predecessor.
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 It is through “taking account (a priori)” of the public (i.e. 
non-private) judgments of human reason – attending “not so much to the 
actual as to the possible judgments of others” – that we manage to go from 
a narrow-minded to a “broad-minded way of thinking” (CPJ, 
5:293,294,295). On this view, reflective judgments of taste entail an 
opening outwards towards the noumenal comparable to how Lévinas 
describes alterity’s interruption of the ego as the starting point for the 
realization of responsibility. Both thinkers are aware that a mind alone 
cannot be tasked with sufficient self-critique and with transcending its own 
perspective; for that it needs to be responsive to the perspectives of others. 
In a similar vein, Makkreel points out how Kant assigns to reflection both 
the ability to lead up to concepts and the power of suspending prejudice, 
wherefore reflection both precedes and follows from determinate 
judgments; demonstrating once again how reflective judgments are not 
subordinate to determinate judgments, but rather frame them and make 
them sensible, because it is with reflective judgments that our mental 
faculties are made self-critical (Makkreel 2006, 244). It is worth noting that 
Kant describes the human being as “destined for society”, and that 
sociability, understood as the desire to share one’s judgments, is a 
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 Those are, as presented in the third Critique: “1. To think for oneself; 2. To think in 
the position of everyone else; 3. Always to think in accord with oneself. The first is the 
maxim of the unprejudiced way of thinking, the second of the broad-minded way, the 
third that of the consistent way” (CPJ, 5:292).  
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“property belonging to humanity” (CPJ, 5:297, 41). Kant even makes it a 
mark of distinction for the human being to have such a desire:  
[A] refined human being […]: this is how we judge someone who is inclined to 
communicate his pleasure to others and is skilled at it, and who is not content with an 
object if he cannot feel his satisfaction in it in community with others. Further, each 
expects and requires of everyone else a regard to universal communication, as if 
from an original contract dictated by humanity itself. (CPJ, 5:297, 41)  
Although empirical desires and inclinations cannot be part of the a priori 
grounds for judgments of taste, it is nevertheless significant that he assigns 
this value to our suitability for and tendency to share our views, and it 
conforms to the Lévinasian point that the self’s openness to being held 
accountable by others is part of the structure of experience as such and 
shapes the way things appear to us as well as the way our judgments appear 
to ourselves. This brings to mind our claim that basic reflectivity is always 
already animated as non-immediate reflectivity through the dialectics of 
responsivity and judgment. The opening outwards of the mind – the 
orientation towards exteriority – is partly how we judge reflectively about 
singular aesthetic experiences and is as such a constituent feature of it. It is 
logically prior to the actual judgment and hence to the confrontation with 
actual public opinion. Had the mind not thus been broadened beyond self-
sufficiency, it would not be able to engage with the actual sensus communis 
as a source of something new, because, as Lévinas shows, we would then 
be left with the replication of our own structures of experience, unable to 
encounter what we do not ourselves already possess. If we on the contrary 
assume that the opening of the mind described here is already 
accomplished when the actual judgment takes place, in which we take 
account of sensus communis in the flesh, so to speak, we can then endorse 
Makkreel’s view on the role that exemplars and precedents hold as points 
of orientation for reflective judgments:  
This is how Kant puts it: “Emulation [Nachfolge] of a precedent, rather than 
imitation [Nachahmung], is the right term for any influence that products of an 
exemplary author may have on others; and this means no more than drawing on the 
same sources from which the predecessor himself drew, and learning from him only 
how to go about doing so.” To consider a model as a precedent is not to appeal to it 
as determining ground, but merely to orient oneself by it as potentially valuable or 
worth committing to.” (Makkreel 2006, 239) 
Adopting this view has the advantage of retaining a strong sense of the 
indeterminacy and open-endedness of reflective judgments. By making 
them constitutively dependent on the non-conceptuality of the noumenal, 
their justification remains an a priori and non-contingent matter, avoiding 
both the determinate nature of conceptually based justification and the 
pseudo-conceptuality that on some accounts are provided by the appeal to 
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an actual sensus communis allotted the role of stand-in for the universal 
rule that cannot be found. There is no substantial truth to be found in the 
sensus communis; the significant fact is not so much what judgments based 
on public opinion would amount to, as that such a non-private view of 
matters and of oneself can be imagined, and indeed must be imagined. Yet 
the actual sensus communis is not bereft of reason, because it is brought 
about by beings whose nature it is to be able to perform this imaginatory 
outreach towards the noumenal, and therefore something more than the 
merely arbitrary expressions of preference can arise when subjects interact 
in the public sphere. Such a view is basic to Arendt’s claim that it is in the 
true plurality of the public sphere that we most distinctly become ourselves 
by being confronted with the irreducible difference between self and other 
grounded in the double indeterminacy of our noumenal nature: it is a 
double indeterminacy because in natality we are defined as beings that are 
not determined by our past and can therefore always act freely, and 
additionally as beings that can think and judge about indeterminate matters 
without forcing them into the determinate structures of understanding. Our 
singularity as individual selves comes about through this our ability to act 
and create the new, which makes us in a very real sense the creators of our 
own essence; it follows from this that the imagined and the actual 
contingent community are less distinct, and that it is possible for a 
community to be more or less in adherence to the noumenal sensus 
communis.  
This same insight is reflected in the Lévinasian view that what is said may 
be more or less inspired by the living nature of saying which always 
attempts to unsay the said, thereby keeping it open-ended and restless. 
Similarly, Lévinas appears to be quite in agreement with Arendt’s view of 
the self as ultimately responsible for its own self-relation when he claims 
that our essence does not precede responsibility but is responsibility (e.g. 
OB, 117); we are what we are responsible for because our nature is not 
predetermined in a manner that would relieve us of the demand to reflect 
critically upon any part of it; and to a very great extent the same goes for 
the social reality that we find ourselves thrown into. Freedom, then, is not 
about mastery or about the transparency of the present, but about the new; 
about setting the unprecedented in motion and about engaging with reality 
in a way that accepts responsibility for the future. It is not about changing 
the future, because such a formulation would imply that the future in some 
sense exists already in some form, even if only as potentiality, and that we 
can relate to it neutrally by doing nothing. Infinite responsibility means 
exactly that our actions are the fabric of reality and therefore of the future. 
Responsibility does in the end match ability because both are in principle 
indefinite: we are responsible because we are quite powerful and make all 
the difference for the people that our lives may touch.  
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We may be reminded of Améry’s demand that the past be undone; what 
happened to him is not fixed in time because its truth is partly made up by 
how the world responded to him, and as such its reality is subject to 
change. If the world is indifferent to his suffering, his torture experience is 
an expression of the final truth about human coexistence, namely that we 
are torturers to each other. If the world reacts with outrage and the 
assiduous ambition of punishing the wrongs and preventing them in the 
future, then his torture experience is an exemption to a world in which 
people are bound together by bonds of care and concern. For him, the 
difference between these two possible truths about what he underwent 
makes all the difference between a world fit for human habitation and one 
that is empty and cruel. The final alienation from the world came not in 
torture itself, but after his release, with the world’s impatience with the 
anger of the Nazi victims. Ortiz undergoes the same struggle with how 
others relate to her experience, and it emerges clearly also in her text that 
there can be no recovery if the surrounding world does not lift its part of 
the burden. It is with this frame of reference that the subjectivity’s infinite 
responsibility for the reality of past as well as future can make sense. 
Because we are not only the products of our nature and history – because 
we can act – we are responsible for the world. We may, with Lévinas, 
speak of a “way of actualizing without beginning with the possible” (NTR, 
43). The future is new, always and radically so. The exercise of selfhood is 
fundamentally this ethical assumption of infinite responsibility.  
Returning to the use that an aesthetically judging person may make of an 
actual community’s views and values, we can take the opportunity to 
consider what this means for the relationship between one person’s trusting 
and distrusting on the one hand and that person’s belonging to a 
community. In imagination we reflect on our judgments and on those of our 
peers, and we let ourselves be led by examples which may serve to 
enlighten, educate and nuance our own views. In a dialectic fashion, the 
development of trust and distrust rests on the trustworthiness of others in 
more than one sense: it is a response to the trustworthiness of the one that 
we judge about, and it relies on trustworthy judgments from my imagined 
and actual peers. Such a way of listening to others retains the 
indeterminacy of aesthetic reflection in a comparable way to how Makkreel 
describes our considerations of exemplary judgments. Jones’ notion of 
second-hand moral knowledge, which we considered earlier, could be a 
case in point. Similarly, we can think of how some experiences are only 
available to us through the mediation of others; this may be either those 
experiences of ourselves that can only come to us through being confronted 
with others’ experiences of us (as we saw, experiencing ourselves as 
responsible has this structure) or it could be an experience where someone 
else has an expertise gained through longstanding engagement with a topic, 
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say tasting wine or listening to classical music. In that case a commitment 
to follow someone else can open up registers of experience that one could 
only have obtained for oneself through years of effort, if at all. We 
apprentice ourselves, so to speak, to someone whose judgments we trust.  
To bring in Jones here is also to point towards how the relationship 
between the indeterminate judgments of basic reflectivity relate to 
determinate experience and to the knowledge that another can convey to 
me in language. Trusting and distrusting, although justified and grounded 
in non-conceptual reflection, can and does take account of conceptual 
matters and of the beliefs that arise through determinate experience, and the 
judgment about trustworthiness that relies on basic reflectivity is influenced 
by it even though it cannot be made to ground the judgment itself. The 
question of the relationship between determinate thought and basic 
reflectivity is in particular a challenge for a view that, like mine, follows 
Lévinas in insisting that the basic form of experience is not conceptually 
structured. It would take me too far to attempt to explicate the nature of the 
interrelatedness of determinate thought and basic reflectivity here, but it is 
certainly an area that merits attention, not least because it is an equally 
challenging task to explain how the reflective non-objective judgment 
about trustworthiness relates to understanding and to knowledge of the 
other. I will merely and briefly make two suggestions: (i) that objective 
thought is grounded in basic reflectivity because it is through the felt need 
to account for oneself before another that self-critical thought and the idea 
of the non-arbitrary viewpoint arise, which is a precondition for objectivity; 
and (ii) that a non-ethical experience of objects will always be an 
abstraction from how they originally appear to me as invested with the 
need another has of them and of how we may join together to utilize them 
for shared projects.  
4.3.2 Purposiveness and the ethical relation  
When Lévinas begins Totality and Infinity by asking about whether 
morality is real or only an illusion for wishful thinkers, it is almost an overt 
challenge to Kant who, with characteristic conviction, insists that reason 
finds itself compelled to assume – if it is not to be thought “the mere 
phantom of a human imagination overstepping itself” (GMM, 4:407) – that 
happiness will in the end be “distributed precisely in accordance with 
morality”, because without the “presupposition of their necessary success” 
it would have to “regard the moral laws as empty figments of the brain” 
(CPR, B839). For Lévinas, such a claim would be a concession to personal 
interest at the heart of morality, and if I cannot find morality meaningful 
without imagining an appropriate relationship between how I act and how I 
fare we have come no further than how the basest of religious leaders have 
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always tried to sway humanity, namely with promises and threats, “as if the 
moral or ethical law were impossible, without promise” (PM, 176). The 
radical disinterestedness of the ethical demand cannot accept what is in the 
end either concern for the self or something akin to obedience and in both 
cases transforms the other person’s dignity to a means for my self-interest. 
One could say that the heteronomy of Lévinas’ thought is uncompromising 
with regard to the other’s dignity and to my freedom from submission to a 
greater extent than the autonomy of Kantian thought.
95
  
Kant’s introduction of the idea of a future world where morality and 
contingent life are aligned is forced by his need to explain how we can 
imagine a connection between the intelligible world that reason tells us we 
belong to and the natural world in which we act, so that our acts can be 
seen as meaningfully contributing to the good. It is the problematic 
connection between the noumenal and the phenomenal world that gives rise 
to problems of unity and meaning, and therefore to the need to explain how 
we could be motivated by the good. For Lévinas, the question of 
motivation is a challenge, and one that he does not thoroughly address. In 
his thinking exteriority manifests itself to experience – a conceptless 
experience, as it were (TI, 101) – and the challenge is therefore not in the 
same way one of unity and connection, but still one must ask: why do we 
want to do good? His entire body of work is a systematic engagement with 
and defence of the reality of ethical life, but his extraordinary appreciation 
for freedom makes him avoid the idea of motivation, and it is indeed the 
case that if that particular question could be answered in full, morality 
would be reduced to a natural phenomenon of the sort for which necessary 
and sufficient causal factors can be given (e.g. TI, 225). Hence, such a 
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 That the problem for Kant’s implicit teleology is one of freedom and dignity is the 
main thrust of Arendt’s critique of the discrepancy between Kant’s notion of human 
dignity – that man is an end in himself – and the idea of progress, which is necessarily a 
disregard of the particular (Arendt 1992, 26). Her concern with Kant’s view here 
reflects her general thinking very well, because it is a main tenet of Arendt’s work – and 
one with which Lévinas would undoubtedly concur – that as soon as some value is 
given superhuman status, one has already conceded human reality to theodicy. If the 
value of the individual’s contingent existence is in any way altered, i.e., overruled, by 
its relation to a final purpose, the individual human life is no longer irreducibly an end 
in itself but is made relative and, consequently, sacrificeable. Arendt’s worry about the 
consequences of letting the importance of the other’s suffering derive not from itself but 
from somewhere else is echoed in Lévinas as he articulates what he finds to be the 
lesson of the rise of totalitarian ideologies in the twentieth century, namely that “For an 
ethical sensibility – confirming itself, in the inhumanity of our time, against this 
inhumanity – the justification of the neighbour’s pain is certainly the source of all 
immorality” (US, 163). 
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motivation cannot manifest itself with binding force, because that would 
compromise moral freedom; for although we are not free to evade being 
responsible, since that is a consequence of the human condition, we are free 
not to take up the task that is demanded of us. Since meaning arrives with 
the other, and only a meaningful world is one in which it can make sense to 
call a being free, my freedom is brought into existence by the other’s 
demand, but that does of course not mean that I cannot act selfishly. There 
is no force in good, and ethics is not obedience to a law. Even so, it is 
certainly the case that our experience of the call to responsibility is not on a 
par with any other experience, and that it does seem even for Lévinas to 
carry some weight with us so that it is not entirely costless to turn the other 
way (cf. OB, 77f). How can we explain this, given Lévinas’ 
uncompromising insistence on disinterestedness, i.e. the absence of all 
personal interest in the being of that which calls and to which we are 
oriented? Clearly he is not satisfied with how Kant solves the conundrum, 
namely by allowing for a moral interest that is pure and free from self-
involvement, but wants instead to establish the possibility of being invested 
with a desire that has no reference to conatus essendi, but exhausts itself in 
generosity towards another’s needs. As we saw in chapter three, he names 
this selfless desire substitution, the oneself-for-another, or inspiration. The 
cost of turning away from the ethical task is not cast in terms of 
punishment, but is instead a matter of closing off the possibilities for 
personal enrichment that is only possible if we engage with the shared 
world that ethics opens up. The self-chosen isolation of the amoral person 
fails to open the infinite potentials that can arise out of responsible 
coexistence.  
4.3.3 As if purposive for positing a shared world 
When we look at Kant’s descriptions of the feelings connected to the 
beautiful and the sublime, it is perhaps not immediately obvious why 
beauty is chosen over sublimity to be the model for trustworthiness in a 
discussion which professedly reads Kant along Lévinasian lines. In many 
ways, the language associated with the sublime comes closer to Lévinas’ 
descriptions of how we are affected by exteriority than does that of beauty. 
Sublimity is that which destabilizes the subject’s sense of appropriation in 
relation to the world and confronts us with that which is entirely formless 
and shapeless and which makes us feel insignificant in the face of powers 
of incomprehensible greatness. We are terrified and thrilled by the 
existence of such grandeur as we sense in the sublime, thus expressed in 
Arendt’s articulation of the difference between the two kinds of aesthetics:  
if the beautiful is to show how adequate our faculties are for being at home in the 
world, the Sublime with its element of outrage, repellence and displeasure lets us feel 
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a premonition of a world into which we, as we are and appear, do not fit. And yet, 
insofar as this displeasure indicates something beyond the sensible, it becomes the 
sign that we are not merely sensible beings, not only at home among appearances, 
but with a need (the metaphysical need) for some other home. (Arendt Library of 
Congress Papers, container 41, p. 032284)
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The pleasure accompanying judgments of beauty is of a playful sort that 
“brings with it a feeling of the promotion of life” (CPJ, 5:244, 23). Not so 
the sublime, which brings about an altogether more serious activity of the 
imagination which, even if what we experience is detrimental to our 
interests, evokes respect and admiration (Achtung, Bewunderung) (CPJ, 
5:245, 23): 
The beautiful in nature concerns the form of the object, which consists in limitation; 
the sublime, by contrast, is to be found in a formless object insofar as limitlessness is 
represented in it, or at its instance, and yet it is also thought as a totality: so that the 
beautiful seems to be taken as the presentation of an indeterminate concept of the 
understanding, but the sublime as that of a similar concept of reason. (CPJ, 5:244, 
23) 
Experiencing the sublime also in its own way elicits pleasure, but it is what 
Kant calls a negative pleasure because what we enjoy is in fact the 
insufficiency of our own mental faculties. Sublimity confronts us with 
incomprehensibility par excellence, and this confrontation with infinity 
pleases the human being. It is a disturbing delight though, because it points 
us to noumenal unboundedness as it “arouses the feeling of our 
supersensible vocation in us” (CPJ, 5:258, 27).  
In explicating the differences between judgments about the beautiful and 
the sublime, it is important not to forget a similarity, namely that they 
express the same basic capacity of the self: the capacity for reflective 
aesthetic judgment. Keeping the fundamental likeness in mind, I propose to 
view the difference between them as reminiscent of, but not identical with, 
the difference between ethics in the Lévinasian sense and trust as it is 
presented here. I choose beauty and its accompanying pleasure for a model 
of the relationship between trustworthiness and trust because they are 
socially embedded and communicative terms in a way that corresponds to 
how trust and distrust relate self and sociality. As such we must take care to 
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 Arendt here provides her answer to why we care about the sublime, namely that it 
evokes in us a desire to belong that springs from how our essence – natality – is not a 
product of our natural existence, but is akin to this supersensible formlessness that is 
freedom. Given her reading of the moral qualities of the aesthetic judgment, this then is 
equivalent to her answer to what motivates us to moral action (in some ways not 
unrelated to her Augustinian reflections on desire (Arendt 1998)).  
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distinguish the interpersonal relationship established in trusting and 
distrusting from the ethical relation in Lévinas. If the aim was a Kant-based 
model of Lévinasian ethics, sublimity might very well be a better starting 
point. The trusting relationship, on the other hand, is more correctly 
understood as emerging from and having its grounds in the ethical while 
not being identical with it. Ethical selfhood is fundamentally an ethical 
wakefulness that comes to pass as original passivity, and out of this purely 
passive responsivity towards moral matters comes the possibility of judging 
about trustworthiness, and consequently of feeling trust and distrust 
towards someone. In trusting, we take one step further than in ethics 
towards the world, because there is a world constituting power in the 
trusting relationship which is not a part of Lévinasian ethics proper. 
Trusting implies, then, the presumption of an at least minimally shareable 
world, or perhaps more precisely it presumes the existence of a formally 
shareable, but content-wise indeterminable world. The form of this 
presumed minimal sharedness is, I venture, the idea that the other is 
responsive to me as I am responsive to the other. If we follow the Kantian 
line, and I think it helpful to do so here, the other is presumed to be 
responsive to the formal peculiarities of the representation and therefore to 
share in “the inner feeling of a purposive state” in judging about it (CPJ, 
5:296, 40). What we are justified in presuming to be shared is not the 
content of the judgment or even the feeling of pleasure itself (although they 
would also be shared), but that the other’s mind is responsive to the form of 
the beautiful, that is, to its assumed purposiveness. In trust terms this would 
mean that trust is ultimately only meaningful if we presume that we have at 
least that much in common. It is a subjunctive mode of commonness, but it 
must be presumed for the communicability of common sense. 
Communicability is translated from the German Mitteilbarkeit, which 
connotes shareability and initiation, and that in turn makes it clear that a 
social relationship is established not just as the background for 
communicating something, but in and as the communicating act itself, 
because communication in this sense means establishing a presumed shared 
situation or perspective. When I assume that others ought to agree with my 
trust or distrust it is because I posit a formal sharedness of responsivity, 
that is, of what it means to be a self in relation to a world of others. When I 
lose my trust in the world in the radical manner described by torture 
survivors, it is a loss of the ability to posit its shareability. The inability to 
presume even the most minimal sharedness is a result of the isolation that is 
brought about in torture, where the torturer manifests the existence of 
another who exactly refuses any part in the constitution of a shared 
meaningful world, but instead deliberately destroys the ways in which the 
self relates to such meaningfully shared worlds, namely through respect 
and responsibility for others, agency and motivation, love and care, and 
 Basic reflectivity: from saying to the said 191 
 
ultimately even the mutual respect for the value of the difference between 
truth and falsity in communication. These are ways that we orient ourselves 
mentally and as such they constitute the formal structure of intelligibility of 
the world and consequently of ourselves as experiencing, thinking and 
acting beings. The loss of trust is a symptom of the loss of our basic ability 
to assume the purposiveness of that by which our mental capacities take 
their bearings and, without such orientational abilities, the coherency of the 
self is undermined. When memory is confused and experience disoriented 
there is no stability for the self.  
But what is trustworthiness? It is that which is judged and it is a non-
objective expression of the non-phenomenal character of the other. We saw 
earlier that judgments about beauty do not depend on an ideal of perfection, 
and if we follow this line here, it means that we in a similar manner do not 
possess an explicable ideal as a measure for comparison against which the 
value of a particular person’s trustworthiness can be determined. For Kant 
it is decisive that judgments of taste be non-relative: they are not a matter 
of the degree to which something lives up to its purpose and ideal. Yet, for 
trustworthiness we might to some extent speak of a relative quality. Not 
understood in the way that its value is determined in relation to what it is 
good for, nor that it is judged as a more or less successful trustworthiness in 
the way that a ladder can be a more or less successful ladder, but in the 
sense that a judgment about trustworthiness is a judgment about the other’s 
moral responsiveness and possible moral motivation for action, or in short: 
the other’s character. 
4.3.4 Negative aesthetic judgments, distrust, and the feeling of life  
In a curious parallel to the discussions of trust and distrust, where the latter 
is most often absent and otherwise given less consideration than the first, 
Kant also does not devote much time and space to the matter of the 
negative aesthetic judgment. Whereas he does in fact mention displeasure 
as a sensation fairly often throughout the third Critique, it is, unlike the 
pleasure arising from judgments of beauty, not given meticulous 
argumentative attention. It is not clear from his text whether we can 
determine with the same universality and necessity when something is not 
beautiful, or when it is disgusting. As one would expect, the interpretive 
literature on this issue in Kant displays much diversity, just as there are 
very diverse views of the role of distrust for an account of trusting.
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aesthetic judgments to be comparable to those of positive value, because 
this is what must underlie the account of distrust.  
In the first lines of the section that begins the third movement, Kant 
remarks that pleasure can be defined as “the consciousness of the causality 
of a representation with respect to the state of the subject for maintaining it 
in that state” (CPJ, 5:220, 10). Although it is not immediately clear what 
“that state” of the subject refers to, the causality of a representation is its 
form, or what Kant calls forma finalis, intending perhaps to connote causa 
formalis as well as causa finalis so as to make clear how he relates cause, 
form and purpose. What this means is that in being aware of how a 
representation by way of its form occasions in the subject a particular state 
of mind there is pleasure; and as aesthetic, the form is not the a priori 
givenness of the concept, but is the (equally a priori) responsiveness to 
purposiveness in general. Elsewhere, Kant explicitly defines the feeling of 
pleasure as the promotion of life and displeasure as the feeling of a 
hindrance (CPJ, 20:231 n24). We may take our cue from how displeasure is 
here tentatively presented as something which has to do with hindering or 
getting rid of the grounds for its own presence, that is, a feeling which in 
itself contains the grounds for the validity of its opposite (CPJ, 5:220, 10). 
Displeasure, which we assume is occasioned by the ugly or the disgusting, 
is then an awareness of a discrepancy between what is and what ought to be 
according to the purposiveness that grounds it, and for the subject, the 
disgusting presents as an obstruction to beauty. Accordingly, the 
purposiveness that grounds the aesthetic judgment is the same for the 
positive and the negative judgment, where the former expresses the 
accordance of our mental faculties with the purposiveness of the form of 
beauty and the latter the hindrance of such accordance.  
Aligning negative judgments of taste to the non-conduciveness of the given 
representation for harmonious free play is a challenge to the notion of 
disinterest because it brings the development of the judgment of taste closer 
to its potential moral significance. A connection between morality and 
aesthetics can be found in the required indeterminate purposiveness and 
can be explained if we view the realization of freedom as the missing, and 
indeed indefinable because infinite, purpose. Our feeling of pleasure entails 
a reference to or reflection on a presumed purposiveness which has to do 
with how “its determining ground may lie in the concept of that which can 
be regarded as the supersensible substratum of humanity”, as Kant explains 
in the resolution of the antinomy of taste (CPJ, 5:340, 57).
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 As we remember from chapter one, the antinomy of taste served very well as an 
analogy for a similar “antinomy of trust”.  
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perfection that aesthetic experience is presumed purposive for, but, I claim, 
the realization of freedom as the essence of human being, i.e. of moral 
human existence, and that is why it evokes feelings similar to those of 
morality and seems intrinsically bound to duty (CPJ, 5:296, 40). 
Comparatively, the disgust that the ugly evokes could have a similar 
relation to what is detrimental to the realization of human freedom. I would 
suggest that such a principle of detriment should be sought not so much in 
being alerted to something positively harmful in the representation as in 
recognizing a limiting of the possibilities for realizing freedom. What we 
glimpse when we experience aesthetic disgust would then, for instance, be 
the perversion of possibilities or the pruning and trimming of multifarious 
life to fit a particular function at the cost of other potentials. We might 
consider the parallel with Arendt here again, because in her view the 
faculty of human freedom – natality – which is the source of infinite 
possibility, is the target of totalitarian regimes in their attempt to gain 
absolute control over the populace, and it is what was at times successfully 
destroyed in the concentration camps of Nazi Germany. We may see her 
view expressed in a way that links up with my suggestions here:  
The camps are meant not only to exterminate people and degrade human beings, but 
also to serve the ghastly experiment of eliminating, under scientifically controlled 
conditions, spontaneity itself as an expression of human behaviour and of 
transforming human personality into a mere thing, into something that even animals 
are not, for Pavlov’s dog, which, as we know, was trained to eat not when it was 
hungry but when a bell rang, was a perverted animal. (Arendt 1973, 438) 
I contend, then, that aesthetic beauty appeals to us because it symbolizes, or 
evokes the sense of, the infinite potential of human freedom which is the 
moral capacity of a quintessentially self-transcending being, bound by 
neither nature nor history. Aesthetic representations could be said to 
symbolize human freedom, where symbol is taken to mean not the 
adequate images of something, but as making it possible for us to relate to 
the representations in a similar way to how we would relate to that which is 
symbolized; and so the beauty of the completely still sea at dawn is not a 
representation of human freedom, but wakes in us a similar feeling to the 
one we have in realizing human freedom in thought and action.
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 Perhaps it is because we are attempting to think more than our thinking can contain, 
and therefore long for an image that embodies this thinking to reflect upon, that the 
beauties of nature evoke such delight: they give us a sense of rightness through how 
they symbolize that which exceeds phenomenal reality; in Arendt’s words, our true 
home (Arendt Library of Congress Papers, container 41, p. 032284). 
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The feeling of pleasure that accompanies my judgments of the beautiful 
tells me that I am fit for this world. But if this is equivalent to how I judge 
that trust would be appropriate in a given situation, what is then the 
opposite? Two moments can be distinguished in Kant’s aesthetic judgment, 
both of which elicit a feeling. The first moment is the feeling about the 
representation and the second is the feeling of ‘fitness’ of my mental 
abilities. When I pass a correct aesthetic judgment it will be accompanied 
by a feeling of pleasure that is a sign of the appropriateness of my mental 
faculties for this world. However, when I pass an aesthetic judgment it 
need not be one of liking. I might, correctly, judge something to be 
distasteful. That would still show the appropriateness of my mental abilities 
and thus still be a source of pleasure. I would feel that it is correct that I 
dislike this particular phenomenon and that others really ought to agree. 
The same can be said to be the case with distrust: even as the experience of 
distrust presents itself to me as a feeling of distaste, I am still satisfied with 
the workings of my powers of judgment. The pleasure that is a sign of the 
appropriateness of my ability to judge, then, accompanies distrust as well 
as trust.  
To argue that trusting and distrusting are results of a judgment is also to 
argue that trust is not to be understood as a background feeling that 
implicitly accompanies mental and social activities and which we inhabit 
like we “inhabit an atmosphere” and notice as we “notice air, only when it 
becomes scarce or polluted” (Baier 1986, 234). A judgment is 
characterized by being an activity. Something is performed. Something is 
claimed. When a statement claims that something is the case (say: there is a 
tree) the claim also – and integral to it – is a statement of the possibility of 
claiming that this something is not the case (consequently: it is possible to 
claim that there is no tree). In a judgment resides a distance between the 
reality that is claimed and a potential other reality, and this is what makes 
any judgment critical: it takes a stance on reality. Crowell makes a similar 
point which is relevant to our concerns even though it is about knowledge 
and not judgment per se:  
Knowing it to be a cup implies that what it is has been called into question; to know 
is not just to have the objects but to be responsible for that having. Even the simplest 
knowing, then, is already transcendental (‘critical’), responsible for ‘its own 
conditions’, called upon to question, reflect and ultimately to give them. (Crowell 
2001, 35)
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 Immediately preceding these lines Crowell quotes a passage from Lévinas: 
““Critique or philosophy is the essence of knowing. But what is proper to knowing is 
not its possibility of going unto an object, a movement by which it is akin to other acts; 
(continued) 
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When brought to bear on the discussion of trust, the inseparability of any 
cognition of reality from the awareness of a potentially different reality has 
the effect of linking trust and distrust in much the same manner: trust is an 
expression of the fundamental relatedness of self and world, i.e., basic 
reflectivity. When I judge that a situation merits my trust, I am at the very 
least potentially aware that it might be otherwise. The judgment inherent in 
trusting always entails our awareness, however minimal, of the possibility 
of our trust being misplaced, and thus the pleasure of a trusting relationship 
is intertwined with vulnerability. The kind of judgment that tells me that I 
am fit for this world can result in distrust as well as trust. Belonging is not 
only a matter of trusting but exactly implies the ability to distrust 
appropriately as well, because only as a discriminating being can I orient 
myself in sociality. Paradoxically we are only at home in a world from 
which we differ by insisting, through our orientational powers of judgment, 
that it could be different. As we inhabit our world by means of reason, 
judgment, and common sense, we are also slightly out of phase, an “out of 
phase which is precisely time, the astonishing divergence of the identical 
from itself” (OB, 28). 
4.4 Trust, distrust, and lack of trust 
As chapter two demonstrates, it is often the case that survivors of torture 
articulate their situation in terms of a lack of trust, whereas the term distrust 
appears with far less frequency. I have argued that their problematic 
relationship with trust seems to be rooted in a problem of orientation. 
Améry describes for us how trust is lost with the “first blow from a 
policeman’s fist” (Amery 1998, 29); it is my contention that distrust is lost 
as well. This may at first appear nonsensical, since apparently it is its 
overwhelming presence that is the very essence of the problem, but the 
inability to trust and the overwhelming presence of distrust that affect 
torture survivors are symptoms of the same thing: an alteration in how the 
person judges about the trustworthiness of the world as such, brought about 
by the violation of the fundamental responsivity of selfhood. Basic 
reflectivity depends on an intersubjective connectedness – also described 
here as sensus communis and a presumed shareability of the world – 
without which the judgments about trustworthiness that it would make 
 
                                                                                                                           
its prerogative consists in being able to put itself into question, in penetrating beneath its 
own condition” (TI 85)” (Crowell 1999, 35). The passage is part of Lévinas’ argument 
that even the ability to have knowledge of objects relies ultimately on being held 
accountable by the other.  
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possible cannot present with a sense of conviction. As we have seen, if a 
person cannot connect to others through shareable judgments about the 
world, isolation ensues and threatens to destabilize the sense of self and of 
reality. Lack of the ability to trust testifies to a lack of the ability to make 
the kind of assertion implicit in trusting, and it is my claim that the ability 
to distrust is similarly jeopardized when a person is subjected to traumatic 
violence at the hands of fellow human beings. When left without trust – 
because unable to make the assertion implicit in trusting – the person is 
similarly unable to judge about what is untrustworthy with such a sense of 
rightness and validity as would accompany a judgment that was made on 
the basis of sensus communis. Both trusting and distrusting are expressions 
of basic reflectivity, i.e. of the basic kind of orientational judgment that is 
indispensable to the exercise of selfhood, and the loss of trust should more 
precisely be spoken of as a loss of orientation or of the conditions of 
possibility for passing a judgment about trustworthiness, or quite simply as 
a loss of intersubjectivity. This judging ability, namely basic reflectivity, is 
grounded in a connection between selfhood and sociality, here presented 
along the lines of the aesthetic judgment’s reliance on the ability to imagine 
the formal possible judgment of sensus communis. As I argued above, 
sensus communis provides us with what we in Lévinasian language can call 
an inspiration from alterity and in Kantian a sense of the supersensible. 
Following Lévinas, the confrontation with that which is beyond experience 
takes place in the ethical encounter with a particular other, and it is the 
otherness of the other as such that constitutes this exteriority that refuses 
determinate thought. If the intersubjective relationship is barred because of 
torture, hence making the imagination of sensus communis unfeasible, it is 
no wonder that one cannot come to feel convinced about the correctness of 
one’s judgments about trustworthiness, and neither is it surprising that it is 
the reestablishment of a meaningful because shareable world that is the 
primary work of rehabilitation.
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 The social aspect of the recovery of the 
self is brought out in the role that sensus communis has for our judgment, 
and the disturbance of the ability to judge is perhaps best conceived of as a 
disturbance of intersubjectivity.  
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 In the existing literature on rehabilitation programmes it is consistently a theme that 
a central challenge for those working with the mental health consequences of torture is 
to effect the reestablishment of stable and shareable frameworks of meaning. A good 
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Torture and its consequences, edited by Basoglu (1992). Other sources could be Janoff-
Bulman, (2002), Montgomery and Montgomery et al. (2004; 1992), Herman (1997; 
2005), Ardal (2010), Wisnewski (2010) and Gerrity, Keane and Tuma (2001).  
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4.4.1 The loss of common sense: isolation, judgment, and belonging 
The torture situation’s destructive potential comes from how it establishes 
the complete superfluousness of the tortured through a perverted version of 
intersubjectivity: all the attention of the torturer is centred on the tortured, 
yet in this setting the tortured matter not at all because of their 
powerlessness. To be superfluous is to be disconnected from a common 
world where one has significance for one’s fellow human beings, and in 
this sense it is no longer to belong to a shared world at all. In light of this it 
becomes understandable that Arendt’s reading should emphasize the 
relationship between aesthetic judgment and common sense: what she has 
found, and tries to bring to light in Kant’s thought, is the necessity of 
sociality for judgments of this sort.  
In her The Origins of Totalitarianism Arendt argues that the ambition of 
total domination underlying a totalitarian regime is realized the full in the 
concentration camp. Her analysis centres on how human freedom and 
spontaneity are sought to be eliminated, and how one very effective 
measure for doing so is to create a system where individuals are isolated 
from one another in the silence and terror of total control and in the 
degradation, hunger and grief of the camps. Her analyses bear a peculiar 
relevance to the torture situation, perhaps because of the perverted 
scientific curiosity behind both abominations. In both cases, an obsessive 
desire for control and full transparency leads logically to an endless drive 
towards total domination and the elimination of freedom and the human 
person. One can imagine that had Arendt written about torture, it would 
have yielded similar insights into its underlying logic: 
Total domination, which strives to organize the infinite plurality and differentiation 
of human beings as if all of humanity were just one individual, is possible only if 
each and every person can be reduced to a never-changing identity of reactions, so 
that each of these bundles of reactions can be exchanged at random for any other. 
[…] The camps are meant not only to exterminate people and degrade human beings, 
but also serve the ghastly experiment of eliminating, under scientifically controlled 
conditions, spontaneity itself. (Arendt 1973, 438) 
Spontaneity, which in Arendt’s terminology means the ability to institute 
the new and thereby to transcend reality, falls victim to an existence in 
which human relationships and human agency are made impossible. As a 
result the ability to uphold a sense of oneself as a person is undermined. 
The link between the destruction of the person, the feeling of isolation, and 
the loss of a sense of reality that we find in torture survivors is also noted 
here: 
This isolation explains the peculiar unreality and lack of credibility that characterize 
all reports from the concentration camps and constitute one of the main difficulties 
for the true understanding of totalitarian domination. […] anyone speaking or writing 
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about concentration camps is still regarded as suspect; and if the speaker has 
resolutely returned to the living, he himself is often assailed by doubts with regard to 
his own truthfulness, as though he had mistaken a nightmare for reality. (Arendt 
1973, 438,439) 
This “doubt of people concerning themselves and the reality of their own 
experience” (Arendt 1973, 439) is also reported by Ortiz, and almost as a 
wish. When she, after long and frustrated attempts, finally uncovers 
evidence of the involvement of the U.S. Government with the Guatemalan 
agencies behind her torture experience, her feelings are a mixture of 
triumph and deep sickening despair: 
The “real” world was gone, the world where ideas about the CIA and its links to 
Guatemala were poor judgment, paranoia. I longed for that world suddenly, the 
safety of it, even if in that world I was wrong. But that world was the fiction. In the 
Politécnica I had seen the reality. (Ortiz 2004, 295) 
To trust her own judgment in this case is to believe in a world where she 
can no longer feel safe; it would almost be preferable to believe in the 
doubt that others express, and that she almost shares, with regard to her 
experience. What is to be preferred: to suffer paranoid delusions or to live 
in a world that is too horrible to face? A psychiatric illness may at least be 
treated and even sometimes cured, and the fantasy of such a solution flits in 
and out of her text as a deep, partly unacknowledged wish, too painful to 
nurture openly, for a miraculous way out. This small doubt about what is 
real and what is imagined again demonstrates the fragile sense of reality 
that survivors often experience. To trust even one’s own senses and 
memory one needs to share, at least very minimally, ones world with others 
– a sharedness that comes about through the responsivity towards sensus 
communis – and in the absence of this one is left isolated and disoriented.  
4.4.2 Trust, freedom, and resistance 
According to Kant, aesthetic judgments of the sublime show us that we are 
indeed more than creatures of nature, because as we are confronted with 
something altogether overpowering, such as a raging storm at sea, we are 
perfectly aware of its power to destroy us and of our own complete 
inability to resist, but at the very same time we know that there is a way in 
which this phenomenon of nature has no power over us and something in 
our being that it cannot destroy because it is strength of another kind (CPJ, 
5:261, 28). We have seen why the experience of trusting is modelled on the 
experience of beauty and not of sublimity, but in this particular respect, 
Kant’s description of sublimity has something crucial to offer. When we 
say that trusting and distrusting relate to others as persons and that they are 
inherently interpersonal, unlike, e.g. reliance and belief, it means that in 
trusting and distrusting we relate to what Lévinas calls the other as an 
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other, i.e. to that in respect of which the other transcends what can be 
known, and for Kant we may correspondingly speak of the noumenal, i.e. 
free, person, unsubjected to nature’s causal predictability. That the human 
being is ultimately free regardless of how we are otherwise determined by 
nature and causality, by our personal histories and the culture we belong to, 
is central to the thinking of Kant, Arendt and Lévinas alike, and it seems to 
reflect how torture survivors experience their situation. One example of this 
is when Améry recounts a situation where a sense of resisting brings him a 
feeling of being himself again, not unlike how Kant describes the 
importance of the sense of resistance in the presence of overwhelming 
physical power for our appreciation of how we are more than creatures of 
nature: 
And still, I tried to initiate proceedings to regain my dignity, and beyond physical 
survival that provided me with just the slightest chance to survive the nightmare 
morally also. […] Before me I see the prisoner foreman Juszek, a Polish professional 
criminal of horrifying vigor. In Auschwitz, he once hit me in the face because of a 
trifle; that is how he was used to dealing with all the Jews under his command. At 
this moment – I felt it with piercing clarity – it was up to me to go a step further in 
my prolonged appeals case against society. In open revolt I struck Juszek in the face 
in turn. My human dignity lay in this punch to his jaw – and that it was in the end I, 
the physically much weaker man, who succumbed and was woefully thrashed, meant 
nothing to me. Painfully beaten, I was satisfied with myself. […] I became a person 
not by subjectively appealing to my abstract humanity but by discovering myself 
within the given social reality as a rebelling Jew and by realizing myself as one. 
(Amery 1998, 90–91) 
Several things are important in this quote. First, it clearly brings out the 
distinction between physical and moral personality and shows that 
damaging one is not the same as damaging the other; and secondly, it 
shows that our moral persons are not detached from the materiality of our 
lives or from social reality. Améry’s need for physical resistance comes 
from the realization that resistance must be expressed, because to hold on 
in private to the thought that one cannot be reduced to non-resisting matter 
is not enough. Personal dignity needs a social sphere to appear in before it 
will feel sufficiently real. Améry brings forth the important insight that the 
moral person exists in action and only subsists through being exercised, 
and that without such exercise our sense of self seems to disintegrate; an 
insight that is mirrored in how resistance surfaces again and again in 
autobiographical accounts of torture. We have already seen how the 
concern with what one did and did not do is coupled with problems of 
agency, and perhaps the most prevalent theme in Ortiz’s account is her 
doubt about whether there is anything of herself left, or if she is now only 
what the torturers made her, expressed in such thoughts as “Sometimes I 
wonder … if I fought hard enough” (Ortiz 2004, 71); and “Am I like them 
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– am I like the torturers?” The questions make her feel spectral and 
insubstantial and make the world appear equally so. The way back to a 
sense of reality and solidity is a slow work of restoration; an important 
factor of which is to attain once again that sense of “a capacity for 
resistance of quite another kind” that Kant describes, and which testifies to 
the self-transcendence inherent in selfhood.  
4.5 In summation 
The purpose of this chapter has been to present in detail what I call basic 
reflectivity and to argue that it is through our experience of the other in 
basic reflectivity that we come to trust or distrust a person. It is a central 
claim of this work that trust and distrust are not mere sentiments of 
personal preference, such as a feeling of pleasure in relation to the taste of 
coffee is, but come with a claim to validity because they are about the other 
in a way that my pleasure in coffee is not about the nature of coffee but 
merely about me and my inclinations. In the preceding pages I have 
attempted to argue for the possibility of judging about trustworthiness in a 
way that produces an understanding of the other that is irreducible to 
subjective feeling as well as to a confused and preliminary form of 
objective knowledge. Lévinas provides a phenomenology of the experience 
of the other and argues that the encounter with alterity which it describes is 
constitutive for experience as such and therefore indispensable for 
selfhood. His thinking provides the starting point for our investigations and 
the foundation for the use that this chapter makes of Kant’s aesthetic 
judgment.  
Kant finds it necessary to address four concerns in order to explain the 
anatomy of aesthetic judgment, and I have endeavoured to show how those 
same four features can serve to make explicit the nature of how we judge 
about trustworthiness. Following Kant, we may say that trust and distrust 
express a valid judgment about the other’s trustworthiness when that 
judgment is disinterested, non-conceptual, non-objective (i.e. without 
determinable end), and elicits a necessary and universal satisfaction. In 
other words, if we experience that about which we judge – the other’s 
character – without grounding the experience in concepts or objective 
properties and without being led by self-interest or imposing on the other 
the role of alter ego, then we can come to what we with Lévinas can call an 
ethical and with Kant an aesthetic understanding of the other which will 
occasion trust or distrust. In yet other words, this amounts to the claim that 
we have a well formed trust or distrust if the feeling retains its clarity and 
power for pleasing even when: (i) the appreciation of someone as 
trustworthy or the opposite is independent of whether or not that part of 
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their character has any significance for my well-being at present; (ii) the 
feeling of trust or distrust manifests a validity that goes beyond my 
personal situation and as such demands the consent of others, were they in 
my position and could perform just this singular judgment; (iii) the 
appropriateness of the feeling of trust or distrust cannot be measured by 
comparing someone’s trustworthiness to an ideal of perfection, because no 
such determinable concept can be imagined for trustworthiness, given that 
it is essentially about alterity; (iv) trust and distrust are felt to have a 
subjective, but universal necessity that proclaims their non-teleological 
purposiveness, i.e., connects self and other within a formally and 
subjunctively shared world.  
The most central feature for the validity of aesthetic judgment, and in our 
case for the feeling of trust or distrust, is the connection between the 
judgment and sensus communis. Kant states that it arises as a consequence 
of the free play of the imagination in which our powers of representation 
are engaged in indeterminate and indeterminable reflection engendered by 
the beautiful (CPJ, 5:238, 20), and it is my argument that this 
connectedness that we need to have to a presumed shared common sense is 
best understood as rooted in the passive responsivity that is at the core of 
Lévinasian selfhood. Our fundamental and constitutive openness to the 
other is the basis for how we experience the world as meaningful, because 
the understanding of the other’s needs is always a part of how I experience, 
whatever the content of the experience may be. When selfhood is 
awakened by the call of the other, it is not to a neutral world of objects, but 
to a world that is already cast in the mode of being another’s, and this 
irrevocable experience of myself as responsible before the other becomes 
part of the form of experience as such. Our constitutive openness to the 
other is a precondition for how we can imagine the possible judgments of 
sensus communis.  
My analogy between judgments of beauty and judgments of trustworthiness 
presents pleasure and displeasure as analogous to trust and distrust in that 
they are expressions of the judgment and manifest its validity to the 
judging person. From this it follows that although distrust can be 
understood as a negative feeling in that it testifies to the fact that something 
is not as it should be, this does not mean that distrust is a destructive 
feeling for the self. On the contrary, the ability to distrust is as important 
for selfhood as is the ability to trust: both form part of the orientational 
work of basic reflectivity. It is necessary, then, to distinguish between 
distrust as testifying to a problematic social situation and distrust as 
problematic for selfhood. I have argued that although trust and distrust are 
not entirely symmetrical, they are always potentially manifest under the 
same circumstances: if one is possible, so is the other. This is a conceptual 
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point, and although it may at first seem that it cannot hold for matters of 
genesis, that is, for the development of trust and distrust in young children, 
I will hold on to the radical version of my point and insist, as I did in 
chapter one, that it is not correct to speak of trust in a situation where a 
person has not even the most minimal and implicit idea of vulnerability. 
The asymmetry between trust and distrust comes not from temporal 
priority, but from how trust opens up the infinite potential of an 
intersubjective future, whereas distrust does not. It is a quite commonplace 
observation that social groups (e.g. societies, institutions, or work teams) 
that are permeated by trust work better and more fruitfully than their 
distrustful counterparts, and the same can be said for the individual person: 
a trustful existence affords potentialities because the openness and 
responsivity that such trust depends on make possible what Arendt calls a 
common world, which is constituted by a plurality of perspectives, and as a 
web of human relationships of meaning, it both stands between people and 
unites them. The common world is where natality is realized through the 
interaction of singular persons, and in this realization of the infinite 
freedom of the human person – comparable to the noumenal self in Kant 
and to each person’s alterity in Lévinas – a new world of possibilities is 
unlocked for the individual. Trust and distrust are asymmetrical because 
trusting relationships enable the realization of what it means to be human – 
the flourishing of human freedom, so to speak – to an extent that distrust 
does not. That being said, the possibility for distrust is still essential to the 
moral person, and the judgment about (lack of) trustworthiness that 
underlies distrust is still intrinsically an openness to exteriority or sensus 
communis.  
In addition to containing arguments about trust and distrust, the chapter has 
also provided the arena for a discussion of and between Lévinas and Kant. 
My explication of how a Lévinasian reading of Kant is advantageous for 
our overall purpose also lets me bring out a particular side of Kant’s text in 
full and, in emphasizing and promoting this side, force his analyses to 
conclusions that he did not envisage, but which are not entirely foreign to 
or incommensurable with his professed views. In the growing body of work 
on the Critique of the Power of Judgment I have found most helpful the 
contributions of Makkreel and Pillow because both of these explicitly seek 
to link the judgment of taste to how we orient ourselves normatively in the 
world. They both depart from Kant’s own stated ambition most 
significantly when it comes to the strict a priori universality of aesthetic 
judgment and soften the demarcation between what is contingent and what 
is not in their attempts to situate the power of reflective judgment in 
historically bound contexts of interpretation. This is not my way. Lévinas is 
often met with the same criticism as that which these two scholars make of 
Kant here, namely that he is too formal and averse to making his ethics 
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depend in any way on actual empirical facts. In this I am siding with Kant 
and Lévinas to a significant degree, and when I insist, with Lévinas in 
mind, that we judge about actual human persons when we judge 
aesthetically about trustworthiness it is not to say that we judge about 
empirical properties of some person, but that in the singularity of the 
singular other we are faced with the most formal and universal of all, 
namely the absolutely different and irreducibly foreign nature of the other 
human being. My critique of Kant in this regard is not that he fails to take 
account of the (hermeneutic, immanent) situation of the untraversable 
historically situated contingency of human affairs, but that he sees the 
contingent as merely arbitrary and immanent. With Lévinas we see that 
there is always transcendence in immanence, always the noumenal in the 
phenomenal, and that it is in the tension of an always both infinite and 
finite human existence that we can come to understand experience, be it of 
trustworthiness, beauty, or a tree. The confrontation between Kant and 
Lévinas has also served to press certain points in Lévinas, and it seems to 
me that he must indeed consent to the necessity of presuming a world that 
is at least minimally shareable between self and other if we are to move 
from the sheer passivity of the first awakening and unto actual responsivity. 
Selfhood begins in anarchic passivity and is realized in turning towards a 
world which is made meaningful by how the other invests me with 
responsibility, and I can only perform this movement – I can only take up 
my responsibility – if I can presume that I share enough of a world with the 
other, as it were, to let me find meaning in it without this being only an 
imposition of myself and a violation of the other. Lévinas’ adamant refusal 
of the necessity of such presumed sharedness comes from how his ethics 
must avoid being based in common nature or in other ways that make it 
simply a projected care for the self; ethics is for him the possibility of being 
affected by the needs of someone who is absolutely other to me and with 
whom I do not share a common genus. But the move from the saying to the 
said, from ethics to knowledge, or from passivity to activity (that is, surely, 
still grounded in passivity) may in fact be better understood if we, as I have 
attempted here, explain it in terms of purposiveness without a purpose. 
With this discussion of Kant and Lévinas I hope to have shown how the 
self is related to the other in basic reflectivity.  
 
5 Conclusion  
5.1 Recapitulation 
I began my investigations with the intuition that trust and distrust in their 
own way provide insights into social existence; that they are in fact a form 
of understanding. It seemed to me that trust and distrust functions quite 
effectively in daily life as features of our social orientation and that they are 
informative when it comes to judging the quality of a person’s 
trustworthiness. My initial intuition found some support in 
autobiographical accounts from survivors of torture and other similar 
traumata, where phrases containing the words trust and lack of trust are 
consistently used to explain what life is like afterwards. As I read through 
these accounts it was clear to me that a sense of trust in the world is of 
supreme importance for human existence and for the sense of self, and at 
the same time it was not yet clear to me of what something like trust in the 
world actually consisted: it seemed to mean or depend on a feeling of 
belonging to a meaningful world shared with others, and its lack was felt 
like a sense of alienation, disorientation, and self-estrangement. Trust in the 
world, in other words, is more important for the self than, for instance, its 
ability to rely on others for particular purposes, which signifies that it 
constitutes a basic connectedness to others that enables shared meaning and 
orientation and without which disorientation and fragmentation of meaning 
follow.  
In the philosophy of trust, usually only one of these two characteristics of 
trust (as a mode of understanding and as basic for the self) is emphasized 
on any one account. In chapter one, I defined two groupings for the existing 
positions according to this pattern, i.e. basic trust and strategic trust. 
Positions belonging to the former group concentrate on the affective 
dimension and generally discuss trust as a non-cognitive and, in fact, 
uncognizable attunement or disposition, sometimes calling it a climate or 
an atmosphere. Those belonging to the latter group tend to concentrate on 
the discriminating nature of trust with particular attention to how it may 
help us decide on the best course of action in situations of great complexity 
where we lack significant pieces of information. Trust and distrust are in 
this case defined as epistemic stances adopted on the basis of higher-order 
cognition. Both positions provide valuable analyses of certain individual 
aspects of trust, but none of them can sufficiently explain the phenomenon 
of intersubjective trust, which must, I claim, be understood both as 
fundamental to the self and as a modality of understanding. I suggest that 
we pursue a definition of trust as both basic and reflective: it is basic 
because it reveals a fundamental connectedness to others that is 
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indispensable for our ability to experience the world as meaningful; and it 
is reflective because it is a form of understanding that, although dissimilar 
to conceptual cognition, delivers valid insights into who the other is. My 
aim, accordingly, has been to explain the nature of the self’s basic 
reflectivity, i.e. of a fundamental connectedness between self and other in 
which the one who trusts comes to understand something about the other’s 
trustworthiness. Lévinas’ analysis of the ethical relationship as proximity, 
responsibility, signification, and obligation illuminate the intersubjectivity 
that unfolds in trust and distrust. For Lévinas, the self-standing, 
autonomous self does not precede experience, but is constituted as 
experiencing; and the first experience is that of being called on to respond. 
One of his main aims is to demonstrate that experience is always already 
ethically imbued, because the confrontation with exteriority, which bestows 
infinite responsibility, has priority in relation to objective experience. 
Lévinas’ description of the situation in which the self comes to experience 
the other as an other corresponds with the definition of trust and distrust as 
intrinsically personal. Consequently, the analysis of trust and distrust is 
placed within the framework of ethics.  
One of the central theses presented in this dissertation is that trust and 
distrust have an ethical dimension because they are related to how we 
orient ourselves morally in the world. But is there something particularly 
moral about trusting? Am I obliged to trust or to respond in a relevant 
manner to being trusted? Yes and no. First of all, to trust is not per se more 
moral than to distrust, and both are part of how we as morally responsible 
beings can evaluate ourselves and others. Trusting and distrusting are not 
preconditions for ethical selfhood (although they are conditions for ethical 
coexistence on a sociological level), but become ethical because they are 
expressions of the fact that selfhood is always already inscribed in an 
ethical world. Trust is not intrinsically ethical; instead, it is the ability to 
trust and the obligation to discern between trustworthiness and 
untrustworthiness that is properly called ethical. Likewise, trusting and 
distrusting are responsible ways of relating to the other, but they are not 
identical to responsibility. Responsibility, defined as the self’s responsivity 
to an other, is what makes trusting and distrusting possible. It is when the 
self assumes its responsibility and the purely passive initiation of selfhood 
(in an anarchical, immemorial past that was never present) is transformed 
to worldly activity (i.e. when the beginnings of justice emerge from ethics) 
that we can come to understand otherwise, and this is basic reflectivity. 
Emerging out of a passivity more passive than receptivity, which is the 
anarchic moment of becoming responsible and therefore of the constitution 
of what Lévinas conceives of as the human self, the passively grounded 
activity of basic reflectivity presents the world to me in a way that remains 
irreducible to ontological comprehension.  
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A main concern of this dissertation is the attempt to elaborate on the nature 
of the non-ontological, ethical form of understanding that arises in 
proximity and becomes a judgment of trustworthiness, and for this purpose, 
Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment was introduced to supplement 
and substantiate Lévinas’ ethics. By arguing for the applicability of the four 
movements of the analytic of beauty to the judgment of trustworthiness I 
sought to show how trust and distrust contain an insight into the moral 
quality of a situation, i.e. into the other’s character. In trusting and 
distrusting we come to know something about the other, albeit in an ethical 
and hence non-objective manner, and this knowledge or insight or 
understanding is, I argue, universally valid. This implies that what one 
person finds trustworthy, others should in principle also find trustworthy 
(although one may of course be mistaken just like one may be mistaken in 
judging matters of fact). Trustworthiness and untrustworthiness are not 
relative qualities of a person’s character, but are as true as any objective 
fact about a person. The latter may, I take it, seem counterintuitive at first: 
do I really mean to claim that my judgments about someone’s 
trustworthiness demand agreement from all, and that a relationship where I 
trust a particular person implies that this person is trustworthy for all others 
too? The answer is positive, which follows from the intrinsic personal 
nature of trust, i.e. trust is always one person’s trust of another particular 
person, and that if it is the case that trust is indeed about the other and not 
just about my past or about an anonymous climate, then we must find a 
way to establish a necessary relationship between my feeling of trust and 
the other’s trustworthiness. By the same token it is clear that 
trustworthiness is not something like a property of the other that can be the 
basis of objective knowledge, such as eye colour or height. I suggested that 
we understand trustworthiness as an expression of what makes the other 
into this unique person and no other, i.e. of a person’s moral responsivity, 
which, as we saw in chapter three, is what singularizes the self. In other 
words, if my friend promises to do something for me and I trust her, it does 
not imply that others can straightaway trust her to be committed to that 
same effort with regard to their situation, but it does mean that they can, 
similarly to me, trust in promises made to them. I have given the example 
of a politician who could be considered trustworthy even by those who 
disagree with the espoused political programme, and the intelligibility of 
this example describes an excellent litmus test of a person’s moral 
character. When we look at it this way, the claim to universality that at first 
seemed counterintuitive now appears to capture just what is essential about 
trustworthiness, namely that it describes something about a person’s moral 
character that is not relative to personal interest.  
I have argued that trust and distrust are part of our social orientation 
because they are expressions of a fundamentally ethical mode of 
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experience in which we understand something about the other in a way that 
affirms our absolute separation and irreducible singularity while at the 
same time binding us together in the responsibility that one person has for 
the other and for the shared world. The examination of the different 
features of the experience of trust or distrust also reveals crucial aspects 
concerning the nature of selfhood and human existence, and it draws 
particular attention to the significance of intersubjectivity. The 
investigation of trust accordingly served as a method for clarifying what it 
means that selfhood is essentially a matter of being responsible – to 
oneself, the other, and the world. Similarly, the investigation of selfhood 
provided a framework for the discussion of the phenomenon of trust. The 
duality of the title of the thesis expresses the duality of the investigation, 
which seeks to explain the manner in which the self is related to the other 
in trust and distrust.  
5.2 Conclusions 
The topic under investigation is the interpersonal relationship that is in 
place in trust and distrust, and the first conclusion is accordingly: (I) Trust 
and distrust are inherently personal. They describe a relation where one 
person trusts or distrusts another, and where the feelings are derived from 
the irreducible singularity of the concrete situation and the persons 
comprising it. Trust or distrust pertains to the other’s trustworthiness and 
therefore to the other’s indeterminable alterity. Hence it is personal in a 
more definite sense than if it were about objective properties such as the 
other’s height or proficiency in math, which can only serve to categorize 
someone under a general concept but cannot illuminate personal 
singularity. Trust and distrust are personal because they are about the other, 
but they are also personal because they to some extent stem from the self. 
That selfhood is conceived as passivity does not imply that it must resign, 
irresponsibly, before supra- or subpersonal forces. Likewise, trust and 
distrust are not simply the effect of external forces working in or on the self 
but are rather expressions of a reflective, discriminating self always already 
responsibly engaged in its world.  
The personal nature of trust and distrust was found to be twofold because it 
pertains both to their origin in basic reflectivity and to the fact that they 
concern the otherness of the other. This leads to the second conclusion: (II) 
Trust and distrust are intrinsically ethical, because they are rooted in 
proximity, i.e. in the original ethical encounter with radical alterity in 
which selfhood is constituted as responsibility. The ethical nature of trust is 
not derived from any increase in happiness that may result from it since it 
is not conditioned by empirical contingency. The unconditional ethicality 
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of trust does not, however, entail that it is always better to trust than to 
distrust from an ethical perspective. Trust and distrust alike express the 
fundamentally ethical nature of intersubjectivity; i.e. they are part of how 
we come to understand and respond to a social situation in an ethically 
appropriate way. Basic reflectivity gives rise to a feeling of trust or distrust 
on the grounds of a judgment of the other’s trustworthiness, and since basic 
reflectivity resonates with the original ethical demand that constitutes the 
self as wakefulness and responsivity, the trace of exteriority lingers in the 
judgment of trustworthiness. Responsibility and obligation structure the 
experience of the other on which trusting and distrusting depend, implying 
that the world is first and foremost meaningful to me in an ethical register.  
It is because intersubjectivity is always an ethical relationship, and because 
experience is made meaningful to me by its rootedness in the ethical 
relationship, that the kind of understanding I can have in trusting and 
distrusting is possible; which leads us to the third conclusion: (III) Trust 
and distrust express the movement from the saying to the said. The specific 
nature of the intersubjective relationship that we have in trust and distrust is 
a result of the fact that it originates in ethical proximity. The encounter 
with the other’s face exposes the self to a transcendent and unconditional 
demand, and the original responsivity of the encounter is a pure passivity 
that must be transformed into responsible activity and responsible action if 
the self is to assume the responsibility that is always already imposed on it. 
As the self undertakes to turn ethical commitment into responsible thought 
and action, it engages in what I have proposed to term basic reflectivity and 
sometimes described as understanding otherwise. Basic reflectivity is an 
ethical mode of experience that is still grounded in original passivity, i.e. in 
exteriority’s call, and because it is constituted as a restless attempt to think 
the unthinkable, it remains sensitive to it and thereby becomes the medium 
for an understanding of it, to the extent possible. The understanding thus 
produced is a constantly restive sense of a truth that is beyond 
conceptuality and ultimately beyond language, but which can be reified in 
language inadequately and briefly before unsaying itself and leaving behind 
only its trace. This truth, as it were, is in our context the nature of the 
other’s trustworthiness.  
The fourth conclusion thus proceeds: (IV) Trust and distrust are inherently 
reflective and express a judgment. When we experience trust or distrust, 
these feelings signal that we have come to hold a certain view with regard 
to the other’s trustworthiness, and it has been my aim to explain how this 
judgment comes about as well as what its grounds are. I have therefore 
focussed on the feelings of trust and distrust and their relationship to the 
judgment a person makes, which has led to an investigation of the nature of 
selfhood and of intersubjectivity. The experience that we may have of the 
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other’s character (by means of basic reflectivity) confronts the experiencing 
self with the limits of thought as well as the infinitude of that which 
overwhelms it. The incomprehensibility of the other points beyond a failure 
of comprehension in the concrete situation to the existential asymmetry 
between the interiority of selfhood and the exteriority of the other; and 
thereby the failure to represent exteriority in thought is accompanied by an 
experience of the infinitude underlying human existence. Although Lévinas 
provides a systematic and rigorous analysis of the experience of alterity and 
of selfhood-as-responsibility and, in particular in Otherwise than being, 
extends the scope to include the movement from ethics to justice (and just, 
or ethical, knowledge), there is still a need to develop this latter theme 
more carefully. I introduced Kant’s analytic of the judgment of beauty to 
supplement Lévinas in this respect, and the discussion between the power 
of aesthetic judgment and ethical proximity has proved fruitful for the 
thesis topic as well as for a discussion of Lévinas’ philosophy. On this note, 
let us turn to the fifth conclusion:  
(V) Trust and distrust are subjectively valid feelings that impart non-
objective and universal insights into the other’s character to the self and 
point to the presumed shareability of the world. The phenomenology of 
trust reveals that the judgment of trustworthiness is grounded in the ethical 
response to exteriority and yields an understanding of what is essentially 
indeterminate, non-conceptual, and inaccessible to thought. In doing so, it 
reveals to us something about the way the mind works when confronted 
with that which exceeds it, thereby pointing beyond finite 
comprehensibility towards the indeterminable whole of human existence. I 
have used the Kantian expression aesthetic representation for the purpose 
of drawing an analogy with the judgements of beauty by which I sought to 
explain the relationship between the feelings of trust and distrust, the 
judgment of trustworthiness (i.e. basic reflectivity), and the indeterminacy 
of the other’s character. Sensus communis is Kant’s answer to the question 
of the possibility of universally valid subjective judgments. He explains 
that sensus communis is a way for the mind to reflect open-endedly and a 
priori on the possible judgments of a universal perspective. The asymmetry 
between the subjective judgment and the presumed universally valid 
judgment is of a kind that allows subjectivity to learn from the non-
arbitrary and non-objective truth of the universal judgment without 
subordinating itself in irresponsible obedience or, as it were, in self-
incurred immaturity. It is, in other words, the self’s reflective openness to 
something that is beyond representation and that stands in a relationship of 
height to the self without annulling the absolute separation of its 
singularity. I have argued that there is a significant convergence of interests 
between Kant and Lévinas when it comes to how a free and critical mind 
can be open to something higher than itself which is beyond empirical 
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contingency but nevertheless has a positive role for experience. In the end, 
Kant’s account of aesthetic judgment relies on the world’s presumed 
shareability, i.e. on the assumed purposiveness of the whole of existence, 
and this indeterminate whole can be felt and aimed at in reflection, 
although it cannot be given an adequate representation. In a similar way, 
trust and distrust appear to require the presumption of the world’s overall 
purposiveness or shareability, because only when this very minimal and 
formal community is in place can we sensibly assume something about the 
other’s character in relation to us. I have argued that Lévinas must as a 
minimum concede to a presumed and content-wise indeterminable world in 
order to explain how we, despite the radical otherness of the others, are 
responsible for acting in their best interest, indeterminate as our grasp of 
the content of that must remain. Lévinas speaks of a disinterest that is not 
indifferent, and I argue that we must indeed assume the ethical 
responsiveness of others as well as of ourselves, which is a certain formal, 
asymmetrical, and non-reciprocitory communality. He calls this a 
necessary betrayal of saying because it takes the liberty of presuming 
something about the absolute otherness of the other, and my aim with 
chapters three and four was to give a positive account of the possible 
ethicality of such a necessary betrayal.  
The necessity of the presumed shareability of the world is manifest in the 
biographical accounts of torture survivors, inasmuch as their choice of 
words highlights the difference between trust, distrust, and lack of trust. 
Finally, then, I conclude that (VI) lack of trust signifies a disturbed 
intersubjective relatedness (or other-disturbance). Torture’s particular 
harmfulness comes from the fact that it targets the person as such: the 
physical destruction aims at destroying the will and self of the victim, and 
the means for reaching that aim is the perverted intersubjective intimacy 
that is the very essence of torture. By violating the fundamental 
responsivity of the victim, the torturer severely impairs the possibility of 
believing in a shared meaningful world. The importance of the 
intersubjective connectedness, arising from the non-anticipatory pure 
passivity of the self, is evident in how its devastation leads to a sense of 
disorientation, alienation, and self-estrangement. If we cannot presume the 
minimal sharedness of the world, i.e. the mutual responsivity of human 
beings, our reflections on the world do not furnish us with a sure sense of 
trust or distrust with regard to our fellow beings, but maintains our 
separation to the degree that a relation between us ceases to exist; existing 
in mutual disinterest and indifference, as it were.  
Moreover, the thesis may also be perceived as a contribution to the 
interpretation of Lévinas’ philosophy. My reading emphasizes that critique 
and reflection are inherent in the ethical relationship and accentuated how 
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understanding emerges from ethics without entirely abandoning fidelity to 
the unrepresentable nature of alterity. In proximity, the beginning of 
knowledge can be found, occasioned by alterity’s interruption of a self-
coincident self and subjected to this interruption. Interpreted in this 
manner, Lévinas is not concerned solely with making explicit the 
possibility and reality of the ethical relationship, but also with explaining 
how knowledge may emerge from ethics without overtaking it or 
supplanting the ethical relationship with one of objective cognition. It is 
this form of understanding – originating in proximity and in the 
unrepresentability of obligation – that I term basic reflectivity, defining it 
as the self’s fundamental mode of world-relatedness and as the place of 
origin for trust and distrust. Although my aim has been to provide 
satisfactory textual evidence for my reading throughout, it can of course be 
challenged and criticized, and I could, e.g., imagine that my attempt to 
further develop Lévinas’ philosophy with the use of Kant’s terminology 
may puzzle some or even be found to run counter to the spirit of Lévinas’ 
thinking. I do, however, find that a case can be made for the necessity of 
explicating the movement from saying to the said, so to speak, and that 
doing so, one must engage with the language of understanding and 
knowledge. In the third Critique Kant analyses the various aspects of the 
experience of beauty, and the phenomenology of the beautiful that results 
seems remarkably sensitive, in a very similar manner to Lévinas, to the 
indeterminacy of certain forms of understanding and to the positive role 
that the felt receding presence of the supersensible has for experience. 
5.3 Implications for further research 
To round off the thesis I would like to remark on two avenues for further 
research. First, I find that philosophy, and, in particular, phenomenology, 
has much to offer in a sustained investigation of the situation of torture 
survivors. One important aim would be to provide new insights into the 
mental health sequelae of torture through a phenomenological analysis of 
the, often disturbing, existential paradoxes confronting the torture survivor, 
some of which were touched upon in chapter two. Longitudinal studies of 
mental health in tortured refugees indicate that many remain highly 
symptomatic despite treatment (Carlsson et al. 2010; Lie 2002; Steel et al. 
2002; Vaage et al. 2010; Silove et al. 2002; Hinton et al. 1997). Due to the 
complexity of the trauma of torture, an improvement of the effect of 
existing treatment approaches would be greatly helped along with an 
interdisciplinary investigation into the nature of the symptomatic picture, 
and philosophy may contribute in this important endeavour. On the basis of 
this thesis I would venture the hypothesis that the pervasive sense of self-
estrangement that torture survivors describe is central to the paradoxes 
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facing rehabilitation, and that a more comprehensive understanding of the 
torture survivor’s subjective experience of self-estrangement (as well as of 
the experiences of isolation, ontological solitude, and loss of meaning) 
could significantly improve our understanding of the task that faces the 
individual in rehabilitation, and complement existing treatment approaches. 
By making the contemporary philosophical understanding of selfhood 
useful for rehabilitation research, phenomenology must engage in an 
interdisciplinary discussion from which it has much to gain as well. In 
particular, I expect that we can further the understanding of 
intersubjectivity’s significance for self-constitution in a way which is both 
informative for and a challenge to current discussion of e.g. social 
cognition. Consequently, a second avenue for further research concerns the 
phenomenology of selfhood, where I suggest that the equiprimordial nature 
of reason and responsibility merits further attention. A hypothesis would be 
that some features of the self (i.e. a self that is capable of experience, 
thought and action) arise only with the co-presence of the other, wherefore 
it is not accurate to presume a pre-existing self before and as the grounds 
for the encounter with the other. Systematic attention to this issue would 
naturally integrate other aspects of selfhood that I have omitted to treat in 
the length that they deserve, e.g. embodiment and temporality. In short, I 
suggest that a sustained philosophical interest in the nature of trust and 
distrust is fruitful for the phenomenological and existential development of 
the other’s significance for selfhood. 
 
Summary 
The thesis consists of an analysis of the phenomena of trust and distrust and 
a detailed discussion of their significance for ethical selfhood. The duality 
of the title – Trust and Ethical Selfhood – expresses the duality of the 
investigation, which seeks to explain the manner in which the self is related 
to the other in trust and distrust. The analysis of trust accordingly serves as 
a method for clarifying what it means that selfhood is essentially a matter 
of being responsible – to oneself, the other, and the world. Similarly, the 
investigation of selfhood provides a framework for the discussion of the 
phenomenon of trust. 
The framework for the investigation is the phenomenological-existential 
philosophy of Emmanuel Lévinas, in combination with Hannah Arendt and 
Immanuel Kant, and the overall thesis is that trust and distrust are part of 
how we orient ourselves morally in the world because they express a way 
of understanding and responding to others and to a social situation in an 
irreducibly ethical register.  
In the first chapter I engage critically with the philosophy of trust, which 
falls into two overall groups favouring either a cognitive or strategic view 
or an affective and basic view of trust. Building on the analytic insights of 
both positions I venture to suggest that when we trust and distrust, we are 
engaging with the world in a critically reflective manner that differs from 
pure affectivity but is also not primarily or essentially of a cognitive nature. 
It is a form of understanding that comes from the self’s responsiveness to 
the moral quality of a situation, and which is here termed basic reflectivity. 
The second chapter contains an analysis of autobiographical accounts of 
torture survivors and a detailed discussion of the significance of trust and 
the lack of trust for their existence. It emerges that there is a correlation 
between lack of trust and a sense of alienation, disorientation, and self-
estrangement, and on this basis I suggest that trust depends on a basic 
connectedness to others, here termed basic reflectivity, that enables shared 
meaning and orientation and without which the person experiences 
disorientation and fragmentation of meaning. Chapter three aims to 
establish an account of the self and of the intersubjective relationship that 
can accommodate the phenomenological and conceptual characteristics 
identified in the first two chapters. It emerges that the self cannot be 
defined independently of and prior to the trust analysis, but is implicated by 
it. The self does not constitute the independent variable grounding the 
investigation of its relatedness to others and to the world in terms of 
trusting and distrusting, but is itself in question. To be a self is to be 
actively engaged in making sense of experience and in self-critically taking 
responsibility for this sense-making, and chapter three argues that trust and 
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distrust are expressions of this reflectivity that is basic to selfhood. Chapter 
four makes a case for using Kant’s faculty of aesthetic judgment, read 
through a Lévinasian lens, as a model for basic reflectivity, i.e. for the way 
the self relates to the world through trusting and distrusting.  
In conclusion, I argue that the intersubjective relationship’s unfolding in 
trust or distrust has a discriminatory aspect that grows out of responsibility 
and obligation and is consequently inherently ethical. When I trust or 
distrust someone it represents an evaluation of the other’s character, and it 
is in this sense that the feeling is called orientational: it is a way of 
understanding the ethical import of a situation. I define trust and distrust as 
part of our social orientation because they are expressions of a 
fundamentally ethical mode of experience in which we understand 
something about the other in a way that affirms our absolute separation and 
irreducible singularity while at the same time binding us together in the 
responsibility that one person has for the other and for the shared world.  
Resumé 
Formålet med afhandlingen er at analysere og diskutere tillid og mistillid 
som fænomener, der gør det muligt for os at orientere os i den sociale 
virkelighed. Ved at vælge fænomenologien som udgangspunkt retter jeg 
blikket mod det enkelte menneskets oplevelse af at stå i et tillids- eller 
mistillidsforhold til at andet menneske med henblik på at afsøge 
oplevelsens forskellige aspekter. Der er således tale om at åbne en 
diskussion om, hvad tillid og mistillid er og kan være for et menneske, og, 
gennem en filosofisk analyse, præsentere et (foreløbigt) bud.  
Med udgangspunkt i en analyse of tillid og mistillid præsenterer 
afhandlingen en dybdegående diskussion af disse fænomeners betydning 
for det etiske selv. Titlens korrelerende termer – Tillid og det Etiske Selv – 
udtrykker afhandlingens dobbelte fokus, idet undersøgelsen af, hvordan 
selvet er relateret til den anden i tillid og mistillid videreudvikler 
forståelsen af begge termer. Analysen af tillid fungerer således som en 
metode til at afklare, hvad det vil sige, at selvets anliggende essentielt er 
ansvarlighed over for sig selv, den anden og den fælles verden; mens 
undersøgelsen af det etiske selv tilsvarende sætter en ramme for 
tillidsanalysen. Undersøgelsen anvender hovedsageligt Emmanuel Lévinas’ 
fænomenologisk-eksistentielle filosofi, men også Hannah Arendt og 
Immanuel Kant bidrager væsentligt. Hovedtesen er, at tillid og mistillid er 
en del af vor moralske orienteringsevne, fordi de er udtryk for, at vi forstår 
og forholder os til vore medmennesker og den sociale verden i en 
irreducibelt etisk modus. 
I kapitel et præsenteres en kritisk analyse af den eksisterende tillidsfilosofi, 
som kan opdeles i to overordnede grupper alt efter om der gives præference 
til et kognitivt og strategiske eller et affektivt og elementært tillidsbegreb. 
Med udgangspunkt i de to positioners analytiske indsigter defineres tillid 
og mistillid indledningsvist som udtryk for, at vi forholder os kritisk 
refleksivt til vor omverden på en inhærent etisk facon, som manifesterer 
mere end blot den enkeltes vilkårlige inklinationer, samtidig med at den 
væsentligt ikke er kognitivt funderet. Der er tale om en form for forståelse, 
som har sin oprindelse i selvets responsivitet over for situationens etiske 
beskaffenhed, og som i afhandlingen gives navnet elementær refleksivitet. 
Med afsæt i en analyse af selvbiografiske fortællinger fra torturoverlevere 
foretages i kapitel to en indgående diskussion af den betydning, som tillid 
og tillidstab har for livet efter tortur, og der argumenteres for en 
sammenhæng mellem tillidstab og følelsen af desorientering, ensomhed, og 
selvfremmedgørelse. På dette grundlag foreslås det, at følelsen af tillid eller 
mistillid hviler på en elementær mellemmenneskelig forbundethed – som er 
et træk ved den elementære refleksivitet – uden hvilken den enkelte oplever 
218 Resumé 
 
sig som desorienteret i fragmenteret verden. Tabet af tillid er således også 
et meningstab. Formålet med kapitel tre er at redegøre for selvet og det 
intersubjektive forhold, og dermed for den foreslåede mellemmenneskelige 
forbundethed, på en måde, der kan forklare de fænomenologiske og 
begrebslige egenskaber ved tillid og mistillid, som blev fremsat i kapitel et 
og to. Her fremgår det, at selvet ikke kan defineres uafhængigt af og forud 
for afhandlingens tillidsanalyse, men inddrages i og udfordres af den. 
Selvet udgør ikke undersøgelsens uafhængige variabel, der så kan lægges 
til grund for det videre arbejde med at forklare dets relation til andre og til 
en fælles verden i tillid og mistillid, men er i høj grad anfægtet af 
undersøgelsen. Selvets væsen er at være aktivt engageret i at erfare, forstå 
denne erfaring samt tage ansvar forforståelsen, og kapitel tre argumenterer 
for, at tillid og mistillid udtrykker denne refleksivitet, som er elementær for 
selvet, og hvor forbundetheden til den anden er en væsentlig faktor. Kapitel 
fire introducerer Kants analyse af den æstetiske dømmekraft og 
argumenterer for, at en Lévinasiansk diskussion af den kantianske 
dømmekraft kan fungere som model for den elementære refleksivitet, det 
vil sige for den måde, selvet forholder sig til verden i tillid og mistillid. I 
kapitel fem konkluderes det, at der er et element af diskrimination eller 
dømmekraft i det forhold, selvet har til andre i tillid og mistillid, og at et 
sådant forhold i sig selv er etisk, fordi det har sin oprindelse i den 
forpligtelse og ansvarlighed, jeg har over for den anden. En persons tillid 
eller mistillid repræsenterer en evaluering af den andens karakter, og er i 
den forstand et orienteringsredskab, fordi det er en måde, hvorpå den 
enkelte kan forstå den etiske betydning af det, der sker. Jeg definerer 
således tillid og mistillid som elementer af en social og moralsk 
orienteringsevne, fordi de udtrykker en etisk form for erfaring, hvor vi 
forstår noget om de andre på en måde, der bekræfter vor absolutte 
adskillelse og irreducible singularitet, alt imens den binder os sammen i det 
ansvar, den enkelte har for den anden og for en fælles verden.  
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